disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory
Volume 28 Affect

Article 1

12-2019

Volume 28: Affect
Robby Hardesty
University of Kentucky

Alina Hechler
University of Kentucky

DOI: https://doi.org/10.13023/disclosure.28

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/disclosure
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License.

Recommended Citation
Hardesty, Robby and Hechler, Alina (2019) "Volume 28: Affect," disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory:
Vol. 28, Article 1.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13023/disclosure.28
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/disclosure/vol28/iss1/1

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory. Questions
about the journal can be sent to disclosurejournal@gmail.com

eiSSN: 2332-9246
ISSN: 1055-6133
disClosure Editors
213 Patterson Office Tower
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506-0027

https: I I uknowledge. uky.edul disclosure
https:l lwww.as.uky.edulsocialtheory
https:I I www.facebook.coml disClosureatUKY
https: I I www. twitter. com I disClosureatUKY

The 2018-19 Editorial Collective is pleased to present the 28th volume of disClosure: A Journal of
Social Theory. Our inspiration for this odd bundle of pages is rooted in the aesthetic of the
self-printed zine. While we regret that we couldn't sneak into Miller Hall in the middle of the
night to guerrilla-copy the entire issue on a late-80s black-and-white Xerox, we are proud to say
that each page of this volume was assembled entirely by hand. Every page is bordered or
backgrounded by collages: these are pages that peel and flake, assembled from bits and pieces
cut up and rearranged- not dissimilar, we believe, from how "knowledge" itself is made. The
articles were printed off a wheezing home office Canon, cut on a crooked paper cutter,
positioned and re-positioned on desks and bedroom floors, glued and taped, and (often, indeed,
under the cover of night) finally scanned into the openly available and infinitely replicable
digital artifact you find here.

In pursuing our vision of the scholarly zine, we have been galvanized by the work of Kara
Keeling, who in Queer Times , Black Futures (2019) lays out what she calls a "politics of opacity." If
we want the future to look different than the present, she says, we must disrupt the
perpetuation of stable, predictable, and expected futures by becoming unrecognizable. This
means proceeding with an indifference to dominant modes of signification and articulating
alternate conceptions of the world that may be incomprehensible to common sense ways of
doing things. In this volume of disClosure, we want to put this politics into action, and make our
own intervention into what an "academic journal," and scholarship more broadly, can look like.

We mean this literally. Scholarship today, more often than not, is framed by the strict square of
the PDF viewer and the standard template of the "knowledge product." We wish to offer a
re-framing. We believe that a creative impulse lies at the root of all scholarship - a creative
impulse too often dulled and denied in the interest of sober, self-censored, scientific products. In
surrounding the words of these authors with color and the kilter of the hand, we hope to
foreground and to highlight this drive that foments our knowledge, and aspires to such ideals
as beauty and truth. As a scaffold, then, these slanting columns are meant to confound the
standard square. This is knowledge production let loose: scholarship askew.

With this slim volume, we join forces with countless other publications in prying open the seals
of academic publishing, continuing the collective push that will eventually tip scholarship into
unrecognizability, and therefore into a more open and inclusive future. Into what might an
unabashedly creative scholarship begin to bloom? On what might "knowledge" come to rest?

The articles and interviews contained herein aim precisely at these questions of possibility-- the
forces that let it fly, and those that reign it in. "Affect" is a slippery concept, and the diverse
pieces assembled in this volume explore the range of modalities through which it can be
thought: from the extraordinary contained within the banal to the lingering residues of
historical trauma; from the mood of global discourse to the sensations of streaming TV; from the
atmospheres rooted into place to the fleeting experiences of the street; from intimate relations to
the anti-colonial potentials of poetry; from the body itself to the collectives we comprise .

.#"K c·~.,. From all this, taking this collection as a whole, we begin to suspect that knowledge itself is
.•... ~.,,.~•..,.,.._ ... perhaps little more than a quivering potentiality: a feeling. And rather than pump it out to ship
,....,,,.-=~t..~~~ in ready-made boxes, fitted into reusable frames, faster than we could ever consume, we will
slow it down, open it up, seize it by the ears, and not be afraid to call it what it has always been:
a creative act, a work of art.
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We'd first like to thank University of Kentuc}<y professors Arnold Parr (Philosophy), Dierdra
Reber (Hispanic Studies), Anna Secor (Geography, now at Durham University), Sharon Yam
(Writing, Rhetoric, and Digital Studies), and Charlie Zhang (Gender and Women's Studies),
who designed and led the Social Theory Seminar on Affect in the Spring of 2018. The present
volume sprang from that course, and we would not be here without their expertise and vision.
In sharing their knowledge and prodding us to think about affect in a critical, intersectional, and
interdisciplinary manner, they laid the groundwork that made this journal possible.

We were blessed to be able to spend time with three distinguished scholars who were invited to
'77-~~ the University of Kentucky for the Committee on Social Theory's Spring Lecture Series, Drs.
e::.rn'Ail Deborah Gould, Brian Massumi, and Shannon Sullivan. In addition, we also had the distinct
pleasure of conversing with the Fall of 2018 Social Theory Distinguished Speaker, Dr. Ann
.,.
Stoler. We are thankful to all four of these scholars for so generously sharing their time and
expertise as they sat with us for lengthy interviews, and for their enlightening and enlivening
inputs to the present issue. Their interviews show why affect studies is indispensable for
understanding our contemporary world.

JrS

We also want to extend a special thank you to Dr. Michael Samers, who provided invaluable
guidance as the editorial collective's faculty advisor. He offered crucial advice throughout the
entire process, especially as we fielded submissions and navigated the peer review process for
the first time.

We are grateful for the backing of the University of Kentucky's Committee on Social Theory and
the work of Interim Director Dr. Michael Samers and Program Director Dr. Tad Mutersbaugh.
Without the enormous efforts of administrators Lori Tyndall and Eva Hicks and Social Theory
Research Assistant Emily Kaufman, organizing and advertising events, managing travel plans,
reserving space, and ensuring the smooth functioning of the Committee's operations, none of
this would be possible. We are the privileged beneficiaries of their unsung labor. The thoughtful
guidance of Adrian Ho, Director of Digital Scholarship at UK Libraries, has kept disClosure
running though its frequently bumpy transition periods, and we are grateful for his presence
and his aid from start to finish.
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Sophonie Bazile, who served as the editor-in-chief for the 27th volume of disClosure, graciously
shared her experiences and materials with us, and answered our many questions. We would
have been lost without her. We reserve a special, heartfelt thanks to Meredith Wadlington, for
her unflagging encouragement and unflinching spirit through the many moments when the
going got tough. Her support was a great source of strength. Last but not least, we want to
thank the authors whose work on affect you find in these pages, not only for their brilliant
contributions, but also for their patience ahd good cheer as we stumbled through this long and
ever-lengthening process. They are why this volume exists, and we are excited to share their
work with you.

Ruwen Chang is a PhD Candidate in the department of Gender and Women's Studies at the
University of Kentucky. Her research interests include biopower, posthumanism, reproductive
justice, and transnational feminism. Ruwen's dissertation project examines the interaction
between the legibility of personhood and stratified reproduction in contemporary China by
investigating three cases: suzhi ~fPJ: (quality), zuo yuezi ~Fl-T (postpartum bedrest), and
guanggun )l[;~tE (involuntary bachelorhood). Currently, she is preparing to defend her
dissertation proposal and to start her year-long fieldwork in China.

He studies

Ian Spangler is a failed musician, aspiring playwright, and current PhD student in Geography
at the University of Kentucky. His research has explored the uneven forms of value capture
introduced by platform urbanism and how the emerging proptech sector transforms and
restructures the practice of transacting real estate in the US context. More recently, he has
become interested in the spatial politics of sweat data. He is a morning person, but only at
night, and greatly despises fluorescent lighting.

Feel-Sad TV: Sadness Pornography in
Contemporary Serials

This article develops a theory of sadness pornographies in contemporary feel-sad television. Under
the sad porn category, the essay explores a key sub-genre in contemporary serial dramas: trauma
porn. The article is anchored in an affective analysis of two contemporary serials: Amazon's
Transparent and NBC's This Is Us, both of which center multigenerational, familial trauma. Through
a combined Berlantian and Spinozist optic, the essay attends to various episodes from the two
serials to illuminate the phenomenon of trauma porn in current feel-sad media. In this reading, the
essay considers how Spinoza's understandings of the temporality of affect relate to the particular
temporalities of traumatic TV in its streaming and broadcast formats. In the analytic process, the
article constructs a speculative spectator, who craves feel-sad media to affectively self-reproduce to emotionally endure - in the face of current workspaces' managed non-catharsis. The essay
concludes with a theory of sad-joy, framed by Spinoza's affective schema, to dramatize a singularly
contemporary mode of purgation, one which succeeds classical and modern theories of cathartic
tragedy.

Bl~ke Karsten Beave: is a PhD student in the Graduate Program in Literature at Duke University.

H1s. research spans f1ln: and media studies, affect theory, feminism, and queer theory. His current
proJect explores questions of emotional realism, ecstatic affect, and feminist politics in the
contemporary docusoap. Contact: blake.beaver@duke.edu

© 2019 The Author(s). This is an open access article published under the terms of the Creativ,e Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https:/ I creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ 4.0/),
which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
that the original author(s) and the publication source are credited.

article's founding observation
states that sadness pornography constitutes a
vital genre of contemporary media production
and consumption. Urban Dictionary user
Brendogfox describes sad porn as media "that
exists
for
the
sole
purpose
of
making people feel deep sadness. Usually there
is no sexual theme, yet like regular porn, some
people seem to get off on it" (2016). Sad porn
constellates a network of exemplary sub-genres,
each of which are defined and circumscribed by
sorrowful affects. Prominent examples include
disability, inspiration, and as we will observe
most closely, trauma porn.
The pornography in sad porn designates
an ironic tone. Oxford English Dictionary defines
pornography as "the explicit description or
exhibition of sexual subjects or activity in
literature, painting, films, etc., in a manner
intended to stimulate erotic rather than
aesthetic feelings ." Although sad porn does not
necessarily represent the sexual, it does require
from the spectator an erotic attachment to
unhappy depressive, solemn, and/ or mournful
viewing affects. I describe these attachments as
erotic because they mediate a relation of passion
and amorousness (rather than one of genital
and other erogenous pleasures) in / to the
1
emotional labors of televisual consumption. In
this way, the metaphoric nature of pornography
in "sad porn" figures a desirous drive for sad
media similar to traditional pornography's
erotic force, while maintaining the full sincerity
of sadness. Said another way, the descriptor sad
porn may be tongue-in-cheek, but the actual
emotional turbulences of its viewership - sad
porn - represent genuine sorrow. Sadness
pornography as a genre marks an erotic
attachment to feelings of sadness when viewing
contemporary television.
In imagining sadness pornography as a
genre, I think with Lauren Berlant's revaluation
of the term. With Berlant, I argue for sad porn
as an overarching "aesthetic structure" across

televisual mediation that creates "affective
expectations" of joyful sadness (2008, 4). As we
will see in a discussion of representative serials'
relation to the contemporary emotive spectator,
the sad porn genre "brackets structural and
historical antagonism" by providing spaces of
affective intensity closely interlinked with the
saturated
yet
administered
affects
of
contemporary labor, affects upon which
businesses capitalize at the same time as they
prohibit a threshold of cathartic intensity,
whether in the corporate workspace, the retail
store, or sites of gig-economic production. The
sad porn genre generates viewers' desirous
attachments to feeling powerful through feeling
disempowered. Moreover, sad porn manages
moods of political powerlessness in the
governed non-catharsis of contemporary labor
environments.
In heavily invoking the concept of
genre, I aim to do justice to sad porn's
moving-image genealogy. Regarding the
sad -pornographic serial's televisual lineage, we
should look to Michael Z. Newman and Elana
Levine (2012), who trace the contemporary
primetime serial drama, perhaps the most
lauded mode of television programming in the
convergent era, back to its primary
serial-narrative predecessor: the daytime soap
opera. For Newman and Levine, soap operas'
vanguard approach to "long-form, novelistic
storytelling" is both co-opted and erased in
legitimating discourses that inform the
cinematization of contemporary, high-culture
television. Moreover, for Newman and Levine,
the legitimation of current serials at the expense
of soap operas' denigration poses anti-feminist
and anti-feminine consequences (82). One
strategy for distancing serial dramas from their
soap operatic precursors is to manage seriality's
temporality. As soap operas are historically
associated with non-endings, narrative gaps,
and the modes of feminine fantasy that the
2
"forbidden gap" and "illicit non-ending entail,
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Thus, I distinguish between the sexual and the
erotic, here, based on the latter 's associations with
passion and love.

For a discussion of the relationship between soaps'
narrative form and feminine political aesthetics, see
Martha Nochimson (1992), No End to Her: Soap Opera

primetime serials impose endings "to keep that
seriality and its associations with feminized
excess from overrunning the narrative" (92).
Newman and Levine's generalization, however,
may not prove so simple. Exemplary primetime
and streaming serial dramas in the current
moment nurture the feminized and affectively
charged never-ending-ness of soaps in what we
will observe as their multi-generationally
traumatic and temporally layered narratives. In
the case of Transparent and This Is Us, the
"forbidden gap" of trauma sustains seriality
and the political-narrative potential such
seriality awards.
As part of a filmic lineage, sadness
pornography's soap operatic roots reach back
even further to a cinematic forebearer: the
melodramatic "weepie." Linda Williams (1991)
predicts sadness pornography and sad-joy in
her articulation of the affiliation between
pornography
and
melodrama
as
and
interpenetrating,
excessive,
gross,
sensational genres. In Williams's argument, the
relationship
between
pornography
and
melodrama is complex. Pornography and
melodrama share an excessive and sensational
status in their imaging of gratuitous sex and
emotion; in their treatment of "the spectacle of a
body caught in the grip of intense sensation or
emotion"; and in their emphasis on forms of
ecstasy and the ecstatic body, primarily a
feminine body "beside herself" in pleasure or
overwhelming sadness (4) . For Williams and
myself, what appears to be most gratuitous in
porn, melodrama, and sad porn, by extension,
is the mimetic relationship of the viewer to
representations
of
ecstatic
affect.
The
her
sad-pornographic
spectator,
like
melodramatic and pornographic predecessors,
rapturous body onscreen.
mirrors
the
Furthermore,
for
Williams,
melodrama
functions as a meta-genre encompassing the
unique forms of excess and grossness at play in
pornography and weepies. This aligns with my
insight that sadness pornography operates as a
and the Female Subject, Berkeley, CA: University of

California Press, in particular 35-6.

parallel meta-genre, one
sub-genres like disability, inspiration, and
trauma porn in
its pleasurably sad
representational and spectatorial strategies. As
a "problem-solving cultural form," what I
would term melo-porn or porno-drama in
Williams's analysis alerts us to the unique social
and political-economic complications that
sadness pornography aims to disentangle:
namely, a situation of affectively suffused yet
non-cathartic labor in the workspace. This
emotional labor in the workplace then
implicates scenes of spectatorial emotion
management in pornographic weeping at home
or on mobile devices, with each viewing
situation mediated by various televisual and/ or
digital representations and technologies.
Under the sad porn meta-genre, I wish
to explore a key sub-structure of aesthetic
expectation. In television, across broadcast and
digital channels, sadness pornography emerges
in serial dramas, particularly centered around
the (ab)normal family, through what I and
others call trauma porn. I anchor this article in
an affective analysis of two contemporary
serials, Amazon's Transparent and NBC's This Is
Us, both of which represent multigenerational,
familial trauma. I read various episodes from
the two serials to illuminate the phenomenon of
trauma porn in current feel-sad TV. In this
reading, I consider how Benedict de Spinoza's
understandings of the temporality of affect
relate to the particular temporalities of
traumatic TV, both in its streaming and
broadcast formats. In this analytic process, I
construct a speculative spectator, who
embodies
the
emotional
dialectic
of
contemporary capital, torn between cathartic
(sad-pornographic, purgative, unmanaged) and
non-cathartic
(capitalized,
administered,
supervised) affects. Finally, I conclude with a
theory of sad-joy, framed by Spinoza's affective
schema, as a contemporary rev1s1on of
Aristotle's catharsis and Hume's tragedy. By
sad-joy, I suggest a dialectical vacillation of the
mind in which the ambivalent tension of feeling
sadness economizes joy. Sad-joy expresses a
paradigmatic affect in recent mediation, one

which greases the emotional survival of the
contemporary laborer as televisual spectator.
The relationship between sadness and
trauma, and consequently sad porn and trauma
porn, appears convoluted and deserves close
consideration. In my analysis, trauma porn is
necessarily a sub-genre of the mediatic
meta-genre sadness porn, and we could think of
the broader relationship between trauma and
sadness similarly. Thus, I imagine sadness as an
overarchingly bad affective genre, a meta-ugly
feeling (following Sianne Ngai), that forms an
affective-aesthetic umbrella under which
variously unhappy and grieving emotions fall.
If trauma articulates states of intense psychic
upset caused by equally intense emotional
wounding, then trauma's constitutive upset
(and the interrelated grief and unhappiness
associated with such injury) could be thought
of as categorically circumscribed by sadness as
an affective meta-genre.
Turning to the issue of contemporary
TV's traumatic narrativity, I look toward
current television programs such as Netflix's
Orange Is the New Black (OITNB) for context, a
series that has received backlash for what many
critics call its traumatic pornographies. One
headline reads, "Orange Is the New Black Is
Trauma Porn Written for White People." In said
article, Ashleigh Shackelford voices grief about
the "exploitation and voyeurism" of black pain
"on a platter for the world to gawk at and
consume" (2016). Critics link OITNB's trauma
porn to the spectacle of black death in police
murders and associated historical atrocities.
Shackleford continues, "Sociohistorically, we
have seen white people aroused and
grotesquely infatuated with the violence and
exploitation of our bodies, pain and agency."
On the violent murder of OITNB character
Poussey, who is strangled to death by a prison
guard, Shamira Ibrahim (2016) writes, "Her
lifeless body [was] left on the cafeteria floor for
what seems like days, in scenes clearly drawing
from the painful tragedies of Eric Garner and
Michael Brown." These criticisms provide
necessary context for imagining how the
viewer's enjoyment of trauma porn is linked to

histories of racialized, sexualized, and gendered
violence. These criticisms also speak to the
legacies of transgenerational trauma in black
3
and queer communities. Thus, in my reading
of sad-pornographic TV, I suggest that
multigenerational
trauma
accounts
for
numerous identity formations and identity
histories.
Amazon's
Transparent
exemplifies
trauma pornography in a queer-trans modality.
The serial focuses on the Pfefferman family in
contemporary Los Angeles as children Sarah,
Josh, and Ali, and ex-wife Shelley, live in the
wake of their father and ex-husband Maura's
coming out as a transgender woman. The initial
trauma of coming out constellates a network of
sub-traumas. In season one, episode four
("Moppa"), we learn that Josh's college-age
babysitter Rita sexually abused him while
sustaining an exploitative age-differential
relationship for several years (Fitzerman-Blue et
al., 2014). In season one, episode eight ("Best
New Girl"), we observe Ali's abandonment by
her parents at thirteen years of age, when they
3

For examples of scholarship concerning black
transgenerational trauma, see Anderson J. Franklin,
Nancy Boyd-Franklin, and Shalonda Kelly (2009),
"Racism and Invisibility: Race-Related Stress,
Emotional Abuse and Psychological Trauma for
People of Color," Journal of Emotional Abuse 6(2-3):
9-30; Gilda Graff (2017), "The Intergenerational
Trauma of Slavery and its Aftereffects: The Question
of Reparations," The Journal of Psychohistory 44(4):
256-268; Jennifer L. Griffiths (2009), Traumatic
Possessions: The Body and Memory in African American
Women's Writing and Performance, Charlottesville,
VA: University of Virginia Press; Janice P. Gump
(2010), "Reality Matters: The Shadow of Trauma on
African
American
Subjectivity," Psychoanalytic
Psychology 27(1): 42-54; and Gabriele Schwab
(2010), Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and
Transgenerational Trauma, New York: Columbia
University Press. For a seminal example of queer
transgenerational trauma, see Ann Cvetkovich's
writings on the gendered-sexualized traumas of
butch-femme cultures and cycles of incest:
Cvetkovich (2003), An Archive of Feelings: Trauma,
Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.

allow Ali to cancel her Bat Mitzvah against her
best interest, ending in a troubling set of scenes
in which Ali hitchhikes to the beach only to be
sexually propositioned by an older man
(Bedard and Soloway, 2014). In season two,
episode three ("New World Coming"), we view
an erotic fantasy in which Sarah partakes,
featuring Sarah masturbating to flashbacks of
her high school disciplinarian (Soloway and
Heller, 2015). Finally, in season three, episode
eight ("If I Were a Bell"), we see twelve-year-old
Maura dressing up as a girl and consequently
shamed by her grandfather; in the same
episode, we realize the psychic fallout of
twelve-year-old Shelley after she is sexually
abused by her music teacher (Our Lady J and
Arnold, 2016).
Beyond a content analysis, I want to
think through the unique modes of streaming
television as they facilitate forms of
multitemporal trauma and screen-intimacy. In
Ali's trauma ("Best New Girl"), the majority of
the episode features the past. Toward the end of
the episode, young Ali dances with an older
man she meets at the beach against a
background of tango music, intercut with shots
of Maura similarly dancing at a camp for
cross-dressing women. Both events occur in
1994. Ali and the older man begin to wrestle as
Maura and her dancing partner get physically
more turbulent and intimate. Then, when Ali's
traumatic event is coming to a head, we observe
present-day Ali overlooking her younger self,
making eye contact with the preying older man.
We then cut to younger Ali approaching the
pair, grabbing the man by the shoulder as the
camera tracks to a shot of adult Ali and the man
kissing, with younger Ali, behind the man,
continuing to tug at his overalls.
In an almost inverse narrative device,
toward the end of "New World Coming," we
view Ali's older sister Sarah gazing
depressively out the window of her new
apartment (Sarah's separation from her
husband, caused by her cheating with,
marrying, and then divorcing her college
girlfriend, has ousted Sarah from the family
home). The camera cuts to a reverse shot, in

which we see Sarah's high school disciplinarian
"Mr. Irons" at the other end of the apartment;
another cut presents Sarah matching Mr. Irons's
eye contact. The following reverse shot images
Mr. Irons in the hallways of Sarah's high school.
Similar to the episode with Ali, changes in
lighting technique and color correction perform
most of the work of designating another
historical period. The scene then continues to
intercut between the high school and Sarah's
apartment, featuring teenage Sarah walking
down the high school's hallways toward the
disciplinarian's office; next a subjective shot
that pans across the placard on Mr. Irons's door.
The shots get tighter as Sarah and Mr. Irons
converge at her apartment table, finally
including the two in the same medium
close-up. Sarah bends over the table to be
spanked, while a subsequent over-the-shoulder
shot represents her younger selfat the far end
of the apartment overseeing the scene.
Reminding us of Williams's feminine body in
melo-pornographic or porno-dramatic ecstasy,
the sound of the paddle hitting Mr. Irons's hand
gets progressively louder and quicker as Sarah
reaches climax.
I identify in these two examples a
complex of sexual-traumatic temporalities: 1994
and the present; high school and now; confused
generationalities of primary characters; and
self-gazes
and
self-pleasures
in
the
contemporary and past. What is unique about
platforms like Amazon are their streaming
formats and "binge-watching" conducts,
engendering something more akin to five-hour
films
(comprised
of ten thirty-minute
"episodes") than the discrete episodic format of
broadcast TV. Furthermore, the streaming
format can allow a more intimate contact
between viewer and screen, often watched on
laptops, mobile phones, and tablets rather than
on the traditional television set and its
contemporary smart capabilities. I suggest that
these
multigenerational,
traumatic
temporalities are a characteristic feature of
feel-sad TV and televisual sad-joy, in which
present-day characters and their proxy viewers
can only process sexual hang-ups and erotic

frustrations
through
an
interintra-generational sexual gaze and im intimate
Through
a
presentist
screen-contact.
temporality of streaming ("I can watch it all
now! The season is all now!") and vulnerable
screen-connection, Tran sparent moves toward a
unique force of sad-joy, in which the character
and viewer's increase of power in the present
relies on a presentism of past trauma.
Transparent's multigenerational trauma
speaks to the non-eternal temporality of
Spinoza's passions and the intensity of the
imagination as the mind regards a past ~r
future thing as present. For Spinoza, an affect IS
stronger if we imagine its cause as present and,
vice versa, an affect regarding a past or future
cause is weaker than a presentist affect. By
imagining a past trauma as present,
Transparent's characters and consequently the
viewer are affected more intensely. In
Tran sparent, the streaming affect of cathartic joy
and increase in power in the present relies on
an imagination of traumatic sadness as past and
present.
To
account
for
the
viewer's
sad-pornographic
relation
to
the
multi-generationally traumatic text, I risk a
speculative
spectator
based
on
t~e
contemporary
emotional
laborer.
Arlie
Hochschild's seminal study of flight attendants
and debt collectors in The Managed Heart (2012)
proves the thoroughgoing permeation of
emotional labor in the corporate workspace,
whether normatively affectively positive (the
flight attendant) or normatively affectively
negative (the debt collector). Though her study
focuses
on
middle-to-upper-middle-class
corporate laborers, we could glean from the
increasingly service-based economy a trend
toward swelling affective labor in variable
workspaces. I think here of professional
functions from fast food servers to Uber
drivers, whose "smiles" surely mimic the
pivotal example of Hochschild's beaming
stewardess. For example, take notice of Uber's
rating and tips systems, which measure drivers'
conversational capacity. Furthermore, note how
Uber employs a gradient of expressive faces

from fuming to overjoyed to gauge (and mirror)
customers' (dis)satisfaction with their service.
While Hochschild's flight attendant and
contemporary gig workers are pressured into
and authorized an at-times jarring smile, I
wager that they are never, under supervision,
encouraged to grin or laugh in manic or ecstatic
affect at customers and superiors. Thus, in my
speculation, and I argue in accordance with
Hochschild
and other affect theorists'
interpretations, the affective laborer is barred
from a level of emotional intensity that I name
catharsis. By this, I mean to communicate that,
in normatively affectively positive professional
functions (positions unlike Hochschild's debt
collector), the laborer is prevented a level of
both good- and bad-affective intensity: cackling
hysterically, screaming in anger at customers
and managers, crying in situations of client or
administrative harm, and so on. In this way, I
suggest that we conceive of the space of
contemporary affective labor as one of emotional

saturation without cathartic intensity.
A more recent example of such
non-cathartic intensity emerges in Berlant's
comments
concerning
the
exhaustive
destruction of contemporary Western service
labor. For Berlant, the combination of waning
social security and extending life expectancies
entails a situation of slow death, "the physical
wearing out of a population in a way that
points to its deterioration as a defining
condition of its experience and historical
existence" (2011, 95). Most simply, people live
longer, have fewer societal guarantees to cap
the length of their labor, and thus work longer
and die slower. It is Berlant's insight regarding
the affective conditions of slow death that
speaks to the contemporary emotive spectator
in my analysis. To counteract the condition of
slow death, of working longer and dying
slower, workers partake in moments of
"interruptive agency" - what Berlant variously
calls "self-suspension," "counter-dissipation,"
"self-abeyance," and "floating sideways" - in
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overeating. With Berlant, I
imagine sad-pornographic catharsis as an
analogous mode of emotional self-interruption,
a counter-agency- sideways and non-sovereign
- in which the emotive spectator achieves a
threshold of affective intensity fenced at work.
In feeling sad-joy, the emotive spectator
suspends herself in an antagonistically
emotional overindulgence beside and against
the under-authorization of emotion in the
workspace. It is no coincidence that the
contemporary rhetoric around excessive
spectatorship -particularly in the form of binge
watching - accords with the very example of
interruptive, lateral agency Berlant describes:
overeating.
Having
established
the
emotive
spectator of sad porn, I look to NBC's This Is Us,
which returns us to multigenerational trauma
and the political-economics of its affective
spectatorship. This Is Us follows the Pearson
family (adopted African-American son Randall;
biological twins Kate and Kevin; and parents
Rebecca and Jack) across multiple temporal
blocs: the many stages of the children's
upbringing, the ebbs and flows of Rebecca and
Jack's past marriage, and the contemporary
events of Randall, Kate, and Kevin's adulthood.
In season two, episode seventeen ("This Big,
Amazing, Beautiful Life"), we follow the
rollercoaster of Randall and wife Beth's foster
child Deja, as Deja and her struggling, young
mother (Shauna) endure poverty. However,
instead of Deja's plotline, I focus on the very
beginning of the episode, which features four
interlocking traumas, all births: Shauna's birth
of Deja; Rebecca's birth of twins Kate and
Kevin; Beth's birth of Randall's and Beth's first
daughter Tess; and the birth of Randall, whose
father leaves him at a fire station (that same day
4

Berlant also terms this "self-medication through
Overeating, as
self-interruption" (2011, 115-6).
opposed
to
over-drinking,
over-smoking,
over-injecting, and over-insulating, exemplifies slow
death in that "food is one of the few spaces of
controllable, reliable pleasure people have," and
"food is necessary to existence, part of the care of the
self, the reproduction of life" (Berlant 2011, 115).
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adopted by Jack and Rebecca, who lose their
third child in their triplets' delivery) (Oyegun
and Asher, 2018). I suggest that, by framing
Deja's multi-generationally traumatic plotlineracialized
poverty
experienced
across
generations -within four birthing traumas, the
writer and director provide the emotive
spectator with sad-pornographic generic cues.
The viewer can then attach to these cues in
passionate endurance from the episode's outset.
In This Is Us, which is aired and
consumed in a broadcast format, the presentist
joy of a past-and-present traumatic sadness
features a different presentist temporality: the
weeklong craving for a new episode and the
consumption of that episode as wholly now,
other episodes in the
discrete
from
season/ serial. Where Transparent requires a
weekend binge, This Is Us necessitates another
temporality of non-labor: the weekday night. In
the broadcast and streaming cases, feel-sad TV
programs nurture a distinct modality of
laboring passionate affect and increase in
power, either in the weekend splurge or the
weeknight reprieve. Necessarily, these scenes of
tragic-cathartic viewership materialize outside
such affectively inundated yet non-purgative
work environments.
The episodic catharsis of This Is Us, a
temporality of the only now, each time this week,
pairs with the form of the births' representation:
the temporal ubiquity and simultaneity of the
interlocking, traumatic deliveries. In the case of
both the viewing temporality and the birthing
temporality, episodic trauma-joy formulates as
an all now, only at this time, with week-long gaps
separating discrete episodes and discrete
historical periods demarcating the divided eras
of the births. The streaming format's "all now,
all at once" matches Transparent's traumatic
erotics of past and present, and the broadcast
TV format's "only now, each time this week"
dovetails with This Is Us's traumatic
simultaneity.
As a cold medium "high in participation
or completion by the audience" and high in
empathy television facilitates unique forms of
personal vulnerability in which an opposing

non-catharsis can be superseded
through affective intensity in the home
5
(McLuhan 1994, 23, 30). Writing on TV
melodrama and postmodern consumer culture,
Lynne Joyrich (1992) argues that "television
draws all of us, women and men, into a shared
bond of consumer overpresence and powerless
spectatorship as melodrama becomes the
preferred form for TV, the postmodern medium
par excellence" (228-9). While Joyrich writes in
the pre-streaming era and is concerned with the
postmodernization of melodrama (and the
melodramatization of postmodernity), I
continue to value the convergence of
"consumer overpresence" and "powerless
spectatorship" in Joyrich's argument, especially
as that convergence pertains to melodrama and
melodrama's generic sprawl across soap operas
and serials. Continuing my reading of
Transparent and This Is Us, the consumer
overpresence
to
which
Joyrich
refers
corresponds to Spinoza's understanding of the
increased intensity of affect under the
presentness of the affecting thing (in this case,
multigenerational trauma in contemporary TV
melodrama). Furthermore, the powerless
spectatorship
in
Joyrich's
formulation
corresponds to the feelings of social
helplessness that Berlant articulates in The
Female Complaint, wherein the feminine subject
experiences a juxta-positionality or asideness to
politics
with
consequent
feelings
of
political-affective
incapacity
(2008,
3).
Spectatorial powerlessness also
invokes
Spinoza' s understanding of sadness as a
fundamental loss of power, striving, action, and
virtue. In this vein, I suggest that this particular
junction of overpresence and powerlessness
trauma
porn's
also
characterizes
generic-aesthetic
structures
of
affective
5

Marshall McLuhan (1994), Understanding Media: The
Extensions of Man, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 23,
30. McLuhan's brief aside about a paradigmatic
affect in the electrical age, boredom, is also relevant
here. The cool corporate non-catharsis I explore in
this article is less a genre of anxiety than a genre of
boredom, a tedious feeling of affective non-intensity.
See McLuhan (1994, 26).

expectation. Furthermore, following Joyrich, I
wager that there is a gendered distribution in
the emotion management of erotic attachments
to feel-sad media: an affective labor often taken
in the home; "marked" by feminized passivity,
domesticity, and susceptibility; and a feminine
labor impossible in masculinist spaces of
managed non-catharsis.
I propose that the commonplace
fascination with traumatic, familial situations
on TV engenders unique feel-sad formats and
sad-joys that rely on a distinctive relationship
between the private and the professional. In my
notion of the contemporary emotive spectator,
the professional public has managed catharsis
out of the workplace and delegated purgation
completely to the domestic/mobile televisual
space. The exhaustion caused by labor's
inhibited catharsis leads to an excitation and
desire for traumatic media in the home in
which the tele-viewer can achieve an emotive
threshold barred at work. The viewer expresses
joy in watching televisual families process their
own complexly temporal traumas, an intensity
of joyful passionate imagination in the present
that necessitates the past-and-presentness of
trauma in the televisual now.
I call the particular affective dialectic at
play in sad-pornographic consumption sad-joy.
I define sad-joy as a dialectical vacillation of the
mind in which the ambivalent tension of feeling
sadness economizes joy. Spinoza defines
"vacillation of mind" in the demonstration of
proposition seventeen of the third part of the
Ethics. The proposition states that, if a thing that
causes us joy is similar to a thing that causes us
sadness, we will have something akin to a
love-hate relationship with that thing. For
Spinoza, this irresolution between love and
hate, joy and sadness, defines the vacillation of
mind as such. Following Spinoza (1996), in my
articulation, sad-joy, as a mental irresolution,
exemplifies an affective dialectic in which
joyfulness- a "passion by which [one] passes to
a greater perfection" and a virtuous increase in
power and striving for self-preservation emerges as the net distribution of sadness - the
passage to a lesser perfection (77).

I categorize sad-joy in classical and
modern theories of tragic catharsis but with a
contemporary historical bent. In this way, I
expand cathartic theory by understanding
sad-joy's dialectic as a catharsis of the
contemporary, one specific to the surveillances
of contemporary capital, in which labor is
expected to emotionally (re)produce at the
same time as catharsis is managed out. For
Aristotle, catharsis was intimately related to the
"purgation of emotions" facilitated by tragic
drama and tragic action's unique modes of pity
and fear (1997, 10). Following Aristotle's classic
tragic theory, I wager that sad-joy is
constitutively connected to contemporary
formats of feel-sad media, in particular trauma
porn's singular modes of fear (traumatic terror)
and pity (sympathy for trauma), an effect of
said sub-genre's equally distinctive purgation
(a
joy
economized
through sadness).
Furthermore, sad-joy as a contemporary
catharsis emerges in the tragic experiential
genres of the contemporary workplace and its
flows of surveilled non-catharsis.
Sad-joy resonates with David Hume's
theory of tragedy, in which he points almost
exactly toward sad-joy in the "unaccountable
pleasure which the spectators of a well-written
tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and
other passions that are in themselves
disagreeable and uneasy" (1993, 126). In
Hume's account, pleasure is directly related to
6
affliction.
Furthermore,
Hume's sad-joy
counterpart is an express response to
unbearable structures of non-catharsis and flat
feeling, whether "the languid, listless state of
indolence into which it falls upon the removal
of all passion and occupation," or "the insipid
languor which arises from perfect tranquility
and repose" (126). In my account, the managed
non-catharsis of the workspace corresponds to
6

"[Spectators] are pleased in proportion as they are
afflicted, and never are so happy as when they
employ tears, sobs, and cries, to give vent to their
sorrow, and relieve their heart, swoln with the
tenderest sympathy and compassion" (Hume 1993,
126).

Hume's agomzmg boredom, listlessness,
indolence, and languor. Finally, Hume's model
moves us closer to sad-joy's dialectic. Writing
on the affectivity of oratory, Hume's rhetoric
emphasizes
overpowering,
effacement,
conversion, redirection, and seizing (129).
Hume's diction moves us into the language of
sad-joy's affective dialectic. In feel-sad media's
paradigmatic
affect
of
sad-joy,
the
overpowering of sadness by joy emerges in an
overcoming of sorrow by an erotically joyful
attachment to sad televisual objects.
As I have developed throughout this
article, the stakes of sad-joy are the affective
endurance of the subject under contemporary
capital. In this way, the consequence of sad-joy
corresponds to the significance of Spinoza's
striving, an analogue for late capitalist survival.
Due to the fact that each thing strives to
persevere in its being, striving constitutes each
thing's essence, and perseverance in striving
endows the individual with virtue, Spinoza
awards desire and striving an ethical content.
Following Spinoza, we could afford the
contemporary emotive spectator's striving an
ethical value, as she pursues her own affective
endurance in the face of supervised
non-catharsis. However, the emotive spectator's
striving is not unlimited; Spinoza stresses the
fact that external causes will inevitably
overpower the force of one's perseverance and
striving. Following the limited nature of desire
for Spinoza and its surpassing by external
causes, I wager that the contemporary laborer
who affectively self-reproduces will always
respond to and be overcome by the managed
non-catharsis of contemporary capital, the
external cause of which necessitates the
laborer's very affective survival for the
reproduction of capital. The employee can only
endure through abiding by an administered
level of emotional non-intensity.
Sad-joy is a dialectical ambivalence that
emerges from the contemporary condition of
corporate coldness. The tele-viewer craves
feel-sad media to feel sad-joy, undergoing a
vacillation of mind whose dialectical push and
pull will end in a net joyfulness. The
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consequences of sad-joy are twofold: first, in
Spinoza's terms, an increase in power via a
double decrease in power: the affective
debilitation of contemporary capital which
leads to feel-sad media's own affective
(dis)empowerment; and second, the affective
perseverance against and for the reproduction
of capital.
In summary, sadness pornography
mediates a unique tragedy of the contemporary,
or a unique mode of the contemporary tragic, in
which people "get off" on overwhelmingly
sorrowful yet cathartic media. As a mediatic
meta-genre, sad porn constellates a number of
distinct sub-genres, such as disability,
inspiration, and trauma porn. An affective
meta-genre, sadness circumscribes pitiful,
depressive, and traumatic emotions as an
overarching "aesthetic structure of affective
expectation,"
following
Berlant.
As
a
contemporary aesthetic category, sad porn
succeeds a lineage of televisual and cinematic
precursors, appearing at the convergence of the
soap opera and the pornographic weepie.
In my analysis, I stress one sub-genre of
sadness pornography, trauma porn, and its
manifestations in serials such as Orange Is the
New Black, Transparent, and This Is Us.
Accounting for numerous identitarian positions
and
identity
histories,
trauma
porn
spectacularizes the contemporary abnormal
family and its legacies of black, queer, and trans
multigenerational trauma. In Transparent,
multigenerational trauma emerges in inter- and
intra-generational sexual longings and gazes, a
transgenerationally traumatic erotics that match
the streaming format's past-and-present
temporality, what I call the "all now, all at
once." In This Is Us, four interlocking births,
which frame a tale of transgenerational black
poverty, emerge an aesthetics of traumatic
simultaneity that mirror broadcast television's
temporality of "only now, each time this week."
Following
affective
scholars like
Hochschild and Berlant, my analysis wagers a
speculative emotive spectator, who embodies
the particular friction between emotional labor
(in the workspace) and emotion management

(at home or on the go). Experiencing variable
~abor
environments that are affectively
mundated while administratively non-cathartic,
the contemporary emotional laborer as TV
spectator craves feel-sad media to reach a
threshold of affective intensity fenced at work.
The sad-pornographic viewer engages feel-sad
media in moments of "interruptive agency,"
modes of sideways and non-sovereign actancy,
partaking in an oppositional emotional
over-extravagance: a "self-medication" in
which binge watching mimics self-abeyant
behaviors
like
overeating.
Occupying
television's larger structures of participation
and empathy, sad-pornographic . viewership is
characterized by a distinctive juncture between
overpresence (such as Spinoza's intensified
a~ect under the presentness of the affecting
thmg) and powerlessness (like Berlant's
understanding of the juxtapositionality or
asideness of the feminine subject to the
political).
Finally, . sad porn generates a unique
affect, sad-joy, which I define as a wavering of
the mind, or a mental oscillation. In sad-joy,
overwhelming sorrow economizes ecstatic joy.
As a contemporary form of affective purgation,
sad-joy revises classic and modern theories of
the cathartic by pointing us toward the current
dialectic between experiences of tragedy in the
home/ on the go - through sad pornographic
media - and professional non-tragedies - in
non-cathartic work atmospheres. In this way,
the stakes of sadness pornography regard the
contemporary laborer as televisual spectator's
affective endurance. Sad porn lubricates the
current emotional worker's survival, but
maybe, even probably, momentarily.
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2016), which triggers both a critical examination of decolonial artistic practices with a
feminist commitment, and a situated response of auto-phenomenographic poetry (Lykke
2018) . In this light, the present paper is born out of the authors' will to pose their friendship
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This paper considers friendship as an
affective terrain of feminist alliance among
subjects that belong to territories with a history
of colonization able to respond to the
colonial/modern gender system (Lugones 2007)
through the arts. To this endeavor, friendship is
here conceived as an engagement of feminist
solidarity that unfolds within theoretical and
practical models of change and resistance
against the logics of cultural imperialism
(Lugones and Spelman 1983). Turning friendship
into a polyphonic relationship of feminist
reaction,
this
work
is
conducted
by
acknowledging the need to incorporate a
dialogue where different authorial voices and
feminist positionalities meet, reflect, and
respond. The paper settles the friendly
encounter between its authors in conversation
with Guatemalan feminist rapper Rebeca Lane
and her song "Alma Mestiza" ("Mestiza Soul,"
2016).
authors'
friendship
Examining
throughout their feminist co-inhabitation,
positionalities,
and
respective
ethnic
backgrounds (Mexico and Spain), this paper
seeks to discern in their alliance a differential
affective relationality capable of fostering artistic
responses to contemporary forms of racism and
neo-colonial exploitation. As part of their
feminist militancy, the music of Rebeca Lane
becomes the meeting point in which to mutually
reflect about the colonial record of their
ethnicities, and to further articulate artistic
dialogues implementing a feminist and a
decolonial awareness. Thus, "Alma Mestiza"
triggers in this essay both a critical examination
of decolonial artistic practices with a feminist
commitment, and a situated encounter of
auto-phenomenographic poetry (Lykke 2018)
with Lane's song. In this light, the present paper
is born out of the authors' will to pose their
friendship as an affective terrain on which to
formulate critical and artistically situated
accounts
becoming-with
feminist
artistic
material (Straube 2014).
To this task, the paper is divid ed into
four sections. The first section conceptualizes the
authors' friendship and feminist positionalities
as an affective engagement informed by their

respective backgrounds. The second section
introduces Rebeca Lane's music activism in line
with the elucidation of contemporary feminist
decolonial practices through the arts. The third
section establishes the possibility of fostering an
encounter between decolonial and posthuman
theoretical patterns in the elaboration of our
artistic approach. The fourth section finally
provides a situated dialogue with Lane's piece in
the shape of an embodied auto-ethnographic
poetry. Overall, this paper aims to frame the
authors' friendship as a feminist alliance in
which the colonial records of their ethnicities are
further
complicated
via
their
affective
identification and artistic conversation with
Rebeca Lane's music. In this sense, our account
enacts the feminist potential of considering the
personal and the arts as joint realms in the
production of analyses and critiques of the
colonial/modern gender system.
1. Friendship as a feminist
positioning authorial voices

engagement:

In mid-July 2017, the authors of this
paper were sent an email confirming our
acceptance as students of a transnational
master's degree in Women's and Gender Studies
across Europe ..For two years, we had the chance
to experience a feminist training and
co-inhabitation in the company of feminist allies
from all over the world. The city of Oviedo
(Asturias, in Northern Spain) was our first
destination, and from September 2017 to July
2018, we became friends and flat-mates in, as we
would call it, casa feminista (the feminist house,
see Figure 1). For all of us Oviedo was a new
city, and English or Spanish was not our
mother-tongue. Coming from different ethnic,
linguistic, social-class, academic, and feminist
backgrounds, the meetings at casa feminista
greatly helped us to shift our theoretical training
towards a friendly engagement of feminist
participation. Weekly dinners, endless debates,
feminist marches, sharing of readings, movie
sessions, evening walks, occasional trips, and the
exciting calmness of a shared routine turned our
co-inhabi tation into a friendly space of feminist
kinship (see Figure 2). By July 2018, some of us
either graduated from the master's, or left to our
second home institution in another European

country. As of July 2019, the authors of this
paper are able to discern an academic and
personal continuum made possible thanks to a
feminist engagement of friendship and alliance
primarily knitted in casa feminista.
Bound to depart from the program, the
authors felt the need to academically and
artistically portray a part of our feminist
co-inhabitation. This simultaneously displays
the conflictive nature of our particular yet
interrelated backgrounds, which have constantly
confronted in dialogue our positionalities with
our former and present experiences as subjects
committed to feminism. As a place of human
and non-human co-existence, casa feminista is not
only a house but rather a communitarian space
where objects, food, sounds, and non-human
living companions have differently coincided in
the evolving of our friendship. For this reason,
the authors want to consider friendship as a
fruitful affective engagement to pose systematic
analyses and critiques incorporating a feminist
awareness. This awareness is here informed by
Marfa C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman's
(1983) conceptualization of feminist friendship
as a relationship facilitating the development of
theories aiming to change and resist the logics of
cultural imperialism (576, 579).
Jointly emphasizing the need for
white/ Anglo feminists to make room for women
of color, both authors thread a quasi-manifesto
providing a few guidelines to talk and to be
talked about (Lugones and Spelman 1983,
578-581). In these, Lugones and Spelman
remarkably touch upon the importance of
articulating situated accounts in feminist
academia that acknowledge as many women's
standpoints as possible, while also pointing out
a sort of hermeneutics reminding white/ Anglo
feminists what Adrienne Rich (1984) would later
define as "politics of location," that is, the ethical
duty for white/ Anglo feminists to recognize
themselves as "outsiders" when addressing the
experiences of non-white women (Lugones and
Spelman 1983, 577). Lugones and Spelman
(1983) inform the "fragile psychic state" (575)
women of color suffer because of the silencing
invisibilization exercised by white/ Anglo
feminism. In Lugones and Spelman's view, such
an exclusion leads women of raza - as they coin
to refer to women of color - into an alienation

that unspeaks in-between ethnic, linguistic, and
social-class backgrounds.
In unspeaking, feminists of raza are
caught in the constant accommodation of their
accents, knowledges, and behavior under the
lens of mainstream feminism (Lugones and
Spelman 1983, 573-576). Out of their alliance to
raise awareness about the dominating character
displayed by white/ Anglo feminism, Lugones
and Spelman (1983) consider friendship among
white/ Anglo and feminists of raza as the "only
sensical motivation" in the fostering of a
non-imperialist feminism (576). This motivation
induces white feminists into a self-fragilization
state that critically reflects the asymmetry
permeating their friendship with women of raza,
and that renders their imperialist modes of
behavior vulnerable. In so doing, white feminists
could
learn
" to
become
unintrusive,
unimportant, patient to the point of tears," while
having their world of experience "disrupted [...]
criticized and scrutinized from the point of view
of those who have been harmed by it" (Lugones
and Spelman 1983, 580). As a result, white
feminists might be able to see women of color in
their own communities, to understand their
cultural texts, and eventually to desacralize
white epistemological authority and their
"ready-made theories"
that
tighten the
experiences of women of color (Lugones and
Spelman 1983, 581).
Paola comes from Mexico and Miguel
from Spain, countries with tense and unresolved
colonial records. In the provisional attempt to
approach these from our respective feminist
positionalities and shared intimacy, we felt
prompted to find in the memories of our
friendly living in casa feminista a differential
affective
relationality
responding
to
contemporary forms of racism and neo-colonial
exploitation. Out of these memories, music is
fundamental. Day and night, casa feminista
played the songs of Javiera Mena, Rebeca Lane,
Gata Cattana, Princess Nokia, Francisco El
Hombre, Mala Rodriguez, Ray BLK, Calle 13,
Young Fathers, Lady Gaga, (Me Llamo)
Sebastian, Alex Anwandter, Natalia Lafourcade,
Cafe Tacvba, or Jorge Drexler. From this
inspiring playlist, Rebeca Lane's music became a
point of encounter in our feminist crises and
debates. Paola, as a Mexican feminist allied with

women's indigenous vindications, found in
Lane's rhymes triggering instances of decolonial
I
feminism through the arts. Miguel, as a Spanish
feminist belonging to a country that continues to
dismiss its imperialistic legacy, saw in Lane's
music an artistic means to actively rethink his
colonizing background.
Emplaced in the safety of casa feminista,
but also within the Spanish escalation of far
right-wing populism, Rebeca Lane's activism
provided us with some support in our respective
feminist interventions, and the socio-political
scenarios where they are inscribed. A case in
point was the recent Spanish denial, both by the
monarchy
and
the
caretaker
socialist
government (2018-2019), to offer any kind of
apology to Mexico for the Spanish colonization
2
on its territories. As it will be examined in the
following section, European colonization was
not an isolated historical event. Instead, it was a
dehumanizing system of Western negation of
indigenous peoples and cultures enacting a
gendered modus operandi that has pervaded
through time, and that keeps nurturing the
exploitation of human and natural resources in
territories with a history of colonization. This
denial has coincided with the rise of far
right-wing mobilization in Spain, as seen in a
shameful Francoist revival, the glorification of
3
the Spanish imperial past, the targeting of
4
feminisms, and the entrance of an extreme
Henceforth, by decolonial feminism we refer to the
theoretical framework developed in U.S. academia,
particularly by Maria Lugones (2007). We
differentiate this school of thought from the
des-colonial (translated as well as decolonial) practices
and theoretical approaches of Latin American
feminisms. The latter focus on the situated lived
experiences of latina women, as for instance the
feminist activism of Rebeca Lane in the hip-hop
scene.
2
For more information about this event, see:
<https:// elpais.com/ elpais/2019/03/26/ inenglish / 1
553587549 _240799 .html>.
3
An example would be the social and institutional
opposition to exhume the remains of former dictator
Francisco Franco from the public basilica of El Valle de
los Caidos (The Valley of the Fallen) in Madrid. For
more
information
about
this event, see:
<https: // elpais.com/ elpais/2019/06/04/ in english/1
559644855_670635.html>.
' A recent instance would be the inspection by the far
right-wing political party VOX of feminist
1

right-wing political party to Congress for the
first time in democracy after the fall of the
5
dictatorship. These few glimpses, together with
the difficulties of forming a stable government,
inform the urgency of tackling right-wing
populism from an intersectional feminist
militancy contesting the Spanish dismissal of its
colonization, while rendering visible the
experiences of colonized women.
Regaining Lugones and Spelman's
formulation, we want to acknowledge in this
paper the potential of conceiving our friendship
as an affective terrain of feminist alliance in
response to the current socio-political scenario
via a critical and artistic approach to Lane's song
"Alma Mestiza." To this task, we simultaneously
address the naive pretension to briefly address
our feminist commitment, artistic inspirations,
and vital experiences over the last two years.
These have undoubtedly made us aware of the
systematic asymmetry investing the affective
relationality of our friendship, but also of the
power of the arts in posing this awareness in
constant dialogue. Throughout this process,
Lane's discography becomes a sonic material
that displays her own agency and feminist
positionality, as well as a musical memory of our
co-existence in casa feminista . The present paper
reunites our memories, critical knowledge, and
artistic skills in the articulation of a theoretical
and practical response of change and resistance
to the colonial / modern gender system (Lugones
and Spelman 1983; Lugones 2007) through our
friendly engagement with "Alma Mestiza." As a
whole, our response attempts to fully frame our
friendship as a reflective space of feminist
participation, and as a means to position our
voices together in conversation with the artistic
activism of Rebeca Lane.

organizations working with gender violence,
migration, and LGBTIQ rights. This is part of a
right-wing campaign of hate speech, institutional
framing, and public shaming of feminisms in the
country. For more information about this event, see:
<https: // elpais.com/ elpais/2019/02/22/ inenglish/1
550852190_868783.html>.
' For more information about this event, see:
<https:/ I elpais.com/ elpais/2019/11/10/inenglish/1
573407794_574125.html>.

2. Contemporary moves of decolonial feminism
through the arts
Rebeca Lane is a Guatemalan sociologist
and feminist rapper. As a sociologist, she has
explored the political contexts of urban tribes
and new youth identities, particularly hip-hop
cultures. Her musical interests led her to
different art projects displaying her feminist
activism in the overall visibilization of Central
American women's struggles and contributions
to the hip-hop scene. Her style and political
stance has opened a gap in a world dominated
by men and co-opted by a cultural industry with
a specific commercial agenda that Lane has
openly criticized. In an interview with a digital
magazine, Lane stated: "I did not come here to
please them or to repeat the phrases that we
supposedly have to say... politically, I am not
going to swallow things in order to receive a
6
prize" (Vichez 2016). Rebeca Lane is part of an
emerging generation of Latin American female
rappers who touch upon common problems that
women and girls face in the region, such as
abortion criminalization, lack of sex education,
deficient healthcare, sexual and domestic
violence, femicides, human trafficking, and a
deep-rooted machismo founded on the structural
inequalities of patriarchy.
Hip-hop in Guatemala, as in her origins
in the popular neighborhoods of New York and
Los Angeles, has become a political platform to
express the griefs caused by the long-lasting
aftermaths of the civil war held between
1960-1996, as well as the resistances that have
emerged to deal with the wounds left by
enforced disappearances, political incarceration,
ethnic cleansing, and genocides caused by the
7
resulting Guatemalan dictatorships (Lane 2012).
6

Translation by Paola Mendoza TeJ!ez Giron.
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Guatemala was the scene of four decades of internal
armed conflict that ended up with more than 200,000
deaths. About 83% of the victims were Mayan
indigenous who suffered a series of systematic
tortures as a plan from the army to end their eHmicity
and take possession of their lands. Within this
context, dictatorships have been the central political
feature of colonial domination and imperial interests
controlled by the ruling sectors and the Army. The
civil war ended in 1996 with the Agreement of
Lasting Peace between the Government and the
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)

Indeed, Rebeca Lane decided to fuse her poetic
vein with rap rhythms as a homage to her aunt
Rebeca Eunice Vargas, who was a poet and a
guerrillera (guerrilla) disappeared in 1981 at the
hands of Guatemalan militaries during the civil
8
war (Rigby 2015). In an interview with The
Guardian, Lane stated that hip-hop is a healing
tool for younger generations that have learned to
survive in violent contexts: "It gives young
people ways of organizing beyond armed
conflict, beyond military or gang violence"
(Rigby 2015). In this manner, hip-hop speaks to
the power relations that underlie cultural
practices, while also becoming a cultural space
in which political action occurs and further
impacts its audience's subjectivities.
As informed by Lane's career, feminist
criticism through art is an invitation to challenge
traditional representations of women in order to
configure new social and cultural significances.
Feminism brings into the Latin American
hip-hop scene the opportunity to give an
account of women's standpoints. Women's
testimonies have the potential to situate
particular women's efforts and struggles within
common structures of gendered oppressions,
which in Latin American countries display a
record of colonization following the logics of the
"colonial/modern gender system" (Lugones
2007). As decofonial feminist philosopher Marfa
C. Lugones has theorized, race and gender were
the marks of civilization settled and reproduced
by the Eurocentered modern coloniality.
Therefore, the dichotomy man/woman and its
compulsory heterosexuality, along with its racial
hierarchization, became a long-standing pattern
of power that has shaped the bodies and
subjectivities of the colonized ever since the
in 1996 (see Conzisi6n para el Esclarecimiento Hist6rico
(Guatemala) [Commission for Historical Clarification],
1998).
Since the 1970s, the insurgent movement
incorporated the Mayan people that had not been
present in the first stage of the conflict. In this
manner, Mayan people expanded the social base of
the guerrillas, which provided greater support from
the civilian population. As a result, from 1981
onwards the Army started an offensive against civil
society,
unloading
disproportionate
counterinsurgency actions (See Comisi6n para el
Esclarecimiento Hist6rico (Guatemala) [Commission for
Historical Clarification], 1998).

colonial expansion (Lugones 2007), and one that
is further replicated in the current exploitation of
human and natural resources in places with this
history of colonization. Especially for women of
color, the enactment of their own accounts is
crucial in the constellation of intersectional
feminisms, avoiding thus the homogenization of
women's needs and interventions under the
agenda of white feminism (Lugones and
Spelman 1983), and the overall commodification
of women's bodies in patriarchal societies.
In this guise, feminist hip-hop subverts
women's objectification as depicted by
masculinized lyrics that construct violent
meanings and practices while invisibilizing
women's agencies and lives. By portraying their
own imaginaries through music, feminist
rappers make room for more women into the
hip-hop scene, thus contributing to the
empowerment, collaboration, and education
among poor girls and women (Rigby 2015).
Rebeca Lane's discography (2014-present)
revolves around identity, culture, feminism, and
anarchism, speaking up against the racialized,
gendered, and capitalist hierarchies imposed
since the European colonial expansion to the
Americas and the Caribbean. Particularly, the
production of the album Poesia Venenosa
(Poisonous Poetry, 2015) took the rapper into an
identity process in which she re-appropriates her
indigenous roots without dismissing the
internalization of Western values and education,
which inform her (self-)racism and privileges
(Vichez 2016). Later, in the poetry, the music, and
the aesthetics of the album Alma Mestiza (Mestiza
Soul, 2016) she deals with the conflicts and
possible encounters of indigenous, ladina , and
mestiza identities. Politically identified as mestiza,
Lane defines herself as "ethnically diverse,"
advancing a notion of a mestizaje that accepts
and negotiates cultural contradictions (Vichez
9
2016).
In Guatemala, ladina/o identity refers to
non-indigenous people. Within a caste model that
reproduces the colonial racialized matrix of
domination, /adina/o identity implies exclusion,
exploitation, and dispossession of indigenous Mayan
peoples, which are the majority of the population.
Mestiza/a identity, understood as a cultural-biological
mixture shared by a collectivity after colonization
processes in Latin America, is used by Lane as a

By proposing
decolonization of
knowledges and of the self, Lane challenges the
colonial impositions that continue to deny the
languages, identities, and even the sounds of the
colonized. In line with these ideas, Lane's music
merges the African American and Caribbean
diaspora roots of hip-hop with Guatemalan
Caribbean rhythms and cumbia. According to
Chilean artist and researcher Julia Antivilo
(2015), Latin American artists revaluate popular
world ritualization in the recovering of
traditional arts and ancestral cosmovision, a
move that enables them to elaborate their
identity out of colonial chains. From a decolonial
feminist perspective, deeply embedded in Lane's
pieces,
non-hegemonic
local productions
through the arts tend to dismantle the idea of the
North American and Eurocentric masculine
objective truth, whose universal scope has long
concealed colonized knowledges, memories, and
subjectivities (Mignolo 2012; Maldonado-Torres
2007, 2011) . This universal thinking, inherent to
the installation of colonial modernity and
displaying racializing and gendering hierarchies,
is thus challenged by local critical initiatives. As
a result, protest art provides remarkable
instances of local mobilization against colonial
patterns of cultural representation, and thus of
colonial power, performed by gendered and
racialized subjects in territories with a colonial
record.
Lane's song "Alma Mestiza" (2016)
explicitly acknowledges the contradictions in
rendering visible the colonial oppressions of her
indigenous roots and gender identity under the
colonial/modern gender system (Lugones 2007).
Artistic representations and performances that
resist the erasure of indigeneity and of any
difference destabilize the hegemonic gender
system, easing the right to self-representation in
decolonizing processes. In Lane's political stance
through music, her mestiza identity navigates the
contradictions that arise when women belonging
to
colonized
territories
visibilize
their
indigenous backgrounds. Accordingly, and as
informed by Lugones' theorization, Rebeca
Lane's music contests the colonial/modern
gender system, while articulating an identity
political stance to recognize the indigenous roots of
national identity and the fusion of cultures that must
be (re-)signified.

repertoire seeking an artistic and political
liberation. In the musical elaboration of her
situated decolonial critique, Lane poses her body
as a locus from which to react against the
colonial lens that has distorted her indigenous
roots, (self-)perception, and acknowledgment.
In the words of Antivilo (2015), the body
"is a reduction modeled by the patriarchal
vision" (7). For this reason, approaching the
body as a physical terrain for the reworking of
colonial imprinting becomes fundamental in
feminist performance through the arts. In so
doing, decolonial feminist artists can envision
alternative identifications with their gender, and
face the structural power dynamics that lie over
their racialized and gendered corpo-realities
(Young 1997; Grosz 1997). In a similar fashion,
Latin American communitarian feminism
recognizes the body as a primal territory against
the material and symbolic impressions left by
neo-colonial power relations. Considering
therefore the colonized body as a battleground
for feminist reaction, the corporeal realm
simultaneously
becomes
a
place
for
epistemological creation, life alternatives, and
identities relating to community, history, and
nature (Paredes 2010; Valadez 2014).
Instead of building upon complex
theoretical corpora, only accessible to certain
intellectual audiences and political forums, Lane
communicates and connects with people via her
direct engagement with the body. This is
approached from her own embodied impulse,
and it is capable of reaching a local and
transnational audience with the aim of raising
awareness about neo-colonial oppressions
shared by numerous territories with a common
colonial record (Vichez 2016). In this regard, the
artist asserts: "I can't write anything if it doesn't
happen to me through the body, through my
10
experience" (Sierra 2016). Departing from these
premises, both in the visuals and in the poetics
of "Alma Mestiza" the singer performs a
(re-)appropriation of the colonized subjectivity,
body, and memory through the reconfiguration
of her own identity. In this vein, she responds
against the perpetuation of the colonial/modern
gender system through time, while rendering
herself as a woman from a territory experiencing

local struggles among women and indigenous
communities. Lane's bodily-political space of
artistic
enunciation
thus
subverts
the
"disembodied and unlocated neutrality and
objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge"
(Grosfoguel 2011, 98) inflicted by Eurocentric
thinking that delinks the racial, ethnic, gendered,
and sexual epistemic location of colonized
subjects.
The re-appropriation of the mestiza
identity leads the rapper to reinforce elements of
ancestral cosmovision in the aesthetics of Alma
Mestiza as a purposeful decolonial strategy. The
healing powers of natural elements, the
cleansing rituals, and the portrayal of myths and
traditional clothes become then symbols of
resistance against neo-colonial powers, and also
the tools for the reconfiguration of her identity
(see Figures 3 and 4). This can be interpreted in
the lyrics of the song "Alma Mestiza":
"Mother-Nature I Tenderly sutures I The
rupture of my body I Once I freed myself from I
My tough armor. Because it does not mature I A
wound that is not healed I A mind without
madness I A heart without ties. To flow is to
des troy and to construct again I A house
without walls I And to lose the fear to die"
11
.
.
(Lane 2016). Evokmg the coloma! wounds that
she still embodies in the re-elaboration of her
mestiza identity, Lane revalidates Guatemalan
ancestral knowledges and spiritual practices that
have been systematically disregarded over time
in the interest of colonial dispossession.
Throughout "Alma Mestiza" (2016), the
artist conceives the body from a cosmos-centric
view, discerning in her materiality a space of
inhabitability. In so doing, Lane moves away
from androcentric abstractions of the (female)
body to further articulate the collective-body, the
body-territory, and the spiritual-body, all of
which are imagined as an identity assemblage.
In this vein, Lane has shared with a Chilean
ma gazi ne th at she cannot refer just to the
material body because "what happens to us as
women, what happens to the peoples in
resistance, what happens to the native peoples,
the Afro-descendant peoples, what happens to
the communities historically excluded from
social welfare, happens to me too" (Viancos
11

Translation by Miguel Angel Blanco Martinez.
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2019). Likewise, Judith Butler (2019), talking
about emotions at the body's limit, has pointed
out that the clamor of the marginalized "is the
living reminder that it is at the level of the body
that political suffering takes place and it is
through embodied action that the disfranchised
make
themselves
known
as
existing."
Altogether, Lane's musical reactions and Butler's
reminder pinpoint the erasure and the
exploitation of the colonized bodies and
territories of the colonial/modern gender
system. As theorized by Frantz Fanon (2009),
these have been pushed out to the "zone of
non-being" (42), a zone of racial oppression and
exclusion where they struggle to be heard and to
be noticed (Grosfoguel2011).
3. Setting the terrain to become-with feminist
artistic material

The unfolding of a differential affectivity
informed by the memories of our feminist
friendship through the arts, and triggered by
Rebeca Lane's music, will be performed by
combining Rebeca Lane's decolonial feminism
with recent feminist research on posthuman
engagement with artistic material (Straube 2014),
and embodied auto-ethnographic poetry (Lykke
13
2018). Throughout our living together, the
authors of this paper have discussed if
posthuman theory could meet a theoretica l
encounter with decolonial feminism. As the
colonial/modern
gender
system
reveals,
dehumanization was inherent to colonization.
Hence, to remain human, or to theoretically
question this category, has been a privileged
stance held by an intellectual elite, which usually
belongs to countries with an epistemic
colonialist agenda. Furthermore, the emphasis of
feminist academia to re-evaluate the relationship

of the human with the non-human in affect,
animal, animacy, or posthuman theories (Ahmed
2004; Haraway 2008; Chen 2012; Braidotti 2013)
has been differently approached within feminist
academic circuits. Anti-colonial and decolonial
feminisms, as for instance the efforts developed
by indigenous peoples, have considered the
engagement
with
the
non-human
as
foundational, while being long researched by
Western academia and its "ready-made"
theories.
However, there have also been academic
attempts to foster possible encounters among
decolonial
and
posthuman
theories
14
incorporating a feminist awareness. In light of
these contributions, and as a result of our
diverse formation during our master's program,
we would like to address "Alma Mestiza" by
enacting a posthuman approach of critical
engagement with the arts. Such an approach is
greatly inspired by Wibke Straube's research on
trans-cinema
(2014), and
Nina Lykke's
auto-phenomenographic poetry rooted in
lesbian widowhood (2018) . By incorporating
their personal needs and struggles as queer
feminist researchers against the systematic
conjectures that oppress them, Straube and
Lykke turn the posthuman nature of their
inquiries into affective healing frameworks.
These are potentially useful for others suffering
from
the
d ynamics
of
compulsory
heterosexuality (Rich 1980), and thus, for others
belonging to the gendered human realm and its
de-privileging dynamics of the neo-colonial
exploitation of human and non-human
resources. In order to provide an artistic
embodied response to "Alma Mestiza," Straube
and Lykke offer the theory and the methodology
to come near to Lane's work without absorbing
her own artistic approach under ours.
Furthermore, the implementation of their

12

Translation by Paola Mendoza Tellez Giron.
The notion of the posthuman has been widely
theorized in the last decades. For this reason, there is
a great number of different authors and approaches
addressing this concept. In this paper, posthuman
refers to our feminist and affective engagement in
casa feminista as one informed by a human and
non-human co-existence, playing music a vital role.
For a quick temporal overview of academic
posthuman research, see:
<https: / / literariness.org /2018/07 /25/ posthumanistcriticism/>.
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Two recent instances would be Schaeffer, Felicity
(2018), "Spirit Matters: Gloria Anzaldua's Cosmic
Becoming across Human /Nonhuman Borderlands,"
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 43(4):
1005-29, and Kaiser, Birgit M. and Kathrin Thiele
(Eds.) (2018), "The Ends of Being Human: Returning
(to) the Question," philoSOPH/A 8. This last one
includes contributions by Denise Ferreira da Silva,
Vicki Kirby, Max Han tel, William Paris, and Bracha L.
Ettinger.

relates to the European
background
Miguel,
and
to
his
non-heterosexual identity and affects. What will
be later developed is a situated posthuman
account through the arts responding to the
colonial/modern gender system as inspired by
Rebeca Lane within the affective engagement of
our friendship, our different ethnicities, and
reflective tools .

Becoming-with audio-visual material
Wibke Straube is a queer feminist scholar
whose research focuses on the environmental
humanities, transgender, and visual studies. In
2014, and as part of their PhD dissertation on
trans-cinema,
they
proposed
a
critical
framework of embodied engagement with
audio-visual material rooted in feminist,
posthuman, visual, affect, and queer theories.
The
author
develops
an
audio-visual
terminology and methodology surpassing the
binary and occularcentric logics that have
predominated in the relationship between films
and spectators, as well as feminist visual
theorization
exclusively
displaying
psychoanalytic analyses (Mulvey 1975) . As a
matter of fact, Straube dismantles the ableist
implications of the spectator figure, suggesting
instead the notion of "the entrant-body": "The
entrant
becomes
a
permeable
body,
multi-sensorial rather than optical, touched and
interpellated by music, other bodies and objects
while touching upon different futures" (Straube
2014, 64). Out of the entrant-body, Straube
widens the "haptic body" initially proposed by
Laura Marks (2000), while contributing to a
branch of feminist theorists dealing with the
body and its affects in visual material (Sobchack
2004; Barker 2009).
These authors characterize the body as a
locus affected by audio-visual material, thus
fostering alternative identifications with it that
rework gendered, vertical, and dichotomous
relationships between the two. As the affective
turn has been differently conceived by a number
of authors since the early 2000s (Massumi 2002;
Sedgwick 2003;
Ahmed
2004), Straube
acknowledges the blurring boundary between
affect and emotion. In Straube's research, affect
is hence defined as "an emotional ( ... ) as well as

physical response to representation," ultimately
enabling
"a n
emotional
'becoming-with'
between film and entrant" (Straube 2014, 54).
Such a "becoming-with" stresses the mutual
engagement among artistic material and the
entrant-body at an affective level, consequently
leading to embodied identifications that are
necessarily situated. In being situated, and by
enacting a feminist awareness, the encounters of
body-entrants with
audio-visual material
specifically relate to the systemic intersection of
oppressions. In Straube's study, audio-visual
engagements navigate the liberating moments
experienced by trans characters through dance,
music, or dreams, which inform their need to
differently identify with their environments.
Straube terms these instants as "exit scapes,"
which also become for the entrant-bodies an
opportunity to move away from their
oppressions and tore-imagine better futurities.
Embodied
engagements
with
audio-visual material not only facilitate feminist
analyses of patriarchal oppressions through the
arts, but also the possibility of articulating
responses to them from our affected, and hence
political, bodies. In Straube's dissertation, sound
becomes a means to temporarily fade from
hurting states, physically and psychically. When
the body is then permeated by the touch of
music, Straube highlights the activation of an
"embodied listening," a concept retrieved from
Gascia Ouzounian's research on the topic (2006) .
Also placing the body at the core of artistic
encounters, Ouzounian implements Donna
Haraway's idea of situated knowledges in the
interaction with sonic material. By the end of the
1980s, feminist scholar Donna Haraway
delineated her critique toward scientific
rationality as a disembodied universal vision
(Haraway 1988, 582) in the debate of Western
feminist epistemologies. She considered the
body and its senses as agents rather than
resources, setting
the ground for the
development of situated know ledges and partial
objectivities
(Haraway
1988,
583).
By
incorporating Haraway's proposal, Ouzounian
argues that "[i]n reviving the corporeal with
respect to sonic experience, we cross the
boundary from the impartial to the very
personal, reclaiming that marginalized space as
a space of significance" (Ouzounian 2006, 71).

Feminist Friendship as an Affective Engagement through the Arts

Following the premises
Ouzounian, and Haraway within the scope of
this paper, we discern a non-intrusive encounter
with Rebeca Lane's song. Out of this, the
entrant-body, its senses, and feelings are
socio-politically affected by Lane via her lyrics.
This encounter better elucidates the feminist
potential of holding a conversation among
different subjects and positionalities, which
through music become-with without subsuming
their respective languages, bodies, and critiques
under one another. As previously discussed, the
authors conceived this paper as an affective
alliance among peoples with conflicting
backgrounds that have found in friendship a
relationship of mutual reflection and support.
For us music is a healing tool to think about and
to care for the other, as experienced in our
co-inhabitation and listening to Lane's music. In
the case at hand, we decided to render our
becoming-with Lane's music through a poetic
piece that ethically relates to our positionality
and personal experiences, together with Lane's
as depicted in" Alma Mestiza." Continuing with
the feminist, affective, and posthuman input of
our approach, the enactment of an embodied
auto-ethnographic poetry, as displayed by Nina
Lykke (2018), proves to be helpful in the artistic
depiction of our becoming-with Rebeca's song.

An auto-phenomenographic methodology
Nina Lykke is a queer feminist scholar
whose later work has focused on queer love,
death, and mourning. Rooted in her experiences
as a lesbian widow, Lykke has recently
published a posthuman account of queer
mourning merging a critical and a poetic
approach. She develops the concept of
"auto-phenomenography" (2018), a situated
methodology of queer mourning and resistance
through the arts. After the death of her life-long
lesbian companion, Lykke underwent a
prolonged mourning that had to face both the
mandates of ableism and the medical stigma
derived from compulsory heterosexuality (Rich
1980). Feeling diagnosed because of her
queerness and willful mourning, Lykke finds in
poetry a relieving tool to not overcome her
mourning, but to frame it as an artistic medium
of queer resistance. The author provides a

"method of inquiry" (110) shaped as a "situated
argument" in the fostering of a new ethics of
intimate relations and of difference (122). She
relies on a model deeply influenced by theories
of affect, philosophies of immanence, and
feminist neovitalist materialism (110), as well as
by
Donna
Haraway's
decentering
of
companionship as strictly human (116). In the
elaboration of her situated argument, "bodily
relations and affective intensities are given
central attention" (109).
Lykke conceives of the bodies of the
becoming-widow (herself) and becoming-corpse
(her partner) as terrains on which to formulate
an artistic response of queer mourning and
resistance. Accordingly, she poses her body as
the carrier of affective relations which, after the
death of her wife, nurture a posthuman poetry
among the two. In this process, Lykke's
embodied memories lead to an ethics of affective
difference through the arts that delineates a
relational
affectivity
which
is ethically
asymmetrical: "There is no hierarchy of pain and
suffering [ .. . ) the relationship between the
positions involved is asymmetrical and
existentially different, and for ethical reasons
they should not be collapsed into one another"
(Lykke 2018, 118). Such a differential affectivity
deserves specia) attention for the purposes of
this paper. Lykke maintains that the artistic
tracing of her queer mourning shall begin from
her differential affectivity as a becoming-widow.
For this reason, Lykke witnesses the trauma of
losing her companion to death, that is, in
conjunction with but not as her partner. The
shaping
of
her
asymmetrical
affective
engagement with her wife is then primarily
informed
by
the
memories
of
their
companionship once the latter has entered into
the posthuman realm of death.
This remembrance, in which the body
and its affectivities are centrally placed,
configures in Lykke's poetry what she terms a
"compassionate companionship" (Lykke 2018,
109). Lykke situates her mourning as a vital
condition to produce a posthuman account
against hetero-normative dynamics of family
and diagnosis . Since both display an ableist
attitude invisibilizing queer mourning for its
non-heterosexual fulfillment, Lykke fosters a
compassionate companionship in which there is

a shared striving of being-with as well as being-for
the other (117). This is possible thanks to
empathetic instances of quotidian sympathy, or
what Lykke reworks in philosopher Ralph R.
Acampora's lexicon (2006) as "symphysis": an "embodied rethinking of the notion of sympathy,
stressing [ ... ] that the subject, in a material,
corpo-affective
sense,
is
affected
and
co-experiences the ways in which hir significant
others are bodily affected" (Lykke 2018, 116). As
a result, Lykke's auto-phenomenography revisits
daily life as a (becoming-)widow to portray the
shared yet differently experienced everyday
episodes of her wife's disease. The focus on a
differential corpo-affective everyday thus
enables, in Lykke's mourning, a psychic
identification with her partner after death,
placing embodied remembrance as central to
posthuman co-inhabitation.
Extracting from Lykke's work an
attention to mourning, the body, the everyday,
sympathy, asymmetrical affective relationality,
and to the memories of former co-inhabitation,
we want to develop in this paper an embodied,
auto-ethnographic, and poetic becoming-with
"Alma Mestiza" from our friendly engagement
and alliance, and without forcing Lane's
performance, or our own positionalities, into the
theoretical
models
detailed
above.
By
incorporating Lykke's writing method, we can
better capture our differential affectivity in
engaging with Lane's song, as well as with the
backgrounds that asymmetrically invest our
feminist politics. These, as the Spanish denial of
its colonization reveals, encapsulate the negation
of indigenous peoples and cultures, and the
neo-colonial practices currently fostering the
exploitation of human and natural resources in
countries with a history of colonization. As
stressed beforehand, the Spanish negation of its
colonization invisibilizes the gendered violences
suffered by colonized women and the killing of
countless lives under the name of conquest and
religious conversion. Hence, mourning, both for
colonized peoples and for Spanish society, has
been strategically prevented. On the one hand,
mourning has been a forbidden
practice
entrapping colonized peoples into social and
institutional oblivion. On the other, mourning
has been systematically dismissed by and within
countries with a colonizing agenda - past and

present - therefore passing
colonial killing onto current
generations.
In this paper, we would like to challenge
this rationale by providing a situated account
that opposes the colonial/modern gender
system through the arts, and simultaneously
addresses a decolonial artistic move enacting a
feminist commitment. The reflection of our
differential yet joint becoming-with "Alma
Mestiza" will thus necessarily navigate our
memories,
former
co-inhabitation,
daily
experiences, and the state of our friendship as
particularly affecting our bodies. As Lugones
and Spelman advise, we will see Rebeca's,
Paola's, and Miguel's feminist politics within
their own communities and cultural texts in the
progressive demystification of colonizing,
universal formulas of knowledge production. As
a concluding note for this section, it is our will
not only to facilitate a theoretical encounter
among decolonial and posthuman feminist
patterns, but also to discern within it the training
and
co-existence
we
have
differently
experienced throughout the last two years.
During this time, our daily lives have been
touched by the power of music, especially that
which incorporates feminist claims. By
positioning our.authorial voices in this paper, we
acknowledge Rebeca Lane's contribution to the
learning and unlearning of our feminist ethics
and praxis. We want to encourage anyone
reading these words to seek in friendship a
relationship of mutual growth, support, and
alliance in the counteraction of patriarchal
confinement nurturing the logics of racism and
neo-colonial exploitations.
4. A posthuman artistic response to the
colonial/modern gender system
Prologue
It has been almost a year since this paper

started as a reflective exercise to portray our
fruitful conversations in casa feminista within the
context of our conflicting backgrounds, feminist
training, and posthuman co-existence. The
intention to become-with "Alma Mestiza" by
enacting an auto-phenomenographic effort came
up thanks to Paola's encouragement to Miguel

to render his poems as situated accounts in his
academic research. We believe that creative
writing is a medium to approach systemic
socio-political scenarios from an academic
feminist standpoint. In conjunction with a theory
and methodology that enable us to come near to
Lane's song, Miguel's poetry attempts to reflect
the feminist potential of conceiving friendship as
an asymmetrical affective terrain from which to
better counteract racism and neo-colonial forms
of exploitation.
Throughout this year, we still embody
the discomfort of the possible contradictions that
emerge from our academic positions, language,
and privileges. How to foster a theoretical
encounter between decolonial and posthuman
frameworks
without
replicating
Western
academic hierarchies? How do gender, ethnic
background, and overall politics of location
come into play when writing about our
friendship and Rebeca Lane's activism? In sum,
is it possible to initiate a conversation among
peoples from territories with a history of
colonization, without falling into the logics of
epistemological colonization? Again and again,
we have discussed these questions, trying to find
in each other's words and vulnerability some
healing to the unending contradictions of the
world-system we live in.
Being willing to render ourselves
vulnerable in our friendship, through music, or
in the formulation of an artistic or academic
piece, implies finding in friendship an alliance to
resist and contest the colonial/ modern gender
system, as well as the relief to the anxiety
permeating any possible attempt to take a stand.
Following Lugones and Spelman's manuscript,
the co-authorship threaded all along this paper
simultaneously voices the affective, positional,
and territorial asymmetry investing our feminist
and friendly engagement. For the matter of this
paper, our memories in conjunction with specific
academic references, not only inform but also
stimulate these stances, as differentially shared
in their affective expression.
In mid-June 2018, Miguel went to a
15
Rebeca Lane's concert at La Ingobernable, in
15

La Ingobernable (The Ungovernable) was an
occupied space in downtown Madrid operating as a
feminist communitarian enclave from May 2017 until
November 2019, when the newly elected right-wing

remembers
walking
communitarian space, listening to Lane, and
sending Paola a recorded note of almost every
song. Later on, in October 2019, Paola went to a
concert of Lane in Mexico City. Likewise, Paola
sent Miguel recordings, pictures, while letting
him know all her impressions of the event. Even
if physically separate, there was a differential
affective sharing of the concert between us.
Framed within the two concerts of Rebeca Lane,
Paola and Miguel have repeatedly doubted,
questioned, denied, silenced, interrupted, and
misunderstood the validity, legitimacy, scope,
structure, and poetry of this paper.
Despite
vulnerability,
listening,
communicating, (co-)writing, reading, thinking,
and feeling can become contradictory sites of
encounter, we would like to stress again the
power of friendship as an affective engagement
nurturing feminist militancy, in and outside
academia. This might not find rigid answers to
any of these questions, nor wishes to do so.
Rather, friendship can provide support and
alliance in a time when neoliberalism and the
circulation of capital entails patriarchal violence
against and destruction of living bodies. In the
face of it, we vulnerably hope to have
documented Rebeca Lane's activism, a relatable
academic corpus, and an artistic contribution in
th e most friendl y possible way.

government of Madrid forced its eviction. During its
running, La Ingobernable worked as a self-managed
social center offering a number of open courses and
activities. As part of Rebeca Lane's European tour,
she offered a concert at La Ingobernable to raise
funds to help those affected by the eruption of the
Volccin de Fuego in Guatemala in June 2018.

Cosmic consciousness
From a magical heritage
Seeking in the shadow16
The traits of my soul.

Miguel

Tengo el alma asustada.
fadeando como un perro
I listen to your soul
To the heritage of the never grieved,
Of the never mourned,
That now, as ever,
Seek for a calling of their names.
Tengo el alma asustada.
fadeando como un perro
It is harder and harder to hear.
The TV screams at you,
While the president denies your consciousness,
And the king ignores the magic
They could never convert.
Learning how to become an animal, like a Nahual
I am a body transiting the spiritual path
It is not linear
My language is ancestral
I travel spirally.
In this blinding noise,
The beating
Where your pains inhabit
Affects my body,
Its odysseic back,
Its thin skin,
Flesh,
Sex,
Drowning under this ocean
That after stealing my breath,
Teaches me how to swim
Otherwise.
And so, I follow.
And so, I breathe again,
Or perhaps for the first time.
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In-between worlds and borders
Questioning the real
The good and evil
The unequal
The inherited, the acquired, and the equally imposed.

I am a creature
In-between cultures
Navigating through the trash
The beliefs that nullify me
To bury them.
Mother-Nature
Tenderly sutures
The rupture of my body
Once I freed myself from
My tough armor.
Because it does not mature
A wound that is not healed
A mind without madness
A heart without ties.
To flow is to destroy and to construct again
A house without walls
And to lose the fear to die.

Even though I follow,
Even though I hear,
Sometimes,
When breathing underwater
I still fear they might scream.
They with a universal name.
They with a masculine voice.
They with gentle speeches built
Upon dead bodies,
Silenced tongues,
And burned traditions.
Yet it's this terror
The source of my deception,
The colonial suffocation
Where the erasure of your body
Incarnates the privilege of mine.

This fear
Lies as the reminder
Of what they left behind.
The armor of
Self-denial,
The armor of
Colonial killing.
To bridge anew.
With homes surpassing borders,
With bodies knitting on each other
The healing colors of
Mother-Nature.

Atrocious contradiction
The four colors of corn in my color.
Abhorrent they say.
Dirty they say.
Animal they call you.
Because ignorance is
As fragile as fear,
And unlike yours,
Their skin is so thick
They cannot speak the
Wisdom of their bodies.
Uttering instead
The universal speech,
The unhuman solitary tone.
But not you.

Contradicci6n atroz.
Voz mestiza.
Echoing the power
Of self-calling,
Of collective calling,
Of nature calling.

Looking for my identity in a racist society
The colonial mind installed in my pupil
The reflection in the mirror gives me back what I believe
If I do not mold my soul.
I do it in the Eurocentric phallocentric models
That transform my experience into an exotic object
Painting cultures as something folkloric
Skipping the subjective from theoretical models.
They wanted me to keep quiet about the heritage of my blood
They wanted me to forget the violence against my mother
But they could not take from us the internal fire
The eternal knowledge
The signals found in dreams.
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They know it.
They know how disruptive
Bodies can be,
And how deceptive
Seeing can be.
And it is.
Because my eyes couldn't see,
And the mirror that reflects us
Is the same one that divides us.
Transforming the personal into
The laughable,
The cultural into
The exotic,
And the cosmic into
Madness.
But once I turned my back to the mirror,
I happened to see what was around me.
There I felt the haunting force
Of unspoken genealogies
And the roots of an earthly survival.
Because the power of the oral exceeds
The privilege of the written.
And so, I listen.

That is why we defend our land and its secrets
With two raised fists and amulets in the soul
With the force of the volcano
The roar of the jaguar
The strength of the female warrior and of the animal spirit.
It's almost full moon, Paola.
And lunatic I remember
Our last ritual.
It was full of love,
And you taught me to call me back.
To call my back
So I could bridge with you,
Nature,
Myself.
Together we heard you,
Rebeca.
We heard you
Calling yourself
And all the names,
Traditions, and tongues
Colonial killing attempted to silence,
But never dared to bury.
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Atrocious contradiction
The four colors of corn in my color.
So here we are.
Here we all are.
Calling our backs,
And the backs of the others,
So we can see,
And feel,
Backwards,
Non-linear,
And only with
Corporeal reflections.

Figure 1. A winter view from casa feminista. Personal photograph.

Figure 2. Our backs, as we face the waters that connect us (Gij6n, Asturias).
Personal photograph.

Figure 3. A screenshot from the video-clip of "Alma Mestiza" showing
Rebeca Lane singing with an aesthetic that addresses the message of the song.

Figure 4. A screenshot from the video-clip of" Alma Mestiza" showing
Rebeca Lane along with a group of women in friendly companionshipY
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queer bodies that make New York's west side piers queerly affective. I use "queer bodies" to
signal the dis-identification with heteronormativity or binaristic sexualities. Queer sexualities
carry political weight with regard to the comments that the politically loaded term "queer"
brings to public consciousness. So queer sexualities and queer bodies substantively challenge
cisgender and heteronormative social institutions that are disgustingly oppressive to the queer
bodies that, perhaps, use the piers as a space to mark their affective and emotive capabilities.
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, Affect and Manhattan's West Side Piers

Defining Atmosphere and Attunement

This paper thinks through the ways in
which places and spaces - two spheres of
endless and unprecedented possibilities become queerly and erotically atmospheric not
by simply who or what occupies the place or
space, but what bodies do or potentially do while
sited to a locale such as Manhattan's West Side
piers. LaToya Eaves (2014) argues that Black
women's
geographies
support
spatial
epistemologies and ontologies as well as
analyses of space, place, and landscape. I argue
that atmosphere is a spatial epistemology, an
analytic, and a concept that is almost already a
consequence and an affect of spatial production
and placemaking. I rely on the images from
Alvin Baltrop's The Piers to think through how
people who have been cast at the fringes of
society such as gay men, re-fashioned
Manhattan's West Side piers from the early 20th
century to the mid-1980s not by simply being
placed in space, but their queer performances
and acts alongside and within the piers. I deploy
queer as a critique, a social formation, and an
identity; it refers to people who embody and
enact forms of gender and sexual nonconformity
(Eaves 2014, McGlotten 2012, Bowden 2012).
Alvin Baltrop (1948-2004) was an important
Black queer photographer from the Bronx who
captured decaying landscapes, despair, and
sexuality, simultaneously. He documents a
period of queer eroticism between Stonewall and
the AIDS pandemic (1980s), his friends who
were in the Navy with him, the graffiti art of
Tava, and Gordon Matta-Clark's "Day's End."
He is widely known for his images of New
York's West Side piers in the 1970s. His images
are distinct insofar as they are voyeuristic, queer,
and erotic. Dreams into Glass notes that Baltrop's
photography does not end and begin with The
Piers, but rather, he documented images of the
homeless, young runaways, sex workers, and
public sexual acts throughout the city.

Geographic thought frames atmosphere as
an important dimension/ effect of Black queer
spatiality. On the one hand, Marxist geographers
have considered the reproduction of social
formations and class relations. On the other
hand, feminist geographers have thought about
the sex-gender system and the extent to which it
is spatialized. Yet humanist geographers who
take lived experiences as a point of departure
fail to address the point at which "bodies'
interiorities and exteriorities, depth, and
surfaces come together or apart" (Longhurst
2001, 24). Atmospheres help us contend with
this disconnect and find ourselves amongst the
complication that is characteristic of space
(Eaves 2014). Atmosphere is a becoming that is
felt rather than seen. Ben Anderson (2009)
defines atmosphere as the "shared ground from
which subjective states and their attendant
feelings and emotions emerge" (78). Anderson
also argues that it is the very ambiguity of
affective atmospheres - between presence and
absence, between subject and object, and
between the definite and indefinite that enable
us to reflect on affective experience as occurring
beyond, around, and alongside the formation of
subjectivity. Considering his theorization,
atmosphere envelopes social relationships in
place with people's subject formations, which
together make a given space-place distinct.
According to Kathleen Stewart (2011,
445), "Atmospheric attunements are a process of
what Heidegger (1962) calls worlding - an
intimate compositional process of dwelling in
spaces that bears, gestures, gestates, worlds.
Here, things matter not because of how they are
represented but because they have qualities,
rhythms, forces, relations, and movements."
Take Chinatown as an example. As a place, it has
forces, relations, and movements that are
responsive to the social and cultural desires of
the spaces in which it resides. This is to say that

the process of worlding and placemaking are, in
fact, political processes with cyclical affectual
consequences: attunements. Stewart explains
that when worlding happens, inhabitants may
fall in line with the status quo - even if that
status quo is derived from normalization
initiated by the state. "Chinatown" for instance
is a product of worlding that has been
co-produced by people and the state (an
institution that has now acted out its fetish of the
"other"). Attunement is called into being when
we consider the affective orientation of daily life.
Shaka McGlotten (2012) takes up attunement to
think through affective ordinariness that is
prompted by advanced or late capitalism in an
effort to do justice to a young Black gay boy who
was a victim of racist and homophobic violence.
McGlotten (2012) says,
[I]f theories of intersectionality work to
identify the structural inequalities that shape
everyday life as a world of violence, unequal
access, and limited or nonexistent resources
punctuated by a range of minor resistances,
then everyday life comes to refer only to
those forms of life lived under what bell
hooks
has
famously
called
White
supremacist capitalist patriarchy. This tends
to subsume what I take up to be some of the
critical stuff of life, the something-else-ness
of life - the ephemeral, or incoherent modes
of awareness, attunement (5).
I ask us to consider the something-else-ness that
seldom gets mentioned in writings on space and
place. Thereby, I take up attunement and
atmosphere as analytics that help us think
through how we - as social actors - understand,
produce, and utilize space, place, perhaps
outside of normalization; they signal a way to
craft and do spatiality. Spatiality is the theory
behind the production of space t~at is inherently
co-constitutive (Kirby 1996). Spatiality engages
the premise that space/place-making is a
process that involves remembering, animating,
and feeling. These practices and affects produce
atmosphere. The benefit of using the analytic of
atmosphere, and by extension, spatiality, is to

analyze what people do alongside what is felt in
a place - where social relationships and
performances are sited to understand some
extent of the desires and social identities that
mark the place. Atmosphere is the feeling that
encompasses the place and looms over and
between people.
Ben Anderson (2009) has conceptualized
atmosphere in relation to affective and emotive life.
Affect is an unmediated potential for things to
happen. Affect, according to Raymond Williams
(1977), involves a happening across structures of
feeling. There are a number of social, cultural,
and political inspirations that channel affect
ranging from media and capital to governments.
Emotive life, on the other hand, is the mediated,
static, and conclusive personal reaction of affect.
In this paper, I center the affective atmospheres
that happen with queer bodies that make New
York's west side piers queerly affective, and
make it, well, a distinct place. I use "queer
bodies" to signal the dis-identification with
heteronormativity or binaristic sexualities.
Queer sexualities carry political weight in regard
to the comments that the politically loaded term
"queer" brings to public consciousness.
Anderson's (2009) conceptualizations
and theorizations regarding atmosphere have
been motivated by Karl Marx (1856) who argues
that the capitalist mode of production conditions
people's lives; it presses on social life.
Simultaneously, atmosphere envelopes and
affects social life. Anderson (2009) is also driven
by the phenomenology of aesthetics by Mikel
Dufrenne (1973). According to Dufrenne, and by
extension, Anderson (2009), "atmospheres are
perpetually forming and deforming, appearing
and disappearing, as bodies enter in relation
with one another. They are never finished, static,
or at rest" (79). In this sense, Anderson is
alluding to the spatia-temporal and kinesthetic
aspects regarding movements, people, and as a
result, atmospheres.

Affect and Manhattan's West Side Piers

Baltrop's The
Atmospheric

Piers

(1977)

and

Becoming

To think through the structures of feeling
that preempts the production of space (Henri
Lefebvre 1974), I will center Baltrop's The Piers
(1977) to consider how New York City's
Christopher Street Pier (Pier 45) was
re-appropriated by gay men to meet, hangout,
and have public sex. While hiding from his
subjects, Baltrop strived to capture the liveliness,
unrest, and becoming of Pier 45.
Pier 45 and the West Side piers have
historically carried a queer atmosphere by what
people did in the area: hookup. In the early 20th
century, the area was a temporary outpost for
well over 500,000 seamen and other workers
who had traveled from all over the world. By
World War I, Pier 45 and the surrounding area
(see Figure 1 and Figure 2) was dense with bars,
warehouses, and men. Its isolation made it an
ideal location to have privacy in public (see
Chauncey 1994). There were a number of bars in
the area that had become a common cruising
area for gay men. Will Kohler (2016) says that
gay men in the mid-1960s would cruise between
the trucks that were parked under the raised
West Side Highway (now demolished) at night.
He goes on to say that that the trucks were
empty and unlocked, which allowed gay men to
have public sex, which was common up to the
early-1980s. Stonewall (1969) marked Pier 45 as
the nucleus of gay life since the riot was the act
that pushed back on the state and its arms that
were oppressing LGBT people who made claim
to the area. Considering public sex was a
common occurrence at the piers, they carry a
distinct atmosphere, which is historic and queer.
Atmospheres have both subjective and
objective qualities that are felt (emotional) and
pre-personal (affective). According to German
philosopher Gernot Bohme (1993),
Atmospheres
are
neither
something
objective, that is, qualities possessed by
things, and yet they are something
thing-like, belonging to the thing in that
things articulate their presence through

qualities - conceived as ecstasies. Nor are
atmospheres something subjective, for
example determinations of a psychic state.
And yet they are subject-like, belong to
subjects in that they are sensed in bodily
presence by human beings and this sensing
is at the same time a bodily state of being of
subjects in space (122).
In light of this quote, though
non-definitive, atmospheres are thing-like and
subject-like, simultaneously. In my sense of the
atmosphere of Pier 45, they are both/ and the
object of inquiry waiting to be discovered
through its (im)materially emotive and affective
capabilities. Atmospheres are realized· through
the senses; they are spatial happenings within
their indeterminate boundaries. Atmospheres
become through what bodies or things do. Think
how energies and intensities between bodies are
felt rather than traced or mapped. Perhaps
Bohme (1993) was accurate to leave his
estimation of atmosphere intentionally vague
and non-static.
Baltrop' s images in The Piers consider the
ways in which queer people make the piers
atmospheric instantaneously. Baltrop captures
the possibilities that the subjects make of the
space by what they do at the piers - either
through sex, sunbathing, or being physically
harmed. To be frank, Pier 45 becomes
atmospheric through distinctive behaviors and
body attractions and repulsions that are felt.
According to Anderson (2009), "atmospheres
have a characteristic spatial form - diffusion
within a sphere. Returning to Deleuze and
Guattari, we can say that atmospheres are
generated by bodies - of multiple types affecting one another as some form of
'envelopment' is produced" (80). In this case, the
sexualized bodies that are captured by Baltrop
are affecting. The images have the capability to
affect at the moment you may experience them
from elsewhere. In this regard, where and when
you may experience the images envelopes the
space, making it atmospheric.
Pier 45 becomes erotically atmospheric
through the ways in which the queer bodies

have been positioned relative to the piers, and
relative to one another. In Figure 3, two men lay
naked on the pier. The man pictured to the right
lays flat on the pier while the man pictured to
the left faces the man to the right; both men's
body language as it is captured in the image is
welcoming - their bodies attract. In Figure 4, 5,
and 7 men sit naked on the pier; lumber rests at
their feet. Their pensive gazes are oriented
toward the Hudson River (see Figure 1).
Although they are naked, their bodies rest; they
are comfortable with one another. Two men walk
past each other in a large, dilapidated
warehouse in Figure 6. The man pictured to the
left is smiling. He is wearing wide-legged jeans,
a white, plain t-shirt, and black shoes. He is
walking toward the camera and his gaze is
focused on the naked buttocks of the man on the
right. The man pictured to the right is walking
away from the camera. He is wearing black
boots, a leather vest, and wristwear on his right
wrist. In Figure 8, two men are engaging in oral
sex in front of a window in a room that is
cluttered with old lumber and crumbling cement
walls. The man pictured on the left wears only a
white t-shirt while his pants are below his knees.
His knees are bent, and his body is lowered close
to the ground to perform oral sex on the man
pictured to the right. The man on the right is
wearing a dark t-shirt and his pants are down;
he towers over the man on the left and his left
hand is touching the man on the left's shoulder.
Considering Baltrop's images, the gay men who
are sited at Pier 45 produce an atmosphere
which is queer and erotic due to their relative
queer acts - either through engaging in public
sex or resting on the pier. The queer and erotic
atmosphere is a significant dimension of queer
spatiality.
To borrow from Anderson (2009), "there
are two different spatialities. The first is the
spatiality of the 'sphere' in the sense of a certain
type of envelope or surround. The second
spatiality is spherical, but it is, more specifically,
a dyadic space of resonance - atmospheres
'radiate' from one individual to another" (80).
For me, the intersection of spatialities,
atmosphere, and queer life envelopes the

possibilities of queer sexual behavior and queer
place-making that underscores how places are
almost always sites of becoming. Anderson's
approach to spatialities and their connections to
atmospheres is informed by Edward Relph's
Place and Placelessness. Relph (1976) argues that
spatial experience has various intensities which
fall on a spectrum: "direct experience at one
extreme and abstract thought at another" (9).
Thereby, the placelessness of the piers,
particularly Pier 45, is an attitude, not a fact. The
attitude of the photos that are captured by
Baltrop is, in my opinion, characterized with
depth, rhythm, and intentionality of the queer
subjects that move within the sexualized
atmosphere of Pier 45. What I mean by depth is
what is seen and not seen but gestured towards.
Specifically, Baltrop's queer subjects are
gesturing towards the ways in which Pier 45, as
a place of becoming, is, perhaps, a site of
conceived and perceived sexualization and
queer identities. Secondly, the rhythms of Pier
45, as it has been captured by Baltrop have
affective and emotive capabilities through the
slowing of time-space by the gay men at Pier 45.
Consider how men are positioned in a way that
signals to the onlooker how time-space is
perhaps slowed through the leisurely gestures
and nudity. Now, closely gaze at the
intentionality of the queer subjects that are
captured by Baltrop. The intentionality of the
queer subjects to make the space of Pier 45
become erotically atmospheric through their
body
comportment
is rooted in the
understanding that Pier 45 is public space that is
not inviting to those who do not adopt
heteronormativity or politics of respectability. In
this regard, the piers are presented as an illegal
mechanism of colonialism- they are a publicly
private space, which means that they are only
understood to be a space reserved for those who
adopt respectability and live their public lives in
a heteronormative manner.
In a nuanced sense, spaces and places
become atmospheric according to people's
actions, their engagement with objects/things,
and the immaterial aspects that are felt. Taking
this further, the requirements for becoming

atmospheric involves some degree of depth,
rhythm, and intentionality. So, a space ~nd plac.e,
such as the piers, broadly, and P1er 45, m
particular, as they have been captured by Baltrop
have affects - that is, rhythms that have
intentionality and depth with felt consequences.
The requirements and the sensing of

atmosphere(s) are motivated by a set of politics
as well. Besides, ask yourself: for whom and for
what meaning making end do atmospheres
unfold? The answer may lie in the intentions of
the people who produce the space and place,
and, by extension, the atmosphere.

Figure 1. Map of Manhattan's West Side
Coogle Maps

Figure 2. Map of Manhattan's West Side (Satellite View)
GoogleMaps

Figure 3. Two men lay on the pier.
From Baltrop, Alvin (1977). Alvin Baltrop: The Piers. Madrid: TF Editores.

Figure 4. Two men sit unclothed on the pier.
From Baltrop, Alvin (1977). Alvin Baltrop: The Piers. Madrid: TF Editores.

Figure 5. Men lay on the pier.
From Baltrop, Alvin (1977). Alvin Baltrop: The Piers. Madrid: TF Editores.

Figure 6. Two men pass each other. One man gazes at a semi-nude man.
From Baltrop, Alvin (1977). Alvin Baltrop: The Piers. Madrid: TF Editores.

Figure 7. Three men sit and stand unclothed on the pier.
From Baltrop, Alvin (1977). Alvin Baltrop: The Piers. Madrid: TF Editores.

Figure 8. Two men engage in oral sex.
From Baltrop, Alvin (1977). Alvin Baltrop: The Piers. Madrid: TF Editores.
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Dispatches from Queer Potluck:
[Extra]ordinary Affects as a Project of
Belonging

This essay takes an approach that is part autobiography, part meditation on theory, in order to
engage with the tension between "ordinary affects" (Stewart 2007) and the queer extraordinary.
Drawing on my own experiences as part of an intentional community in Philadelphia, I
consider what it means for me to experience affect in queer space. How does that manifest in
the body, and the world in turn? How do these experiences fit into a larger desire for kinship
and belonging? My purpose here is not to make broad claims about what affect is (or is not), but
to provide a template for auto-ethnographic writing about the topic that is critical, self-aware,
and exploratory. Situated within a queer context, it highlights connections between moments of
everyday life and participation in discursive processes about what being [extra]ordinary means.
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We sit silently in a circle, on cushions and mats, some of us bare to the waist, some of us in flowing fabric.
We sit around a string of beads lying in the center on the floor. One of us- I can't remember who- tossed
it there to serve as the talisman or skeptron: whoever takes it up will have the right to speak and be heard.
The room is warm but dim, high-ceilinged and with walls covered in paintings. There is soft music and
the smell of freshly-burnt sage in the air. Memories of silent worship at Friends schools are on my mind,
and I think of the spirit moving me to speak. But I have nothing to say, at the moment; and it's my first
one of these meetings, so whenever I feel about to stir to action, the impulse is noticed, caught, and
suppressed. I want to see how it's done. So I wait until some imperceptible cue catches me off-guard: the
twitch of a hand, a tension in someone else's shoulders, their intake of breath. After a moment, it happens.
We all know [he] is about to do it just before [he] does it, leaning to grab the beads and begin -

•••
What I want to do here is feel my way in. For some time, I've been keenly aware of the
.-.-~ difference between attending potluck - one of the core activities of this self-proclaimed radical
association- and being present at potluck. At some point (when?), I transitioned from showing up
"'..._~,""""". , to entering. Many of those who come to the dinners each week, spanning the range of the gender
Hf;l~~,..
spectrum or casting it off entirely, have become my friends. Thursday night rituals of greeting,
embracing, lining up with plates in hand, have become second nature. But as comfortable as I
am now with being here, listening and learning, I still feel that something keeps me from total
engagement with the spirit of the group. I want to write my way into this, recording my senses
before they are assigned too much meaning; the aim is one of "disorienting and disrupting[ ... ]
impermanence and change" (Holman Jones and Harris 2019, 7).

•••
I became aware of the group through social media comments from friends of friends, allusions
to parties and dinners, the occasional oblique reference in literature. It is an intentional
community: wholeheartedly and unabashedly queer, centered around elders (but ultimately
without hierarchy), politically and civically engaged, a dash of universalist spirituality. For
years, I moved on the fringes, and when I was finally granted access, it was by luck more than
anything else. It was during a date in Manhattan, as we sat at Christopher Street Pier watching
the sunset; my companion mentioned the group and suggested I come to an event the next
night. (I didn't want to seem too eager, but I accepted.) It wasn't exactly the camaraderie I'd
hoped for and needed, at least at first -life in New York was too hectic, the get-togethers too
performative. Only after moving back to Philadelphia a few years later did it begin to feel like I
had time and breathing room to appreciate it more deeply.

t--- -

Niedt

1

I've been thinking about the experience of my body in queer space, trying to the capture with
definitions the intensities it feels and the way stimuli create responses. In its presentation, my
body signifies oppression: white, cis-male-presenting, mobile. The challenge is to know exactly
how much to self-negate, and how much to actively flex my embodied and exbodied privilege
for the benefit of others. Within spaces where queerness is the default position, I am aware of
relaxation. My movements feel more natural, less pre-judged and pre-determined. It seems like
an entirely different body than I am used to, unstable but celebratory. But when I think about
affect, I lean towards its preconscious aspect, occupying the interstices between actions and
conceptions, tangible in the body before it can be definable (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, Massumi
1995). Given the array of approaches to grappling with a topic that is, by (some) definition,
indefinable (Figlerowicz 2012), here is my own attempt at operationalizing affect: the landscape
of not-quite-noticeable physical intensities that underlie our experience of the world, which give
rise to things we name and categorize as emotions, reactions, understandings ... To be more
metaphorical about it, maybe affects are the seeds (or rhizomes?) whose character only becomes
apparent after they have already bloomed into discernibly different flora. They render
themselves unknowable, and yet each blossom carries the material to pollinate the next.

It is an imperfect definition. But it is what I use for the ruminations in this essay, whose
structure owes a great deal to Patricia Clough's (2008) genre-bending work. Feeling and writing
my way in means reading between the lines of my own history, looking for the affects in the
negative space. And when it comes to queerness - well, to paraphrase Eva Green in Casino
Royale, there are queer affects, and then there are queer affects. This is my attempt at the latter.
First and foremost, it is the story of my participation in a network of like-minded queer folks.

• • •
My eye gets lost in the artwork covering the walls, wide strokes of tempera paint on sheets of brown
paper, abstract but with shades of Haring. In the half-lit room their riotous colors are somewhat muted. I
know that the apartment's owner created them, though I never watched [him] do any of these particular
pieces; I have seen [him] make other works; and my mind combines these two pieces of information to
visualize [his] hands holding the brush, tacking the finished paper to the plaster. This assumed history
unfolds even as the two of us are sitting together on the other side of the room, talking about
who-knows-what. Later, [he] will see me drawing sigils of my own; later still, one of these will take their
place in the kitchen, like a proud parent adding a child's scribble to the fridge. But how do I confess that
[he] was the one who inspired me to try in the first place? That the echo of [his] past is what the
wandering eye translated into the unlocking of (one small corner ofJ my future? It feels too simple to call
this inspiration, but I search for some other way to honor what moments like this have done for me, to
articulate the connecting spark -

•••
(I've resisted using many specifics here when talking about the community. This is not out of a
desire for secrecy but to maintain privacy, even given the encouraging feedback from members
who have read the draft of this essay, some of whom appear in it. Perhaps I'm also afraid of
disturbing the enchantment that I've been able to feel time and again within the boundaries it
constantly seems to re-invent. But as one friend said before I made contact with the group in
New York, "If you need to find them, you'll find them.")

My first experience with the Philadelphia branch was one of these potlucks, at an apartment in
Center City, a space rich with more body positivity, fluid identity, and ritualism than I had ever
encountered at one time before. Tables groaned from the surfeit of homemade dishes. There
seemed to be much greater bodily, psychological, and socioeconomic diversity among those
present than among the New Yorkers. They were not as self-conscious about their overt
expression of queerness; they cared more about safety and survival, an atmosphere of home,
recognizing and understanding each other. Certainly there was all the language and structure of
"fictive kin," interactions that indexed a familial connection, echoing Weston's descriptions of
dinner with a self-declared family of choice (1997). But forming deeper ties that endured from
one week to the next was a benefit, not the Point; what stands out to me as the central
experience was the process of displacement, sense-making, and alignment that kept recurring
every week. Each time I walked through the door, arms full of vegan, gluten-free casseroles,
there was the potentiality of that cycle. Halberstam (2011) talks about forgetfulness as a strategy
of disconnection from more retrogressive, even damaging, ideas of kinship. Given the large size
of the community, there were always different configurations of people with shifting gender
expressions, names, relations. To strategically forget was a prerequisite of attendance, creating a
fugue state from which new potentialities of queer kinship, new social ties and the significances
they bear, could emerge .
•

o;....•

. ..

---,.. •

•••

We begin by joining hands and announcing our names and pronouns. The pronouns are a recent
addition, and some of the more traditionally-minded are not fond of the change. But there are many
younger folks here now, bearing different ideas about the world and how it is put together, so we want to
be respectful. We go around the circle one by one. There are some faces I recognize, and some I don't,
either of which may correspond to the names I recognize, or don't. (People come and go so strangely here!)
The wave of voices comes to me, and I say for the first time about my pronoun, "whatever you like." I
mean it, I realize. Does it make a difference to me if someone in this space refers to me by this third-person
pronoun or. that one, especially if I'm not standing there to hear it? Not particularly. There is a nervous
sensation that I begin to understand is a feeling of liberation; I think I came to a decision about gender
and my destination in relation to it. Some part of my brain conducted that into my answer just before I
spoke it. Now the words are echoing in the air, which is when words always feel truest. And then the
pause is over, and the next voice begins to sound -

•••
Affect seems to occur in the moments when our shared breaths mysteriously synchronize. I am
suddenly, specifically aware of the bones and muscle tension in my neighbor's hand as I hold it.
There is someone across the room who I find myself attracted to, or more precisely intensified by.
Before this is translated by the undeniable privileging of sexuality in queer space, there is a
sudden, inexplicable compulsion to merely be close that pre-empts lust. Each sensation
recognized and assigned meaning in a queer context; it is like gathering wildflowers.

Lately, as though it were some kind of bibliomancy, I've been flipping through Kathleen
Stewart's Ordinary Affects (2007) each night before bed, looking for resonance in the slice-of-life
vignettes that populate the book. When I first read it, some of the moments, framed by Stewart's
theoretical comments, felt familiar to me; others call on places and circumstances that are so
foreign, I struggle to find any kind of connection with the people (should I call them subjects?
characters?) that are described. The affects that echoed in me as I read and digested those stories
resolved into feelings that didn't sit right, that were almost clinical. How sad. How charming.
What I recognize now is that I had approached these stories on unfamiliar terms rather than
their own. Perhaps it's just that as a queer urbanite, moments from the rural U.S. don't generate
the same intensities in me. Maybe I've internalized a combative stance towards what they
represent, reading into their heteronormative framework an implicit (or, at certain points in the
book, explicit) homophobia. Whatever the cause, I find myself searching too consciously for
connections between my own experience of affect and what is going on in this book. Why can't I
get hold of it? Stewart's language is by turns elegant and meditative, always as complete as it
needs to be; linguistically, I can understand the content, so what is the fundamental break?

If ordinary affects underlie some set of universal experiences and sentiments, then presumably
there must be extraordinary affects as well, with the basic denotation of "outside the ordinary"nothing more, nothing less. But it's all relative, of course. Martin (1994) and Love (2015), among
others, take queer theorists and those who seek to enact their ideas to task for creating a
differential experience that doesn't necessarily have to exist. Why try so hard to be
extraordinary or deviant at all? I think there is room for both attitudes: as long as mainstream
culture continues to draw lines of exclusion, then folks who do queerness ought to reclaim and
reframe their deviance as exceptionality. Yet surely most people believe that the average
moments of their lives aren't that special. Cavalcante (2018) argues for broadening the concept
of the ordinary to encompass the everyday experiences of those whom mainstream society
usually considers and represents as anything but (in particular, transgender folks). And even
affects arising from the most substantial events, generating the most dizzying of emotions, must
eventually lose their extraordinary character with enough repetition or time to acclimate to
them. But if forgetfulness is a virtue, isn't is possible to resist that? What would it mean to keep
the affects always extraordinary, to make a life out of those? How unusual! How queer!

It's too easy to say that my experiences in the community never seem to get old (because they
often do), or that they are always entirely new (because they often aren't). Rather, as they build
up a life, they are in turn built upon an impossibility of expectations. Like a villanelle or a
ghazal, being part of the community has a rhyme scheme and refrains, but the frisson comes
from the anticipation of the unknown that fills in the rest of it. Extraordinary affects are the ones
you never feel coming, even though some part of you knows they will.

•••
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I offer what I can. For some folks, this might be their only meal today, and I want to contribute. This
evening I've made something that I hope will tick all the dietary-restriction boxes: sweet potato and apple
crumble, verified gluten-free oats on top, soaked in maple syrup steeped with ginger. [They] come to the
table, looking over the ingredient cards and considering what is edible and what is not. My dish is put to
the test: vegan, gluten-free, soy-free, perfect! But alas! [they] don't care for sweet potato. There is a
tightening in my chest that resolves into a mix of emotions that can't be teased apart, although certainly
disappointment is in there. As I sit across from the table in silence, I see [them] hold one hand over a bowl
of hummus, dangling a pendulum that oscillates in small loops. Disappointment gives way to curiosity as
I comprehend that [they] are divining the food. What sensation must that produce? I imagine it would be,
and thereby I feel through some kind of sympathy, a flutter in the stomach. But more likely it's a tremble
in the hand, some distinctive magnetism that points this way and that-

•••

~~~~~~

To move queerly through the world entails an experience of queer affects, and if those proceed
from the body, they can also be positioned in space. The same could be said of queerness itself:
whether it is an affect, an identity, or some other construct entirely, it has something to do with
the body - therefore space. I am thinking in particular of how Ahmed (2006, 2010) outlines a
form of queer phenomenology that addresses this concept, and points to how far it extends.
Individuals, deep-seated social and cultural structures, arrangements within arrangements of
objects ... what is it like to encounter them? Perhaps the most useful thing I've learned by going
to potluck is to resist the attribution of gender, reflexively. Having met so many wonderful
people who mix, flex, and otherwise trouble the parameters of gender has made it easier, but the
affect still persists. My eyes take in the visual data of clothing, body shape, facial features, et
cetera. In that yawning half-second where they are assembled into an individual, the impulse to
categorize male/female is still there, and I don't know if it will ever go away.

(Note that Stewart (2007) refers to herself as "she" throughout her book in order "to mark the
difference between this writerly identity and the kind of subject that arises as a daydream of
simple presence" (5). The approach appeals to me, but my daydream, and the daydream of the
others who populate my memory, have become progressively more ungendered. If third-person
gender mu~t be assigned at all, I want it to be bracketed, asterisked, to denote its uncertainty.)

There should also be a distinction drawn between queer and extraordinary affects, even though
the definition of the former implies that it must be part of the latter. Take the dinner table, for
instance. (As Ahmed (2006) points out, "Queers have their tables for sure. Stories of queer
kinship will be full of tables" (167).) If I were thinking queerly, I look at the potluck table and
know, before I even realize that I know, that there is difference here with every other potluck
table around which I've sat outside this space. But then I also recognize difference of the
experience itself, simultaneous to my recognition of the object. The meanings layered into the
table that follow my translation of that intensity separate: I understand the nature and
non-standard familial origins of the food, queer by virtue of what this represents in discourses
of various shapes and sizes. And memories of all the encounters with potluck tables in my life
become a metric in my mind, extraordinary by virtue of what this represents only for me.

•••
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Dispatches from Queer Potluck
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[She] is young, barely twenty-two; [she] identifies as Black, and [she] is in the process of transitioning
(transgressing, transcending) gender. [Her] nerves sometimes fire unexpectedly: a gasping laugh, a
strained exclamation, the flutter of hands. We are in another room of the apartment after the meal has
finished, sharing a decaying couch as we gather with others at the coffee table, sorting through markers
~t::IINl'll and sketches. I could hardly be more different from [her], and it is true that we have little common
conversational ground. [She] has endured more hardship than I could ever dream of But we are
physically close, our skin just about touching. Energy thrums between us. It generates an impulse to say
something, do something, as though by overcoming our immediate nearness, I should do my part to
narrow our ongoing distance, negotiating the disparity between these two coexisting states. But I am not
the one who acts. A cup of cheap wine is passed around like communion. [She] gives it to me, teaches my
hand the feel of reassurance. A firm and warm reminder that [she] is still here-

•••
What can I call gratitude? It's not just what stems from the physical sensation of nourishment,
or from the honest acknowledgment for those in need; I am fortunate to have other parts of my
life where I receive these things. What the group has taught me most in its coming-together,
what I am most grateful for, are the lessons in hearing from others' experiences, understanding
the differential between theirs and mine, and the encouragement to do something about it. From

each according to [their] ability, to each according to [their] needs.

The trap is the inclination to center my own experience at the expense of others, running the
risk of committing one more form of violence. The intersectionality of my identity is largely
unhindered by forms of systemic discrimination. And while that of many other potluck guests
can become a "prism" (de Vries 2015) that sheds complex light on the unfolding of identities,
bodies in space, it would be inappropriate for me to make claims about how that revelation
happens for anyone else. This account is self-centered because it has to do with affect, which is
about as intensely personal and phenomenological a thing one can explore. I did not conduct
interviews or provide direct quotations, this time. (In this regard, besides his attention to the
difficulties and horrors of the trans experience, de Vries' work is a further inspiration for its
interplay of perspectives.) Yet the feeling of contrasting experience in interaction has been
enough to make me question my own positioning, as I try to grasp what affects I might
engender in others, before they become full emotions. If someone at potluck tells me I make
them uncomfortable, it is my duty to change my behavior, but my hope is that this never has to
happen. Before their moment of conscious discomfort, my task as one of the most unreasonably
privileged is to allow awareness to permeate my muscles, nerves, and skin, habituating myself
to automatically do or not do whatever it takes to put others at ease. I have to accept that this is
not always possible, and equally that I must keep trying.

Ahmed (2006) refers to the "hesitation" that characterizes putting a queer body forward into
space, an exposure of the body that - depending on the nature of the place, the nature of the
body and its expression, and that of other bodies present - opens up a range of possibilities
from violence to "[giving] the world a new shape" (102). I recognize my own bodily capital. Key
elements of the gender identities I perform can be put on or removed, stored in a backpack or
hidden under a coat as I walk to and from the potluck through the Philadelphia Gayborhood.
My being doesn't really challenge anyone as I pass, which is a source of something that grows
into guilt, especially when I hear stories of the harassment or threats that others have received
for their more overtly non-binary appearance and behavior. I tell myself that I should be flexing
my privilege and trying to tear down heteronormativity in my own city; I fail to do so, again
and again. On some level, maybe I feel that I deserve happiness, and as Heather Love (2007)
puts it, "Sometimes it seems that the only way for queers to start being happy is to stop being
queers" (62). But it is ridiculous for me to feel that I have to suppress myself, when there is
already so little to suppress, and balanced against that is my desire for kinship, for solidarity.

•••
We see each other in the coffeeshop on some random Tuesday afternoon; I am stopping in on my way from
point A to point B, [he] is there canvassing for work. We hug and exchange pleasantries; I show off my
latest nails, an iridescent navy topped with blue glitter that took me an hour to get right. At the table for
two, covered in flyers, stickers, clipboards, these few minutes feel like a micro-potluck. The same rules
apply. There are no assumptions of gender. Yet there is something uneasy, as though we have pulled back
the curtains on our own private space and let the world gather at the window. [He] is wearing a nametag
with [his] Christian alias, not the name I know [him] by. And when the barista calls mine, my throat
tightens into embarrassment. Now we have been given weaponry to use against each other, that we did
not ask for and will not use. I take my coffee in hand and say my farewells. We hug again. I move towards
the exit, feeling that I could have added something more or done something differently-

•••
My goal here was not to be opaque or self-important about affect and my relationship with it.
But I think it is a concept we all could think about a little more, not just within the queer
community. Increased attention to how the world brushes against us (and vice versa) can lead
us to greater self-awareness. That being said, any group that is consistently reified as an Other
needs every tool it can get its hands on to make sense of every quality of their experience. To be
labeled as queer suggests that one's affects are seen as similarly skewed. I believe in writing into
this experience: even though there is insufficient language to accurately convey the
preconscious, there is still some benefit to be gained in describing what it surrounds. To narrate
one's own history, to dig as deep as one can down the roots of the emotions therein, to pay
attention to one's own body as it moves through space and encounters other bodies, floating
among the webs of discourse - all of these are valuable elements of a project whose end goal is,
perhaps, a queer and affective belonging.

Dispatches from Queer Potluck

I don't mean to say that everyone who identifies as queer will have the same visceral reaction to
everything that befalls them, in no small part because such a wide variety of other factors
influence what does. Nor will every queer individual interpret their responses in the same way.
But what does cut across this diversity of phenomena is the outsider's expectation that those
responses will be something other than "normal," their impressions of the world distorted by - - their queer orientations (Ahmed 2006). Rather than allowing this to be a mark of negative •--""';z__·
distinction, we can build contexts where it becomes a source of strength. Despite all the
fractures within the queer population, the affects we share can empower us to reject the
normative understanding of how one "should" approach the world. And while I have focused
on queer issues here as the disjoint I feel, the same potential is there (as long as it is borne out of
support and validation) for any group whose way of being is nonstandard, demonized, or
suppressed. From what I have experienced, I believe the best way to find that kind of existential . ._....,
security is through sharing space with those of like mind- or rather, not-quite-mind, the thing
that comes before thought.

L-----::11

This essay was an attempt to explore one possible unfolding of this idea, with its
communitarian result. I do sincerely believe that queer space enables intensities that are
somehow ineffably different, if for no other reason than they are discursively positioned as such. 1!-="!'!!'!!!!W:·
Even in that difference, some kind of comfort and connection can be found. In the most esoteric,
ritualistic moments, the ones that would most perplex those who most stringently believe in
normativity, there is an opportunity for a new and familiar kind of ordinary that is
simultaneously extraordinary.

•••
After the plates have been cleared and the compost tucked into plastic containers, some of us are sitting or
reclining on cushions, chatting and listening to music. We talk flea markets, politics, recent moves across
town. A track comes on the speaker with an insistent beat that moves underneath our talk. It's impossible
to say how it starts: someone begins tapping [their] fingers against a metal bowl, someone else the armrest
of a chair. Heads nod. Feet move. Even as we keep discussing the matters of the week, rhythms arise and
dissipate as each person's body in the circle finds its own way of engaging with the music. Our host steps
away for a moment and returns with more bowls and a drum . Soon enough, the conversation is drowned
in percussion and -from one corner - wordless singing. No one prepared for a jam session, but everyone
was ready for it, it seems. The kind of synchronicity and improvisation one might expect from session
musicians is replicated here, around the potluck table. Motive force replies to motive force. This is our
affect - kinship created by the unified action of bodies, upturning chairs now and banging on floors,
someone has produced a trumpet, of all things, from who-knows-where- just another night at potluck in
something we can call home -

•••

disClosure
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For many postcolonial diasporic subjects,
belonging and not belonging are often negotiated
within conceptions of home. Home is a geography
that contains memories and emotions that are, in
the postcolonial context, linked to displacement,
histories of conflict, and colonial exile. As a result,
home, or the idea of home, can be defined as an
emotional location rather than a strictly material
and three-dimensional geographical location. The
manifestation of these emotional locations whether through human relationships, spaces, or
the memory of metaphorical and physical
heirlooms and artefacts - have affective qualities
that can engender intergenerational linkages
among postcolonial diasporic subjects, creating
potential spaces for recovery and belonging. In
other words, the idea of home, and its emotional
meanings and its familial significations, can be
transferred on to objects, artefacts, and heirlooms.
I suggest that the question of home and
belonging, specifically in the context of South
Asian postcolonial diasporas, is connected to past
1
traumas of colonization and displacement. This
article addresses, therefore, how trauma,
displacement, and colonialism can be understood
through and with material culture, and how
familial objects and items emit and/ or carry
within them, emotional narratives. I expand upon
1

In this article I refer to members of the South Asian
diaspora as postcolonial subjects and to their
experiences of trauma as both postcolonial and colonial
experiences of violence. I slide between postcolonial
and colonial violence, in this context, because of the
ways in which some subjects experienced the violences
of pre-Partition and Partition, which were moments of
direct colonial encounters with the British Raj. Some of
those same subjects and their family members,
generations later, continue to experience the ripple
effects of that catastrophic event in a postcolonial
context. Thus, my slippage between the terms colonial
and postcolonial indicates the ways in which
colonialism is part of the on-going present (Bhabha
1994). I am referring here to the argument in the field of
postcolonial studies that the "post" in postcolonial does
not refer to an "after", but rather works as a marker
from where we start to recognize the presence of
"coloniality" or "modernism" (7).

existing conversations regarding objects and
homes having emotional value in the context of
displacement by arguing that understanding
material things as affective objects allows us to
rethink the ways in which colonial histories of
violence are taken up within official archives; and
that considering material things in this way makes
room for alternative epistemological sites to exist.
Put simply, my argument addresses how within
the context of colonial and postcolonial violence
for South Asian diasporas, there are some
experiences of trauma and violence that are
beyond words. The inability to articulate
experiences of colonial and postcolonial violences
results in a lack of space within official state
narratives about personal experiences of
displacement. The absence of voices of those
diasporic subjects in official records then in turn
allows for practices of silence to permeate
intergenerational understandings of home and
belonging for those communities. Thus, I turn to
the affective currency that emit and transfer on
and down from objects, by diasporic subjects, to
access the potential recovery of otherwise silenced
narratives of colonial and postcolonial trauma.
In this article, I situate affective objects
within postcolonial frameworks by using
diaspora, trauma, and object theories. I begin by
unpacking the ways in which affect as a concept is
taken up within the field of affect studies and how
it extends to non-organic matter, or objects. In this
way I attend to the question of "why objects?", or
what about the nature of physical things allows
for a useful discussion on affect? This then leads
into a discussion of how affective objects inform
notions of belonging through the loss of home.
Here, I look to the ways in which ideas of home
and belonging are particularly contentious for
diasporic subjects within postcolonial histories
and discourses. I consider how home, for South
Asian diasporic subjects, can thus become mobile
when we consider affective objects as narrative
and voice-giving entities. I use the specific
example of the Partition of India in 1947 as a
violent historical moment that saw the
displacement of millions of people - where
individuals were forced to flee and abandon their
dwellings only to resettle in the abandoned homes
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of their "enemies" on the other side of the border.
In this way, I examine the ways in which survival
and
recovery
of
such
traumas
are
intergenerationally passed on and down through
physical objects. Finally, these theories and
discussions come together to recognize that the
potential space created by affective objects can be
voice-giving to otherwise silenced narratives in
postcolonial archives.
Affective Objects

Affect is described by Sarah Ahmed (2010)
as "what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the
connection between ideas, values, and objects"
(29). Affects are those prediscursive forces that are
outside our conscious knowing and emotions that
impact our thoughts and types of relationships.
Melissa Gregg and Gregory Steigworth (2010)
explain that there is no pure or original state of
affect. It is something that can be found in the
"in-between-ness" of our ability to act and is
therefore a result of a state of relation and the
passage of that force (1). As well, affect is an
ever-changing and ever-evolving force and its
movements vary depending on the type of body
or thing it encounters. Emotional geographer
Steve Pile (2010) describes affect as "a
transpersonal capacity which a body has to be
affected (through affection) and to affect (as the
result of modifications)" (8). That is, affect has
potential possibilities through its capacities. Affect
is always expanding into areas of (and beyond)
living, non-living, matter, sensation, events,
atmospheres, and feeling-tones (Gregg and
Steigworth 2010, 2).
In this paper, I look at affect specifically as
it extends onto objects and things. An object's
affective quality can be determined based on its
location and time -when and where the object is
situated is when and where one would experience
its affect. This is to say that to experience an object
as affective is to consider not only the object, but
also what is around the object (Ahmed 2010, 33).
As Ahmed explains, to be affected by something is
to assess that thing, to understand it (31). In
pairing affect with objects in order to reassess
certain postcolonial histories of violence, what is

thus created is a space to get to the truth (Morrison
1998) of lived experience, which are often left out
of official state-sanctioned histories. I am referring
here to Toni Morrison's discussion on truth vs.
facts as she states, "[ ... ] facts can exist without
human intelligence, but truth cannot" (93). I
particularly push against investigations of
"official" histories of the South Asian diaspora those narratives that are deemed "legitimate" or
"acceptable" (whether it be memorials, official
documents,
history
books,
etc.).
These
"acceptable" narratives were, mostly, written by
those who had not experienced the trauma of
displacement or indeed were the very colonial
bodies that incited the violence. In this way I
attend to the voices of displaced postcolonial
Indians that were otherwise silenced. The
importance of this idea lies in its exploration of
those silences and the ways in which we can
access them without disrupting the well-being of
the victims of displacement.
In understanding objects as affective sites,
we can find that materiality is not only the value
of an object. The value, for the most part, exists in
the tangible processes of humans' interactions
with things (Hockey 2007). Humans are as
material as the objects they make and are also
moulded by the supposedly "dead matter" that
they are surrounded by (138). As Hockey et al.
state in reference to Peter Pels, "things also tell us
who we are, not in words, but by embodying our
intentions. In our everyday traffic of existence, we
can also learn about ourselves from objects, almost
as much as from people" (138). Objects and
material agency foster powers that raise hope,
induce loss and sadness, and create fear and
happiness- along with other human-based senses
and emotions. They can also engender a space for
memories and memory-sharing, particularly when
we begin to consider objects as "inalienable
possessions" - things that cannot be replaced by
any other object (Myers 2001, 9). It is to this
approach that I consider a very particular
human-object relationship in cherished items.
"Inalienable possessions" are types of
objects that are categorized as artefacts, heirlooms,
and
familial
belongings.
Heirlooms
are
symbolically heavy with cultural meaning and are

1

collected as prized ancestral relics (Myers 2001, 9).
Annette Weiner (1992) describes how the
heaviness or "denseness" of such objects is created
through ancestral histories, the object's association
with its "owner," secrecy, sadness, and sacredness.
Heirlooms and objects are also exchanged, passed
around, passed on, and if they are tied to familial
histories, can be read as replacements to
memories. As identity-bearing objects that hold
memories, heirlooms become what Weiner
describes as "keeping-while-giving" (13). The
residual effects of the individual's experience are
intermingled with the heirloom's affects as it is
passed along. Therefore, the materiality. of
everyday objects and their survival across tlme
and location illuminates a particular relationship
between human lives, memories, experiences, and
culture.
The memories of such objects, I argue, are
accessed through genealogical connections and
intergenerational stories. This is to say that these
have
culturally
specific
objects,
which
transmittable memories, do not do this same kind
of emotional work if separated from their
ethnographic ties when, for example, they are
reclassified as "art" and placed in museums in a
2
Western context (Myers 2001, 10). Within
postcolonial frameworks, the relocation of
2

To clarify the concept of the varying types of
emotional work done by the narratives attached to
affective objects, I consider their context. That is, the
narrative that is given or prescribed to objects (in the
form of panels or didactic texts) that have been taken
from the homes and possession of postcolonial subjects
and put into Western institutional settings, like a
museum or archive - usually at the hands of the
colonizer -does not evoke this same kind of connection
when it comes to familial narratives and objects. That
is, the object itself may resist the narrative that it is
assigned in a museum setting (through its affectual
currency and residue), but its assigned panel or
description (which has been written by the institution)
.....r---. that it accompanies, does not tell its truth, but rather,
more of its "facts" (Morrison 1998, 93).

materials and material culture insists on an
understanding that value cannot be simply
defined but that is engrossed in various routes of
exchange, display, and storage (12). The
appropriation of culturally significant items into
colonial routes of exchange are historically loaded,
thus the ways in which affective objects can be
read as sites of recovery can only be done so
within the setting of familial narratives of victims
of colonial and postcolonial violence. In the
context of familial heirlooms, a genealogical link is
used as a space to communicate, but while
keeping in mind the complexity of such
relationships. Thus, the spaces in which these
affective objects are held become important vessels
in which belonging and not belonging is
negotiated. This space is traditionally considered
to be the home or familial dwelling. However, for
South Asian postcolonial diasporic subjects, the
loss of such a space opens the possibility of
notions of home becoming mobile, as home
attaches itself to its affective objects.
Home and Belonging

Anat Hecht (2001) powerfully states, "to
lose a home. is to lose a private museum of
memory, identity and creative appropriation"
(123) . To be separated from one's home and
belongings is often equated to being separated
from all that is familiar and steady. When
discussing the South Asian diaspora, this
separation is particularly important to note
because diaspora cannot exist without the loss of
home or the displacement from homelands. This
unfolds vis-a-vis identity formation (the loss of
home is a kind of identity loss, too). Moreover,
homes are not just sites of conditioning, social
relations, and economic management; they also
represent a position that is in relation to the nation
as a whole. The house is not only integral to the
individual identity, but that of the community and
nation in its entirety. This is to say that place and
home represent belonging in terms of individual
identity as well as citizenship and national
identity (Hua 2011, 52).
In understanding the home as a pivotal
component in both the construction of individual

and national identity, we can then look towards
the physical things that make up the home. A
house holds an array of different materials and
therefore collectively creates a living experience
that is more important than the total of its parts
(Hecht 2001, 123). All of these materials are
supplied with meaning, memory, and emotion,
which are what turn a house - infrastructure,
property - into a home. However, in the context of
postcolonial diasporic experiences, homes and all
their various held objects become lost or
displaced. This concept exposes the tangled
tensions that exist between humans and objects,
drawing specific attention to objects that are
removed or demolished and thus do not "out-live"
their owners. With this I ask: if objects are
supposed to be cherished sites of memory, what
happens when these sites are destroyed or ruined?
What is at stake if an identity-forming
environment, like a home, disappears? And,
finally, how does the idea of home, and
displacement, play out across generations?
One of the ways to begin thinking about
the connections between objects, memory,
emotion, diaspora, and location, is to notice how,
during war and conflict, objects are both removed
and cherished. The emotive energies emitted by
artefacts and objects appropriated during war by
members of the "enemy" community demonstrate
the non-human agency and consequential affective
ties that material goods have. Yael Navaro-Yashin,
in her work Affective Spaces, Melancholic, Objects:

Ruination and the Production of Anthropological
Knowledge (2009), for example, considers people
who are displaced from their homes and are
forced to flee and take shelter in other abandoned
houses, producing the odd result of a diaspora
living in homes of another diaspora; and in doing
so, she explores how it feels to live with objects
and within ruins left behind by the earlier,
displaced, community. Navaro-Yashin describes
the things within houses as being charged with the
traces of other people's lives. She demonstrates
how homes are charged with "cultural agency"
and as objects of political and legal substance
(179).
Her
specific
study
examines
Turkish-Cypriots' relations to houses, land, and
objects
that
they
appropriated
from

Greek-Cypriots during the war of 1974 and the
subsequent Partition of Cyprus.
Through this work, the notion that those
who have been uprooted from their homes
because of the threat of war, conflict, or violence is
investigated by the ways in which they become
surrounded by objects of ruin. For Navaro-Yashin
"ruined matter" refers to things that are a result of
an act of violation (5). She explains that these
abject objects and environments have acquired
their status because they could not be carried or
taken with their owners due to the displacement
incited by conflict or war, rather than because
these things were not needed or wanted. This
rejected material is then reused, recycled, and
appropriated by those who are left behind.
The emotive energy of focus in
Navaro-Yashin's work is melancholia, or what she
calls "maraz" (4). According to Navaro-Yashin,
maraz is a way the displaced Turkish-Cypriots
described their condition of depression in their
inner state of being. It is a state of deep and
unrecoverable sadness that is located by the lack
of calmness and happiness within their internal
selves (4). It is a concept that represents a feeling
that is beyond words; an affective state that
permeates experiences of survival for victims of
displacement. These spatial and experiential
tensions highlight the dualism between the
material and the ideational, between tangibility
and social imaginaries (1), which becomes key in
analysing the colonial discourses that encapsulate
the portable affective objects. That is, what
becomes apparent are the limitations of language
when it comes to experiences of trauma.
The limitations of language when
expressing
experiences
of
colonial
and
postcolonial trauma results in some members of
postcolonial diasporic communities becoming
emotionally attached to, and therefore internally
(psychically) responsive to, family mementos,
objects, and artefacts; it is this process that helps
underscore the connections between the material
and the ideational. As a result, emotion can be
understood alongside memory and affect in order
to draw attention to how the human "senses" are
inseparable from the ways people act and live.
This coupling allows us to think about the

relationship between human and object and
encourages new understandings of how colonial
histories are inseparable from material objects that
existed in and through conflicts, displacements,
and migrations (Edwards 2006, 4).
Remembering Difficult Histories

In the context of the South Asian diasporic
subjects, histories
of colonialization and
displacement are most notably centered around
the catastrophic event of the Partition of India in
1947. The end of the British Raj resulted in the
birth of two nations: India and Pakistan- an event
that led to murderous riots, unspeakable violence,
and mass loss of lives and homes. Partition saw
the division and separation of Hindu, Muslim and
Sikh populations into newly assigned countries,
creating interethnic conflicts and fissures that
continue to have rippling effects to date. This
event, in many ways, parallels but does not twin
with the Partition of Cyprus that Navaro-Yashin
focuses on in her study. The Partition of India and
Pakistan also resulted in a mass displacement of
between eight to ten million people who were
forced to flee across the border into their newly
created country of either India or Pakistan (Didur
2006, 4). The violence of this rupture saw the death
of half a million people, and whole communities
abandoned their homes and belongings on one
side of the border to resettle on the other side in
the deserted homes and spaces of their "enemies"
who were doing the same thing in their homes
(Das 2007, 20).
The suddenness of this loss and relocation
manifested a lasting trauma on victims of this
have
been
passed
on
violence
that
intergenerationally. Dhooleka Raj (2000) notes that
amongst the three different generations that
experienced different stages and moments of
Partition and post-Partition, there are various
understandings of what Partition is and was.
These generations grew up in different periods
and their family narratives are disjointed. At the
same time, those who directly experienced
Partition often obscured their stories when passing
them on to other generations by often sharing
or "different" memories of the events. As

Gyanendra Pandey (2001) explains, these new
memories did not often include Partition when
they were retold; what emerged was the mentality
that stated, "what is the point telling today's
children about these things? [... ] All that has
nothing to do with their lives and their problems"
(16). From this, the story of Partition as told to the
children and grandchildren of victims, becomes
faded from shared stories. In this way, the voices
of the victims are strikingly silent and many do
not recount their experiences unless asked (Das
2007, 80). As well, the knowledge of Partition's
trauma is not explicitly shared between parents
and children - therefore the sharing of stories
between family members becomes understood as
silent practices (Raj 2000, 31). Raj explains that
individuals do not want to remember, that families
do not want to "recall the bad times" (36), and that
many would rather avoid the stigma of being
known as a refugee. This becomes particularly
potent for Sikh diasporas in post-Partition India,
as the newly formed India became a Hindu state
and Pakistan a Muslim state, and the Sikh
community suddenly found themselves belonging
to nowhere.
The absorption of Partition narratives into
silent practices has meant that many descendants
of the refugees do not realize that when their
refugee family members left the Pakistan side to
come to India, and vice versa, they assumed the
move was temporary (39). There is a lack of
understanding, by the later generations, of how
the migration was perceived as impermanent and
what difficulties were faced when the refugees
realized they were, indeed, not going back home.
What resulted for the displaced was a deep feeling
of nostalgia and a desire to see their homes one
last time, which they could not do, leaving many
not wanting to speak about Partition at all (39).
On the side of official state narratives,
Partition, as a subject, has been generally
neglected in Indian public culture - there have
been no attempts to "memorialize Partition"
through monuments, museums, or even public
hearings and trials (Das 2007, 19). This approach
has had an impact on how refugees feel
stigmatized and uneasy about sharing their
experiences with family members. Veena Das
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describes the lack of response to Partition as a
reoccurring trope in Indian historiography that
views trauma as "witness to some forgotten
wound" (102). What results, then, is an "official
history" that is largely accepted and structured
based on statistical figures and timelines, leaving
out the lived experiences of those victims of
violence.
In the general silence that surrounds
narratives of Partition as an event, something else
emerges. In many cases, a different kind of
remembering happens where familial stories that
are intergenerationally passed down from
refugees of Partition to their next of kin often takes
on a quality of a "frozen slide." In other words, the
storytelling that does transpire tends to focus
more on life pre-Partition- what life was like "on
the other side." Stories would therefore include
the details of everyday life: stories of neighbourly
gossip, how fresh the fruit used to be in their old
homeland, or how they missed the shopping at
their neighbourhood bazaar (80). Through this,
there is an attempt to recover aspects of the past
that re-enters life experienced prior to
displacement.
Items that were somehow carried across
the border in the chaos of Partition become now
cherished possessions as they represent survival a nod to the fact that if the item survived, so did
its owner. As a descendant of refugees of Partition
myself, I have experienced this very moment with
my own family members. Stories of "what
happened " always centered around an object or
physical thing that stands as proof that there was
indeed a time before this rupture happened. For
example, my Sikh grandmother - who died when
I was much too young to remember her -left with
her son, my father, a wedding necklace known as
a Rani Harr. This heirloom was one that was
beloved and charged with familial history but was
also one that was almost lost during the upheaval
of Partition. Yet, now it sits in my possession as a
physical link to a past that I would have never
otherwise known or understood. There are no
words that come with the Rani Harr, only an
affectual residue that this item once sat in the
hands of my grandmother and acted as a witness
to a moment of horrific trauma and violence as it

'I

was tucked away against my great-grandmother's
body to be carried across the border into a place
that promised safety.
Recovery in the Loss

The difficulties that resulted from the
intergenerational traumas of Partition have led to
a reliance on official state records and archives for
general knowledge and understandings of its
history. As Gayatri Spivak (2008) explains in her
discussion
of
the
gendered
subaltern,
communication between daughters and mothers,
and between grand-daughters and grandmothers,
is difficult. Language, location, and time create
barriers that are difficult to penetrate (7). This is
where the affective object becomes useful when
thinking about the ways in which post-partition
subjects
may be
able
to
recover
an
intergenerational connection to their familial past.
To put it simply: there are some traumas that are
beyond words.
Dina Georgis, in her work in The Better
Story: Queer Affects from the Middle East (2013),
elucidates, "indeed, when it comes to trauma, the
only thing we can be sure of is that our experience
resists thought and language" (169). With this
explanation, the question of survival is not only
understood through what is said; it can also be
understood through experiential knowledge and
silences. Here I argue that affective objects not
only complicate language, but do not always have
to depend on language. I contend that survival is
articulated through the object's tangibility and
materiality as well as oral narrative or storytelling.
The affective feelings surrounding objects, and the
desire to keep, discard, and share objects, aids in
the production of diasporic recovery to colonial
trauma in the postcolonial present while offering a
new or different set of thematics linked to, but
outside of, embodied personhood.
The affective quality of the objects can
create or destroy "the better life" depending on
whether the object projects a melancholic history
or what Georgis calls "the better story" (1).
Georgis argues that narrative is an emotional
resource for learning and for generating better
futures. She suggests that narrative gives us

insight into understanding the unknowable
processes by which we create collective memories,
histories, and identities. Georgis uses stories to
link us to forgotten spaces of history; she
highlights narratives that have been disregarded
and thinks about how social injustice is articulated
(and how some narratives, despite wanting to
speak against injustice, fail to do so).
Understanding affect, memory, and
narratives as power, and connecting this power to
the task of retelling postcolonial histories,
complicates how "legitimate histories" are
conveyed. With this I highlight the power of
counter-narratives that emerge from sites and
voices that are otherwise silenced. For example,
my grandmother's wedding necklace allows for a
connection between her and I, generations apart. It
is a gendered object that represents her gendered
experience as a Sikh woman, who was never given
space to speak about her experiences of trauma
pre and post-Partition. As such, objects do not
speak in a written language but, in their very
existence, they can create a space and incite us to
return to forgotten memories from forgotten
peoples.
The affective qualities of such laden objects
give them capacities for survival. They work as
"unaffected witnesses" to everyday lives (Olsen
2010, 8); they are unbiased participators of the
everyday. Indeed, they are participators as they are
intrinsically and indispensably involved in
enabling actions. As Jas Elsner (2013) explains,
objects work against our assumptions about the
motives, character, actions, and causes of the past
through the ways in which they place a literal
material obstacle within discursive patterns of
writing, thereby moving these writings to an
actuality (167) . In other words, objects inject a
"realness" into writings of histories in their ability
to withstand history without changing in form they are physical and metaphorical evidences of
the past. Elsner states, "Objects are part of the
story or agenda or theme they have been
summoned to help on its way. They can conjure
imaginations from a space of real-life experience
, outside the narrative. They exist in a space that is
outside the narrative while being within it" (167).
~L---
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By accepting the suggestions that the
question of survival can be understood through
what is unsaid, affect as it attaches itself to objects
and artefacts - material things - creates points of
inquiry into, and potential understandings of,
experiences that are beyond words. In linking
these concepts to trauma and displacement, the
emotions surrounding the affective object - the
subjective meanings attached to things -uncovers
some of the unspoken and unsaid complexities of
displacement. The very characteristic of portability
of objects creates an ability to carry a history,
narrative, and even home. What is lost in
upheaval and violence can, once again, be found
in the memories the objects hold.
Conclusion

Belonging, for many in the South Asian
diaspora, is a contentious issue that is connected
to feelings of colonial exile. Their narratives and
histories of home are often rooted in displacement
and violent ruptures. Through traumatic events
that occurred to the Indian nation during the
twentieth century, including the Partition of India
and Pakistan in 1947, voices of survivors and
victims have oftentimes been undermined by the
"official" histories of the South Asian diaspora (as
seen in memorials, official documents, and history
books) or through the wilful erasures that seek
recuperation in silence.
In order to uncover these otherwise
silenced stories, I have turned to objects and
theorized how they provide us with alternative
sites of remembering. By attending to emotion,
memory, and affect through the medium of
material culture, I have drawn connections
between objects and the human experience. In
order to access the narratives that come from
affective objects, in the context of post-Partition
India, I have argued that a genealogical link is
produced through affective objects and their
attendant narrated memories, which are often
found in material things passed down through
generations. I emphasized the importance of
familial and intergenerational ties within this
discussion as it is key in accessing the objects'
affective currency. Ultimately what the study of

affect affords, when thinking about the ways it can
attach itself to physical things, are alternative
epistemological sites that can provide potential
spaces for recovery to postcolonial trauma and
violence.
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Weatherlessness: Affect, Mood,
Temperament, the Death of the Will, and
Politics

First, I develop an account of the nature of moods and the relation of mood to emotion
and temperament. This account stresses that social and individual moods are marked
by four features: They are transactional - neither wholly subjective nor objective; in
experience they shade into and blur back and forth with feeling and temperament; they are
ambient and atmospheric, a habit of living ·in the world more expansive than a habit of
mind; and, whether conscious or not, moods have causes that, if known, may be
manipulated to advance both personal and political ends. Second, I focus on a particular
mood that, following the novelist John Barth, I term "weatherlessness." I then
distinguish weatherlessness from both learned helplessness and manufactured consent.
Third, I conclude by showing ways in which weatherlessness is fatal to democracy, to
government of, by, and for the people. Here I suggest ways in which weatherlessness can
be a tool used by authoritarian regimes, including those that disguise themselves as
democracies.
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1. Moods
Supposing that truth is a mood- what
then? Supposing every philosophy and every
politics expresses the mood of its originatorswhat then?
OK, don't even try to answer these
questions, don't even start to read this ~ssay
until you're in the right mood. Followmg a
good sleep and healthy breakfast. Your mouth
holding a pen crosswise, not by its end. A
sunny day and pleasant breeze, maybe some
exercise or some time in the park. When you
want to be right here, right where you are.
After an ocean of love. That could make all
the difference. And this difference . is not
merely personal: Associations, organizations,
governments, and cultures call forth., are
marked by, and nourish or starve particular
moods. Moods may be political; they may be
manipulated to advance both personal and
political ends.
What is a mood? With roots in Old
English, Gothic German, and Old Norse
words for mind, spirit, courage, and anger,
mood is typically defined as an individu~l 's

particular and temporary feeling or state of mmd,
a distinctive emotional quality or tone, a
pervading impression or general attitude or tone of
some thing or some time, and a person's
inclination or disposition or receptivity or temper
to some activity or thing. (The term also has
specialized and precise meanings i~ logic (as
classification of categorical syllogtsms) and
grammar (as categories of verb inflection to
indicate syntactic relations among clauses or
attitudes of speakers with respect to
certainty I uncertainty, wish/ command, a~d
emphasis/hesitancy. I note here that the m~m
character discussed in this essay's next sectwn
is a grammar teacher - in part a teacher of
moods.) Mood is most often attributed to
individuals, but a mood may be a feature of a
social group, political regime, or historical era
- e.g., the mood of a people during a wa~ or
the mood of an age of enlightenment or hme

of famine - or to creative works - e.g., the
characteristic mood of a painter's period of
work or the tone of a piece of music - or a
location - e.g., the mood of a military
cemetery or the feel of a lake house. In her
song, "Ventura," Lucinda Williams (2003)
sings:
Haven't spoken to no one
Haven't been in the mood
Pour some soup, get a spoon and
Stir it up real good.
Sometimes "mood" is used almost
synonymously with "feeling" or "emotion"such that, for example, to be in a good mood
is simply to feel cheerful or have positive
emotions and to be in a bad mood is to feel
irritated or suffer from negative emotions.
Many psychologists, however, differentiate
emotion and mood. In these cases, an emotion
or "emotional episode" is characterized as an
experience marked by: a particular (usually
relatively short-term) quality and caused by
particular physiological (e.g., neurol~?ical
and endocrinal) changes and condthons;
behaviors (e.g.; smiling or running away)
caused by and consistent with this experience;
attention directed toward an eliciting
stimulus; cognitive appraisal of the meaning
and possible consequences of the stimulus;
and, attribution of the genesis of the
experience to the stimulus. An important
point here is that emotions are not reacti,o ns to
perceptions and then, afterwards, th~ caus~ of
bodily expressions. Instead, perceptions gtve
rise to bodily expressions the awareness of
which is emotion. William James (1981 [1890])
put this nicely: "Bodily changes follow
directly the perception of the exciting fact,
and . . . our feeling of the same changes as
they occur is the emotion." We feel sorry
because we cry and afraid because we
tremble, James explained; we do not cry
because we feel sorry or tremble because we
are afraid. Without the bodily expressions
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following perception, those perceptions
would be wholly cognitive - we might judge
it best to run but we "should not actually feel
afraid" (1065-66). So characterized, emotions
are brought about by something, are feelings of
bodily reactions to something, and are about
something cognitively appraised. Examples
include anger, fear, sadness, happiness,
disgust, and surprise. Indeed, many
researchers argue that these are the six, and
only, universal emotions. That may be right,
but I'd like to think that the sentiment of
rationality - James's phrase for the fact that
rationality itself is a sentiment - might be
very widespread too.
By contrast, a mood is characterized as
an affective state that lasts longer than an
emotion and often is temporally distant from
the stimulus and its resulting behavior that is
its cause (e.g., waking up one morning in a
bad mood because of an argument several
months earlier or being depressed years after
the death of a loved one). This includes
moods brought on by causes unrecognized by
the given individual - causes such as
nutrition, weather, facial muscles, physical
activity, persistent poverty, a culture of
violence, structural absence of opportunity,
and so on. A mood is more diffuse and
general than an emotion - less about
something in particular that is cognitively
appraised and more about everything in
general (e.g., anxiety not about an important
exam in an hour but about one's whole
future); less a reaction to something in
particular than a reaction to life more
generally (e.g., irritability brought on not by
one particular co-worker but by absolutely
everyone around); and less brought on by
something particular but, instead, more
sustained across many different particular
experiences (e.g., a depressive state due to the
So characterized,
totality of one's self).
moods are relatively long term, broad scope,
and diffuse affective states. From this
perspective, moods are generally viewed as
having two primary dimensions or valences:
positive affect (and the positive consequences

of this affect) and negative affect (and the
negative consequences of this affect); that is,
being in a good mood or being in a bad
mood.
Examples
of
moods
include
depression, anxiety, resignation, confidence,
and serenity.
I accept and want to make use of the
notion of mood understood in this brief,
unfinished but, I hope, workable sketch. That
said, I also want to add four important points
to this account of mood. First, any adequate
account of mood must be shady. This means it
must not claim neat separations between
instincts,
emotions,
moods,
and
temperaments. Rather, they blur into one
another. To note this is simply to extend an
observation by James
(1981
[1890]):
"Instinctive
reactions
and
emotional
expressions thus shade imperceptibly into
each other" (1058). So too do emotions,
moods, and temperaments. We can feel
hopeful or be in a hopeful mood or have a
hopeful temperament. Somebody can just be
an anxious person, find one's self in an
anxious mood, or feel anxious. As James (1981
[1890]) noted, "The result of all this flux is
that the merely descriptive literature of the
emotions is one of the most tedious parts of
psychology. And not only is it tedious, but
you feel that its subdivisions are to a great
extent either fictitious or unimportant, and
that its pretences to accuracy are a sham"
(1064). Differences in both life and language
among instincts, emotions, moods, and
temperaments are shady, blurry, vague. An
emotion can coexist with or produce a mood
or a temperament over time, but so too a
mood can call forth and exist simultaneously
with a particular emotion.
I go out with a friend
Maybe a little music might help
But I can't pretend
I wish I was somewhere else (Williams
2003).
Second, any adequate account of mood
must be transactional. This means that moods

are not wholly subjective or wholly objective.
Rather, they are what James called
"double-barreled," applying to both the how
and the what of experience, features of
irreducibly interrelated consciousness and
object. Moods are what John Dewey (1989
[1949]) called "unfractured" -without radical
separation between knower and known,
namer
and
named,
organism
and
environment, subject and object (96-97). For
Heidegger as for Dewey, moods are features
of a world, not simply subjective overlays or
reactions to it. Just as Dewey asserted that
reality possesses practical character, so too it
possesses affective character. Reality is
moody. Our ordinary language captures this
and displays our unsettlement about our
being in a mood or a mood being in us. Place:
The dark streets were foreboding, tense,
unforgiving, full of danger, without hope.
Action: The gunfire was terrifying, scary,
frightening, horrific. Person: After her death,
he was disconsolate, depressed, unable to
cope, dark, without joy. Time: "Ah distinctly, I
remember, it was in the bleak December," the
mood was grim, there were shootings almost
every day, it was a dismal period. The
affective is thick and stretches across our
lives. In now-outdated language, tertiary
qualities are features of reality - and that
includes emotion, mood, and temperament.
Mood colors, fixes, and transforms both the
how and the what of experience.
Third, affect includes more than instinct,
feeling, and mood. It is ambient and
atmospheric. It also includes temperament. By
temperament I mean not just a person's or a
group's habit of mind, but something more
expansive - one's habit of living, one's
constitution or characteristic modes of feeling
and action. As feelings come and go and
shade into more diffuse moods that may last a
while or longer, so too moods often shade and
blur into temperaments. In such cases, moods
become habitual in duration and wide in
scope - affective undergoings, doings, and
dispositions across wide swaths of one's life.
They become whole climates rather than the

weather one particular day or even one
season. This points to another standard or
dictionary meaning of "temperament" that
sheds additional light: temperament is the
condition of the weather or climate, regarded
as resulting from a combination of heat or
or
humidity.
One's
cold,
dryness
temperament is one's personal weather. We
all know some people who are warm, others
who are cold, some who are arid, and yet
others who are stormy (and so on).
Understood this way, temperament shares
more with feeling and less with mood a
connection with action and disposition to
action. Icy feelings and an icy temperament
are called forth and displayed in icy behavior;
an icy mood is more atmospheric - "I had no
idea you were in that kind of mood!" -and
may be barely evident in action. Affects blur
along a temporal arc of shorter-term feelings,
longer-lasting moods, and relatively durable
tern peramen ts.
The fourth point about moods is this:
They have causes. They are the product of
physiological, environmental, and cultural
conditions. The fact that a person may not
know what brought on a mood (e.g., "I have
no idea why I'm in such an unhappy mood")
does not mean that the existence of the mood
is irreducibly mysterious or unknowable. Just
as it is possible to manufacture feelings (e.g.,
"If I let her in on this secret, she will be so
jealous"), so too it is possible to manufacture
moods (e.g., "We had to get out of the Pacific
Northwest to cure his seasonal affective
disorder," or, "Whenever the manager turned
on Fox News, I felt anger at Trump and my
whole mood turned confrontational and
hostile"). This has potential practical
implications for anyone marketing products,
ideas, or regimes - or even philosophies if one
accepts Deleuze and Guattari's (1994 [1991])
observation that "philosophy has not
remained
unaffected by the general
movement that replaced Critique with sales
promotion" (10). As it is possible to inflame a
crowd, create desires, learn emotions and
emotional responses, produce belief, and

engineer consent, so it is possible to
manufacture mood - crucial perhaps in some
kinds of administration of populations.
Individual and social moods, then, are
shady and transactional, blurring back and
forth with feeling and temperament, and
caused by conditions that, if known, may be
manipulated to advance both personal and
political ends.
2. Weatherlessness
In light of this general understanding of
mood, I want to focus briefly on a particular
mood for the purpose of reflecting on its
origins and its political as well as personal
uses. I take the name for this mood weatherlessness- from the novelist John Barth.
To be weatherless is to be in a moodless
mood, to be without climate, without feeling,
freedom, or purpose. When habitual, it is the
complete absence of disposition and
inclination, the absence of any temperament.
It is to be helpless, unable to act and without
desires or goals, paralyzed to the point of
inaction. Just as Hemingway recorded the
death of love after World War I in The Sun
Also Rises, so Barth recounted the death of the
will after World War II in his 1958 novel, The
End of the Road (1969 [1958]). Hemingway
chronicled the "lost generation" while Barth
illuminated the "submission generation." For
the book's "hero," Jacob Horner, there is no
convincing reason to prefer or do anything
and so he does nothing (except at the
command
of
the
"Doctor,"
a
psychiatrist-counselor-men tor-God,
as
impersonal, aloof, and inexplicable as fate).
The book opens with a six-word
sentence
suggesting
uncertainty
and
absurdity: "In a sense, I am Jacob Horner"
(Barth 1969 [1958], 1). Next: "It was on the
advice of the Doctor that I entered the
teaching
profession."
The
mood
of
weatherlessness and a temperament of
paralysis are set quickly: Readers are treated
to two long paragraphs dealing solemnly
with the vexing problems of how to sit

properly in the Doctor's office and the equally
grave problem of how one's arms should be
placed. After discussing the shifting of
positions and arms, Jacob Horner tells us that
the story of his life is contained in the
sentence which says that this shifting is a
"recognition of the fact that when one is faced
with such a multitude of desirable choices, no
one choice seems satisfactory for very long by
comparison with the aggregate desirability of
all the rest, though compared to any one of
the others it would not be found inferior."
This sentence, which Jacob Horner describes
as "a double predicate nominative expression
in the second independent clause of a rather
intricate compound sentence" (Barth 1969
[1958], 2-3), not only shows that Horner is a
grammar teacher but also reveals Barth's
contempt for conventional rules and societal
customs, for sense and order, for logic and
principles. Jacob Horner's mastery of these
techniques was no avail against his
impotency.
You like it under the trees in autumn,
Because everything is half dead
The wind moves like a cripple among the
leaves
And repeats words without meaning.
... you yourself were never quite yourself
And did not want nor have to be,
Desiring the exhilarations of changes:
The motive for metaphor, shrinking from
The weight of primary noon,
The ABC of being (Stevens 1993 [1947],
288).
Factually and briefly, The End of the Road
is a story supposedly written by Jake Horner
in 1955 about an incident, which took place in
1953, an event caused by the advice of the
strange Doctor whom Horner met in 1951 and
with whom he is doomed to serve the rest of
his aimless, empty life. The novel opens with
the Doctor's advice to Jake Horner to go to
third-rate Wicomico State Teachers College in
Maryland's Eastern Shore to get a job
teaching grammar. At Wicomico, Jake's first

and only friend is Joe Morgan, a liberal
academic "emancipated" from objective
values: "What the hell, Jake," says Joe, "when
you say good-by to objective values, you
really have to flex your muscles and keep
your eyes open, because you're on your own.
It takes energy; not just personal energy, but
cultural energy, or you're lost. Energy's what
makes the difference between American
pragmatism and French existentialism where the hell else but in America could you
have a cheerful nihilism, for God's sake?"
(Barth 1969 [1958], 47). Jake had also said
goodbye to objective values -after all, he had
been ordered by the Doctor to read Sartre and
to be an existentialist and instructed that
"Choosing is existence: To the extent you
don't choose, you don't exist" (Barth 1969
[1958], 83) - but he did not accept Joe's
cheerful spirit. He had no experience of
himself as a unified self. Jake claimed:
"Indeed, the conflict between individual
points of view that Joe admitted lay close to
heart of his subjectivism I should carry even
further, for subjectivism implies a self, and
where one feels a plurality of selves, one is
subject to the same conflict on an intensely
intramural level, each of one's selves claiming
the same irrefutable validity for its special
point of view that, in Joe's system individuals
and institutions may claim" (Barth 1969
[1958], 142). Here Barth pokes fun at the
American Dream, American progressivism,
and meliorism that smile in the face of
adversity and hope for better things ahead.
Jake does not smile. He is immobilized,
helpless, sapped of will, doomed to
immobility and living what Wallace Stevens
(1993 [1949]) characterized as a "skeleton's
life" in" As You Leave the Room":
I wonder, have I lived a skeleton's life,
As a disbeliever in reality,
A countryman of all the bones in the
world?
Now, here, the snow I had forgotten
becomes
Part of a major reality, part of

An appreciation of a reality
And yet nothing has been changed except
what is
Unreal, as if nothing had been changed at
all (488).
Joe kept pushing his wife, Rennie,
toward Jake and found ways for them to
spend time together. When he learns of their
affair, Joe makes it the subject of long, open
philosophical conversations, as he does when
Rennie becomes pregnant (whether by Jake or
Joe no one knows). After a discussion of death
as the only alternative to bearing the
unwanted child, the three discuss another
alternative, abortion. Jake's Doctor agrees to
perform the abortion, the price being
complete ownership of Jake for the rest of his
life. Rennie is killed on the operating table,
leaving Jake to break the news to Joe. Joe
disappears into oblivion while Jake departs
by taxi for the Doctor's Remobilization Farm
where he is fated to live his life in complete
dependence on, and total submission to, the
Doctor. The book's final word- Jake says this
to the driver - is "Terminal" (Barth 1969
[1958], 198).
Weatherlessness: After recounting a
dream in which a meteorologist announces
that there simply will be no weather
tomorrow, Jake says this:
A day without weather is unthinkable, but
for me at least there were frequently days
without any mood at all. On these days,
Jacob Horner, except in a meaningless
metabolistic sense, ceased to exist, for I was
without a personality. Like those
microscopic specimens that biologists must
dye in order to make them visible at all, I
had to be colored with some mood or other
if there was to be a recognizable self to me.
The fact that my successive and
discontinuous selves were linked to one
another by the two unstable threads of
body and memory; the fact that in the
nature of Western languages the word

disClosure
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change presupposes something upon
which the changes operate; the fact that
although the specimen is invisible without
the dye, the dye is not the specimen- these
are considerations of which I was aware
but in which I had no interest. On my
weatherless days my body sat in a rocking
chair and rocked and rocked and rocked,
and my mind was as nearly empty as
interstellar space (Barth 1969 [1958], 36).
And like the bodies of individual persons, so
too political bodies may sit in a rocking chair,
just rocking and empty.
3. Manufactured Helplessness and Politics

Barth's novel presented a mood of
weatherlessness, the absence of temperament
and disposition - the death of the will- and
the resulting paralysis and impotence of
action primarily as an individual's (Jacob's)
and
as
a
psychological
condition
philosophical problem (if one makes certain
"existentialist" assumptions about the world,
freedom and choice, and values). I want now
to consider weatherlessness and the death of
the will in a more explicitly political context
because I find these ideas illuminate central
commitments and problems for democratic
practice - for practices that broadly value and
are marked by broad participation, consent,
and benefit of the governed. To do this, it is
necessary to view weatherlessness not simply
as an individual trait but as a social product something socially manufactured (indirectlywhether fully conscious or not - via
sentiments) in particular ways in particular
and
places
with
particular
times
consequences for particular selves. The reason
for doing this is straight-forward: the self, to
use the language of George Herbert Mead, is
a social product (and so there can be no
question about mood being either only
wholly personal or only wholly social). It is
also necessary to view weatherlessness as a
cultural deployment - a strategy (conscious or
not) on behalf of particular interests and

powers, particular forms of government, and
particular cultural relations.
In this light, it is helpful to contrast
weatherlessness and the death of the will with
two other phenomena: learned helplessness
and manufactured
consent. Following
Seligman (1975a, 1975b, and 1993), learned
helplessness is a condition in which a person,
after a traumatic experience or repeated harm
and failure, learns powerlessness and absence
of control and then gives up even trying,
taking no action to avoid subsequent harm even in subsequent changed conditions in
which the harm could be escaped or stopped.
Two points stand out here: the helplessness
learned in the original situation is warranted
- the subject actually is helpless with respect
to the given trauma or harm; and, in later
changed
conditions,
the
habituated
helplessness does not appear warranted to
third-party observers who know surely the
conditions have changed such that the person
is no longer helpless, but it does appear
warranted to the person who has no reason to
realize that conditions have changed - and
who finally does act to avoid trauma or harm
only after being shown that this is possible. In
learned helplessness, then, the self first
discovers it has no effective power to act, no
ability to achieve its goals, and then
concludes there is no point acting. This
paralysis of will, understood as a habit, is the
result of actual helplessness in a given
environment. In cases of weatherlessness, in
contrast, the self first finds itself in an
indifferent,
no-mood
mood,
without
temperament or disposition, and this mood
washes over will, drowning it, the self then
having no inclination to act at all. In learned
helplessness, the self's will to act is defeated
by its actual environment. And the self learns
that fact. In weatherlessness, the self's will is
defeated by its own indifferent mood and
a-disposed
temperament
(and
the
physiological, environmental, and cultural
forces that create and sustain this mood and
temperament). And the self expresses that fact.
The result is the same - paralysis of action;

however, the cause is different (and, therefore,
any remedy also would be different).
Manufactured
consent,
following
Lippmann (who coined the term in his 1922
Public Opinion) and Herman and Chomsky
(who took it up in their 1968 Manufacturing
Consent), is the idea that formally or
outwardly democratic regimes can support
themselves without any overt coercion by
employing propaganda-functioning mass
communications that create citizen consent.
Here the roles of the media and manufactured
consent in a democracy are viewed as
functionally parallel to the roles of the
military and violence in an old-fashioned
dictatorial or openly authoritarian regime.
Understood in a political context, both
manufactured consent and weatherlessness
are societal creations. However, in these two
cases of manufacturing, both the immediate
producers and the resulting product are very
different. Manufactured consent produces just
that - consent - through the work of
profit-driven corporations and investors who
utilize mass media, government agencies, and
regulation of social interactions to serve their
private interests. Weatherlessness, on the
other hand, produces vapid spectatorship,
non-engagement, and non-allegiance in
politics as a result of an indifferent mood and
a temperament lacking all disposition.
Weatherlessness does not manufacture
consent
or dissent; it manufactures
a-consent, even "sleeping through a
revolution."
And it may well be that we will have to
repent in this generation. Not merely for the
vitriolic words and the violent actions of the
bad people, but for the appalling silence and
indifference of the good people who sit
around and say, "Wait on time." (King, Jr.
1968)
Yes, but weatherlessness is not a long
marking of time, a waiting on time. It is not
waiting, even long-game waiting; it is only
sitting - paralysis without expectation or
anticipation.
Viewed
it is clear that

weatherlessness is fatal for democracy - for
any government of, by, and for the people. The
point is not simply that those who are
weatherless do not participate. That is true at
the individual level. However, at the social
level, weatherlessness is not simply the death
of
some
individual's
will.
Rather,
weatherlessness in effect is the outsourcing of
the will, a space that allows the creation of a
people's surrogate will. In the End of the Road,
for example, from the novel's start at
Wicomico State Teachers College to its end en
route to the Remobilization Farm, Jake does
not really himself act at all- but only on the
instruction of, only under the control of, the
Doctor. Weatherlessness is a means to, and a
mark of, authoritarian political regimes.
Here is a natural history or genealogy of
authoritarian politics in democratic disguise:
At first, those who will not consent must be
rendered unable to oppose effectively - the
work of armies, jailers, and executioners;
then, that opposition, frequently so difficult to
control, must be remanufactured more
efficiently into consent - the work of
advertisers and marketers, mass media
professionals, and private corporations;
finally, consen_t, frequently unable to keep
hidden the traces of its manufacture (and so
remain effective), must be retooled as
and its paralysis of
weatherlessness
inclination and action - the work of mood
managers and temperament creators via one's
physiology,
environment,
and
culture
(including one's self).

Like all forms of government, democracy is
moody (and I think it is very useful to think of
democracy as a mood, affect, and
temperament rather than merely a doctrine or
set of practices). The mood of illiberal
democracy - external trappings of democratic
government adopted by anti-democratic ways
of life
is, at least in large part,
weatherlessness. In such regimes, popular
unrest, political protest, and social action are
mood disorders. The Doctor's message to
Jake, Donald Trump's message to Americans,
Xi Jinping's message to the Chinese, Viktor

Orban's message to Hungarians, Hitler's
message to the Germans: Trust me. When
Trump proclaims "Make America Great
Again," he is not laying out any platform; ~e
is expressing and strengthening, among his
tribe, a mood. Mood blurs into temperament.

Temperament separated from will is an abstraction
and without motivation. Will separated from hope
makes hope ineffective, mere wish. This hope is a
mood.
I close with three points about
weatherlessness in political contexts. First, it
is rarely aU-or-nothing. One can be, for
example, weatherless with respect to a
national election but deeply concerned and
involved with local school board issues. This
means that if one views weatherlessness as a
mood blurring into a feeling, there may be
little weatherlessness. One feels the school
shooting is tragic, feels NRA funds in politics
are obscene, or feels perplexed by the idea of
schoolteachers
carrying guns. But if
weatherlessness is seen as a mood shading
toward
temperament,
inclination, and
disposition, then weatherlessness clearly .is
widespread today in American society and I.n
other traditionally liberal and democratic
societies. One sees the televised school
shooting, reads about dark money in politics,
watches pictures of the rainforest set on fire to
clear it, drives past extreme poverty and does
nothing -rocking with Jake Horner in one's
chair. This is paralysis - or its practical
equivalent. Weatherlessness is not merel~ the
paralysis of wish; it is also the paralysis of
action.
Second, how is this produced? Both
psychologically and politically.
James
described brilliantly the physical process on
the nerves - he called it an "economy of
nerve-paths" - by which emotion slides in~o
inattention
and
indifference.
(This
explanation captures many lives to date in the
Trump Era - and while I appreciate the
"economy" here, I resent the difficulty of
keeping "perturbation" alive.) Emotions,

James (1981 [1890]) wrote, "blunt themselves by

repetition":
The more we exercise ourselves at
anything, the fewer muscles we employ ...
The first time we saw [some stimulus] we
could perhaps neither act nor think at all,
and had no reaction but organic
perturbation. The emotions of startled
surprise, wonder, or curiosity were the
result. Now we look on with absolutely no
emotion (1089).
Third,
finally
and
importantly,
weatherlessness has more indirect cultural
causes
as
well
as
proximate
emotional/ physiological causes. If every
claim is met with a counter-claim, if every fact
is suspected on the basis of alternative facts, if
a commitment one day is not a commitment
the next, if all news is fake according to
someone, if science and its critics both are
suspect, if many voices shout many messages
equally loudly, if every claim is a lie, there
may come to seem to be little reason to listen
at all. Or, it may be impossible to hear
anything at all but collective background
noise. Indifference in mood and in practice,
weatherlessness, can result from there really
being no difference among all alternatives,
but it also can result from situations in which
it is impossible to judge differences,
impossible to differentiate, impossible any
longer to look on, as James put it, with any
emotion or care. In such cases, Joe was right
when he told Jake that pluralism and
democracy take political and cultural, not just
personal, hope and effort. Hope for that effort
is hope for conditions for a more fully
democratic mood.
Suddenly everyone was run over by a
truck (O'Donoghue 1971, 16).
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Street Affects: An Exercise on Why We
Listen To But Don't Hear the Street Music

1

This paper argues that affective moments between street musicians and the audience in
Istanbul, Turkey suggest a loose connection to open and highly affective practices of
hearing. The street brings them together during the moments of performance. The
performance twists the power of sound that the musician makes and draws that into
visualization of the moment, which underlines a peculiar affective attachment on the
audience's side. The city's, musician's, and the listening practices' significance in these
moments are taken into account and narrated with examples from the fieldwork.
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What is going on in the affective sphere
between the street musician and their audience
on the street? It is more than a mix of visual and
aural sensations of bodies in transit, bodies that
are either working in, passing by or touring the
place, and that are lured by an immediate,
short-lived yet repetitive, sometimes makeshift
musical performance. Reasons to perform on the
street vary from managing precarity to making a
public statement of an alternate politics of music
and life, even to building confidence out of
difference. But street performers' motives are
beyond this short essay's focus . Here, I
problematize the audience's obsession with
visualization
in
their
fleeting
affective
encounters with street music(ians) in Istanbul,
Turkey. My role there as a researcher was to take
account of moments of performance and record
events, encounters, ruptures and flows
surrounding those moments in Istanbul's street
music scene between 2014 to 2016.
One immediate note was that so many
photos, videos and notes got posted on social
media - not always with geotagging - of a
performance that was found endearing or
interesting or touching or just weird. From time
to time, when interaction with musicians took
place, it was with its twists and surprises: for
example, think of the peculiar rhythm of when
someone in the audience was getting too close to
the performer without permission in order to
take a picture without even having a word with
them, treating the stage as dead as a sculpture.
Or, when communication is much more relaxed
between the band and a small group of
onlookers who cheered to songs, danced,
clapped and hung out with the performers: it
turns out part of the audience knew some of the
musicians, and so they shared an even groundsometimes they are among friends. Both of these
situations hinted at a temporary - yet strong bond at the same level, but they contrasted in
the sense that each flowed from an uneven end
and met here on the shared street stage.
Encountering such curious and sometin:tes
sinister moments made me question how the
affect worked there - or, to be more accurate,

I approached this affective sphere even
more carefully after having repeatedly observed
that people who stopped to listen to the music
took selfies at the scene and photos of the scene
like in an enchanted reflex. I found it perplexing
how space that was so open to influences from
all over the place allowed listening, yet skipped
hearing. Perhaps the need to make it visual
comes up naturally by being there; then, does
witnessing the auditory dimension command
visual documentation? It seemed to me that
international and local tourists alike strived to
prove they're listening - was it a kind of duty?
Was that act required to verify an abstract
purchase (in an economy of experience), and
functioned like a certificate of the fact that they
had been affected by what they found there on
the spot? Perhaps an act of appreciation is not
quite distanced from an act of capturing the
practice on camera? After all, I occasionally
recorded these stages too, for my own purpose
of documenting what happened there, even if
my rhythm was different: I did not listen and hit
the share button hastily to move on quickly with
my route afterwards. Besides, the musician-body
shares a similar obsession with the touring-body,
that is to say, the want of visibility. When on the
feeble, makeshift yet seamless stage that is built
out of the street, band members habitually ask
people to "take and share photos of their
performance on Facebook" if they "like [the
band] on Facebook." That would do them good.
The online presence will presumably affirm and
expand their struggle, a proto-business that is
more in the form of a pursuit of art and life (or
the other way around?). Does being visible equal
appreciation and promotion? Does it secure that
the musicians and the context of their song are
being heard all right? Perhaps it is for the sake of
being visible . What did it mean when the
musician I ran into and asked for an interview
repeatedly pointed me to visit their online
presence so that I would send them a message
online to check when they are downtown,
playing, and then we could have a chat?
This essay is an effort to come to terms
with a gap between listening and hearing,
between immobility and mobility, between

"sonorization of images" that Virilio (2003)
criticized, and getting immersed in soundscapes,
a practice sound studies have spoken so fondly
of (Schafer 1993, among many others). This is a
gap full of affective bonds. What is the matter
with affect when we recognize and problematize
a rift between listening and hearing? Murray
Schafer (1993), a pioneer of listening to one's
environment actively, defended an active, almost
biophilic listening: he went against the grain and
suggested that dominant soundscapes of the
urban and the industrial silenced the richness of
life around us. It takes effort and patience to
actively listen to one's environment, to its less
visible components, thanks to an aggressive
urbanization. However, for the audience in my
case, listening in the city center remains a rather
superficial act; if they listened to the sounds and
music a la Schafer, they would not necessarily
like what they heard; it would be too long, too
detailed, and even noisy. That is why I present a
twist between listening and hearing in this
essay: hearing patiently where the music comes
from and goes to is serious work that an
audience member, who pauses to photograph
street music, would not easily be willing to
undertake. The passing audience member allows
themselves to get affected by the sound and
space in a peculiar way. Hearing sound and
space would mean to let go of a touristic control
in a sense; yet, people in the audience are
selective when they take a selfie or choose to
pause to listen to a certain sight for a while. It is
not about patience, it is not about opening up
and defending the sounds of an environment
beneath an aggressive urban context. What
touristic hearing does is socially reproductive. I
pick up on this behavioral nuance thanks to their
haste, their short span of attention, and, when
they, as touring-bodies, do not engage in
conversation out of curiosity about the
mus1c1ans. On an interesting note, Marie
Thompson (2017), who returns to Michel Serres'
work on parasitism in order to write about the
materiality of affect, suggests that noise is he?rd
as a "generative force" (60): we do not listen to
noise, we hear it; and in hearing its parasitic
context, we find new information, new ground.

Noise is "an affective, perturbing force" (ibid.,
60), and it becomes sound that allows a
substantial communication between ends. When
we hear stuff, we open; we are at a receiving end
without having to be instrumental about taking
something from the milieu for profit. We allow
interruption; we are situated in a milieu that
brings to us surprises along with what we
receive. Thompson's argument confronts the
average ears that the heard parasitic components
can highlight relation and communication, and I
realize the hearing component can be equally
significant in thinking about street musicians'
performance. However, when the passing
audience member listens to the musicians for
consuming a certain message inscribed on the
fac;ade, the force of their songs and sounds
becomes attenuated. In this essay, I want to take
up the exercise of thinking about the audience's
rhythms as they pause for the musicians who
performed.

The City
In Politics of Affect, in a conversation with
Joel McKim on Micropolitics, Massumi (2015, 59)
talks about an "enacted past" running "active in
the present." Regarding affective memory,
Massumi argued that
there is no such thing as starting from
scratch. Everything re-begins, in a very
crowded, overpopulated world. Even one
body alone is prepopulated- by instincts, by
inclinations, by teeming feelings and masses
of memories, conscious and nonconscious,
with all manner of shadings in between
(2015, 51).

Massumi reminds the reader that perceiving
shock is elemental in understanding the
workings of circulating affect. If the question is
when and how a politics of something is born,
then the thought of something is equally
significant as the action in constituting the
present, while that thought runs in the mass
beyond its consciousness. When taking a selfie of
a moment of musical performance found,

listened to, and lost in the street is an affective
act, the act begs to take us beyond the fac;ade, i.e.
the listening fac;ade. I think that is how an
"enacted past" will be observed "running active
in the present." What brought the musician to
that spot, and what brought the touring-body
and the touring-ears there have a lot of personal
reasons, of course; however, there are collective
reasons to their encounter, too. There is a past
that is not heard in such an act, and affect is one
way how association can be formed between one
body and the mass. Here, we are dealing with
"microshocks" and their impact on us as
"microperceptions"; and the latter is graspable
as "something that is felt without registering
consciously" (ibid., 53), with reference to
Deleuze and Guattari. I recognize that the power
of microperceptions speaks much to how the
touring, listening, watching or musical body in
the street swims in the material and immaterial
currents of the street. So, such an active memory
is alive in particular nodes and corners of a city,
too; and yet, it sleepwalks as long as it circulates.
In this sense, Istanbul's main public
corridor, Istiklal Street, a touristic catch and a
pedestrian street that opens up to Taksim Square
next to a tiny public park with a much contested
history that extends well beyond the local area,
carries such nonlinear vibes to the present.
Following a tide of youthful political protest in
the Summer 2013 in Istanbul, the authoritarian
response to it showed that the past is alive in the
commercial and urban governmental ambitions
to reshape the milieu of this square (see Dikec;
2013; Hammond 2013; Hammond and Angell
2013; among others, who noted that these
ambitions very much circulated in the space).
Then came 2014 and 2015, an intense period of
elections and strife in the country. The protests
had coincided with the fervent Arab Spring, and
would touch Istanbul's already troubled mood;
the latter, in the mood for elections, brought
more of those complicated feelings about
difference. According to Gene; (2016), the
protests had incited a local generation of young
artists' greater attention to the Taksim area,
where tensions over an imperial reconfiguration
of the site met with future-oriented concerns

over what to make of this space. Yoriik (2013;
2014) discussed how the liberating air from
summer 2013 stirred a mobilized Kurdish
politics in the country along with giving more
space to other political discussions over rights
and wrongs of religion, morality, sexuality,
economy and so on. In my own field notes, I was
able to record more relaxed and energized
Kurdish voices next to Black Sea sounds and
dances, joining musically to the space next to
Turkish and Farsi songs, Balkan and klezmer
tunes, or more exotic performances of, say,
Korean dancers or vuvuzela performers,
alongside the dances of the pride parades and
political demonstrations. It was not surprising to
have those all together; after all, this space was a
massive tourist attraction.
Meanwhile, businesses on the street
noticed and responded to the flow of Arab
tourists (see for instance, Tremblay's news report
on it, 2016) along with a slow yet persistent
inflow of refugees from Syria. Economic stress
was also becoming a part of everyday, as
business took off and shops closed. Now, new
actors joined the rhythm of the place in their
own ways; one, for displacement and escaping
the conflict; the other, fulfilling the duties of a
touring-citizen .· What is more, added to this
pich1re was the 2014-2015 election frenzy in the
country, which actually ended up creating a
sense of mess, and pushing much of local youth
away from this axis of the city. It was no longer
fun, safe or interesting to be there in a
cacophony. One day, one of my research
participants would take me to an artists' cafe
where many Middle Eastern (not necessarily
Arab) musicians and youth were regulars; the
next day, I would walk the Istiklal to hear a
woman's random cry as she begged in Arabic in
the middle of the pavement, next to the tram
route. The male tourist who flew into the city
from a country south of Turkey to get a "hair
transplant" and took the family along for a
vacation would perhaps understand the
language, but did one need to know that
language to "hear" the anguish and burden in
her voice? Mind you, what is caricatured in the
above character became a popular- i.e. selective
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- image of a typical new tourist in the country
since 2015 - and the image finds embodiment
toward the right end in Photo 1 below, too, as he
held out the selfie stick closely and ambitiously
to capture the performance. One day I would
find my way to a concert by a musician from
Syria living in Istanbul, organized in the context
of a festival to acknowledge her culture; another
day, I would stand in the crowd and listen to a
street concert, next to the typical new tourist
holding a selfie stick attached to his phone
camera, and usually surrounded by family on
the trip. However, he was not the only figure
who embraced the sounds with his camera as he
toured; in that sense, many others in the
audience repeated the act of "sonorization of
images and all audio-visual icons," if I may
build on Virilio's (2003, 69) phrase on the
workings of global multimedia on works of art.

The Musician
I was curious if the musicians I talked to
really liked this place, this mess, this flow and
the rich attention it brought about. The city has
showed up as a hub in global music production
with world music tunes in the recent decades
(Degirmenci 2010; 2013); and, even before the
2000s, Istiklal Street was marked by sounds and
sights of the musician as a transnational figure
seeking new platforms: as early as 1990, Sun Ra
had visited the city and played live on a truck
touring Istiklal Street; his concert was apparently
organized and video recorded by a music
organization company in Istanbul still active in
the sector (Kortun 2013). The jazz and
experimental tunes of Sun Ra had met the street
as a stage. When I learned about this visit in
2016, after accidentally seeing a picture of it on
the wall of a concert venue, I mainly thought
about two things. First, this performance had
already marked Istiklal Street as a stage, and
regardless of whether musicians I talked to
knew about this or not, it did not matter: it was
already born as a stage, and it was constantly
being (re)born as new bands, amateur and
schooled musicians stopped by at its collective
stage. If it did happen in the 1990s, in the wake

of a stressful period of internal displacement and
migration in the country, it was no surprise that
it would happen now; the word would spread
and it would attract more, alternative musical
visits. While I am not making any inferences that
this truck concert was what started it all, the fact
that a concert organization company got
involved in recording a performance that
changed a lot in the soundscape of this street
was striking enough. Second, I thought of
whether and how mustoans ignored the
audience circulating and flowing before their
eyes, as I recalled listening to funky jazz tunes
from an orchestra on a tram going back and
forth on the street, which was part of a day of
festivities organized by the local government.
Sun Ra's orchestra had toured the same route;
the resemblance was no surprise, given that this
was the touristic corridor of the city. The
transiency of the relationship between the
performer and the audience was shocking,
though.
Taking note of a disconnect between
street performers and audience, I am taken
aback by how one of my early conversations
with a street musician nailed it. Playing guitar
and timbrel on his own on a night in October in
the Galata area, near Istiklal, he told me that he
was a travelling musician, originally from
Greece. I had to stand on the sidewalk near him
for a long bit before I was able to strike up the
conversation. When he took a break from
playing, I introduced myself. "You're not a
musician, if you were, you wouldn't find it
interesting. You would be like let's play, let's go,"
he situated me. "For a musician, it is [a] feeling;
let's do it, let's play, come on [sort of feeling]," he
added. It was noisy because the street was not
closed to car traffic. In the really narrow street
(see Photo 2), few people stopped to pay
attention to the performance. At one time, I
noticed that laborers across the street working
on the construction of a store paid attention to
him without coming closer. I asked him what he
thought of people who "stopped and listened":
"I visit [during] September-October-November
every year. Doing this for four years, it is Ziilll~~
different than the last year. Last year, people

Photo 1. Musicians performing in front of locals, tourists, street children. Ortakoy, Istanbul;
August-September 2015. Photo by the author.

Photo 2. Playing to a narrow street near Galata, October 2014. Photo by the author.

were making music with me, joining. This year,
it is silent. They just go by. [... ] Money is not
important, sometimes they like your 'figure' so
they give [you] money. I play in bars too. This is
different [though], I want [random] people to
join." He clearly desired the audience to
participate; that came up again when I asked
him to tell me more on what instruments meant
to him: he explained that he used the timbrel to
clue the audience into the rhythm and to help
them join in.
Other musicians may give different
accounts of interactive music-making. A Turkish
performer published his diaries chronicling the
period when he made music in the street; he
played Persian santur (dulcimer), which required
him to avoid looking up or across to the
audience. Anar (2018) mentioned being able to
only look at people's shoes in front of him and
not their faces as he played. This allowed him to
avoid the audience in a sense, to play
uninterrupted - unless by other means. It did
not make a connection between musicians and
performers impossible of course; perhaps, it
simply hints at how the instrument imposes on
genre, genre imposes on posture, posture
imposes on the connection to the street. If
someone in the audience wanted to get into a
conversation with him, this would not stop the
person. On the B-side of the narration, he tells of
a time when someone who already worked
elsewhere, say, in a public office, played with
them on the street. This temporary band
member wore sunglasses to go unrecognized,
and simply did not feel like taking a share from
the money donated by the audience (Anar 2018,
172). In my notes and conversations, I recall
instances of when someone in the audience
could leave some money and take the change
they wanted by picking coins from musician's
instrument case/ donation box. Taking a picture
or a video of such a public performance seems
not to require permission. Taking a selfie with
the musician during an ongoing performance is
another story, though. Having witnessed such
moments on Istiklal Street, as a random young
woman jumped on the stage, got behind the
performers as they played, asked her friend to

take her picture with the band, not asking
permission before or after, I asked the musician
how they felt: "Just rude, but can you do
anything?" was a common answer. I would get
the feeling the musician wanted to disregard
that instance. It is not like the listening-body
changes their rhythm according to that of
musician's; instead, it seems like they are
interfering without being interfered with. How
is that an affective moment? The flow of
interaction in such an affective sphere reminds
me of Kathleen Stewart's talk of "being in the
mainstream" (2007, 51): being in tune without
getting involved deeply in the tune (because that
would alter you irreversibly).
Unlike those who casually shoot a
picture and keep going, children are welcome
and not an interruption to performers. Many
times, street musicians add that it is nice to get a
response from children. It feels different. Bodily
commotion, voice and informal interaction from
kids dancing to their tunes, talking to the
instruments and getting excited on the stage are
all part of a child's affective involvement in the
scene. This is not the same as the tourist who is
hastily going for their camera and shooting with
it. Above, in Photo 1 from Ortakoy, Istanbul, you
can see working kids getting up close to the
performers, placing chaplets on their heads and
just hanging out around them. They are not
street kids, but they are a regular part of the
scene: working kids, who are supposedly sent
there to sell those chaplets to the touristic crowd
in this busy part of the city. They associated with
the affective sphere as sharecroppers, not
customers.

Listening versus Hearing
I'd like to end the essay with positioning
touristic listening, which remains brief, on the go
and on the surface, as opposed to situated
hearing, which comes up to the fac;:ade in a
constant struggle with tensions of the city and
the place itself, and plays with an affective
memory while surviving the place. The
makeshift stage of the street is perfectly
integrated in the economy of the city that relies

on tourist inflow, which is indispensable for the
municipality to make a profit, in the face of
inherited tensions and practices from the past(s).
To be fair, the street musician is also aware of the
stage; otherwise they would not consider being
there while their performance runs on selfies,
donations and love/ attention coming from
passers-by (stoppers-by). These are fundamental
to their presence and performance. They are
creating a performance to be watched as much
as listened to in the street. They want to be seen,
and they might honestly want to be seen for the
sake of making a statement alongside the
rhythm of capital on the street. Speaking of the
street and its rhythms, Pasi Falk (1997, 181)
conceived of the dynamic street as a platform for
"serial looking," where touching is usually out
of question. It should not be too intense to stop
the flow.
However, the kind of street I
documented is quite tactile. There is a change in
the rhythm of the place at the moment a
performance hopes to turn strangers to (kind of)
neighbors and sway them from "serial looking"
into deliberate conversation. The musician
welcomes this touch, too, even though it may
fall short of a situated hearing. Meanwhile, the
literature on encounter (Valentine 2008; 2013;
Wilson 2017, among others), finds that
"face-to-face encounter" can acknowledge
tension and conflict. Being immersed in one's
craft/ art in the street is not a solitary act; the
musician cannot escape the mess. Being on the
street is a tool for "meeting between adversaries
or opposing forces and thus a meeting 'in
conflict' " stated Helen Wilson (2017). Based on
that, we can state that we enter a strife with
prejudice and "micro-publics" in the moment of
encounter, according to Gill Valentine, utilizing
Ash Amin's work. There are obvious gaps
during an encounter; it is just that the encounter
means a will to be open to be affected by that
too.
A gap between listening to the music and
hearing the sound of it becomes relevant to
understanding encounter in the street, as the
tourist-body acts like immersed in the musical
performance until the excitement of a selfie

wears out. Sound studies scholars tell the
difference of carefut active listening from just
being exposed to sounds, and describe the
former closer to what I take as situated hearing in
this essay. Recalling Schafer, in his piece titled
Open Ears, he simplified the gap to be between
the developed, industrial world and the rest:
"Sound objects in the oriental landscape
encourage peripheral listening, while sounds in
the West compete for focused attention- can this
be true?" he asked (Schafer 2003, 18). In my
understanding, hearing as an act is less than
controllable; it is not a rationalized effort,
whereas this fits into the frame of "deep
listening" discussed by acoustic ecologists such
as Schafer. In my case, the act of hearing is also
more complicated than a situated contrast
between the industrial urban and the rest in the
countryside landscape. My motivation to
distinguish listening from hearing so comes
from bell hooks. In her autobiographical book,
Wounds of Passion, there is a passage where she
reminisces about her university experience in
California, her encounters with class and ethnic
differences. This passage might indicate a failure
of hopeful encounter, but it also hints at how
people can avoid being affected much by their
surroundings, ·avoid hearing (the difference)
when they are too busy affirming themselves. In
hooks' words:
When I speak everyone stops to listen but
then no one hears. They are all white and
they are all here to celebrate being female.
They do not want to hear that the shared
reality of femaleness does not mean an equal
share in powerlessness. [... ]They listen to me
but they don't hear. They don't have to hear.
This is what it means to be among the
colonizers, you do not have to listen to what
the colonized have to say, especially if their
ideas come from experience and not from
books. They ask you if there is a book they
can read that will explain what you are
talking about (1997, 98).
Listeners are indeed affected, but how?
The story of encounter between street musicians

and their audience becomes a visual moment
that is disguised (and marketed) as a sonorous
moment. In awkward interactive moments, the
audience leans on the fact that the street, i.e. the
musician's stage, is a visual dominion. The
sound experience we get on the street is stuck in
a visual experience when the audience fails to
give in to hearing. It would still be a sonorized
image that they are capturing, following Virilio's
confrontation. It's the practice of a habit, which
is quite different than nonconscious thought in
Massumi's terms. Massumi warns that affect is
not the same as "habit [which] has become a
reflex, lost its adaptive power, its powers of
variation, its force of futurity, that has ceased to
be the slightest bit surprised by the world"
(2015, 66). The street musician / performer may

not primarily be concerned with such a reflex
when they put themselves out to face the flow of
the street: they attempt to change the flow as
well as accept being changed by it; alas, what
they have been witnessing lately is that reflex.
Streets are always going to be porous and open
to surprise - think about kids! - so being on the
street is always helpful for being "in tune" with
the affective sphere. When the habit of sonorized
images may be taking over the affective sphere,
the rhythm of the tourist-body is not the real
trouble. We would need to be concerned why
hearing what is not intentionally captured on
cameras, selfies and ears is the challenge.
Engaging in situated hearing is crucial in the
sense that it will open up the street and let us
trace what is "running active in the present."
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Brittany Frodge (BF): In the introduction to Moving Politics, you define affect as an unnamed
force "bursting with potential" which suffers a reduction once it is labeled as an emotion. How
can we harness the raw power of affect without subjecting it to potentially reductive linguistic
labels?

Deborah Gould (Gould): Your question touches on many things, it might be best to begin by
saying something about how I understand the difference between affect and emotions, and the
relationship between them. I'm drawing from Brian Massumi here who himself is drawing from
Spinoza and Deleuze. They define affect as the capacity to affect and to be affected, so it has to
do with a body's movement through a world of other bodies, all of which have the capacity to
affect and to be affected. Following Spinoza, when a body is affected, its capacities are either
augmented or diminished, and that change in capacity, however slight it may be, is felt, that is
to say, it registers, not consciously but rather as a sensory experience of having been affected
and thereby changed. An affected body prepares to respond - to affect in turn - and that
response might go in any number of different directions, which is to say, the response is not
predetermined. There is a lot going on in that relational experience of affecting and being
affected and preparing to affect in turn. An emotion, according to Massumi, is a personalized
expression or account of that experience, an approximation - using, for example, language,
conventionalized meanings, gestures - of what the body has experienced in terms of that
change in capacity, that transition which results from affecting and being affected and preparing
to respond.

To understand the relationship between affect and an emotion, it's helpful to think about
how we try to make sense of a vague or barely perceptible bodily sensation or feeling . We pull
from our storehouse of knowledge, from the prevailing ways of making sense of a feeling, from
culturally available names and conventional labels for feeling· states, from habits and norms
about feelings and their expression, and so on. That's what an emotion is, it's within a system of
meaning and helps us make sense of what we're experiencing as we move through the world
affecting and being affected by what we encounter. The less-than-fully conscious experience of
being affected and sensing the accompanying change in bodily capacity, that is what is bursting
with potential in the sense that there is nothing predetermined about what then will follow;
given the bodily change in capacity, things could unfold in any number of different ways, even
if things might tend to flow in a particular direction . An emotion - the personalized expression,
through langua ge and gesture, of that changed bodily state and all of the potential therein- is in
that sense a reduction of an experience that really is more relational, multiple, and open-ended.

The idea of affect bursting with potential is precisely what's interesting to me about
affect as a concept. The notion of potentiality is a way to carve out conceptual space for the idea
that any moment contains within it multiple possible unfurlings, meaning any moment holds
within it multiple possibilities for something different to emerge, for the present and future to
unfold differently than the past. The notion of potentiality points to the something else of each
moment, to the fact that what gets actualized in social life is not all there is. And that's why it's
important, conceptually and politically, to pay attention to affect. What doesn't get actualized is
still there in potential, and in that sense is in the mix, exerting force, shaping social life. And
because things always could have unfolded differently, and because things might unfold in any
number of different ways in a situation we now might be facing, we need to tune into that
moreness, that potentiality, if we care about how we might play a role in bringing about social
change.

To turn to the part of your question about harnessing what you call the raw power of
affect without subjecting it to potentially reductive linguistic labels, I get why you say "the raw
power" of affect, because it is a direct, and in that sense unmediated, experience of being affected
and a body's capacity being changed, and so we might call that raw. But I'm a bit wary of that
word because it seems to align affect with nature and the presocial. The way I see it, affect
presupposes sociality. Affect is the capacity to affect and be affected, and thus has to do with
contact, encounter, relation with other bodies. In that sense, affect is all about sociality, it's a
body's way of processing the conditions it encounters, that it affects and that affect it.

To address the part of your question about harnessing the power of affect before it is
reduced through language, I would say that power, in general, operates in part by producing
regularities, normativities, tendencies. In that light, cultivating an awareness of the potential of
any moment, of any situation, developing an awareness of what else might be possible, of what
might occur if we break out of those perhaps deeply grooved patterns of thought and action, in
short, cultivating a sensibility that tunes in to the potentialities of any given moment, seems
important for harnessing, as you say, the power of affect.

BF: You also imply in the introduction that, while you were participating in ACT UP, you
weren't aware how angry you and your fellow organizers were. Do you feel that, in revisiting
this period of your life from an academic perspective and labeling the affects that structured
your movement, something is lost? Is affect, in its extra-linguistic nature, impossible to truly
capture in academic writing?

Gould: I would probably need to look at how I wrote that. I don't remember saying we weren't
aware of how angry we were. Maybe what I was saying is that being angry about the AIDS
crisis was the "common sense" of the movement, it was hegemonic. In many ways, anger was
the dominant emotion within what I would call our emotional habitus. And that meant that we
were familiar with that anger toward state and society, we knew how to enact it and perform it,
and in some ways, we thus knew how to feel it. Other affective states kind of fell by the
wayside, or couldn't be acknowledged, and certainly did not have the same collectivized form.
Anger, in contrast, was collectivized within ACT UP.

So, I would say that something happened when I took the movement as my object of
research. I had to defamiliarize and make strange what was my own common sense. To me,
initially, it went without saying that lesbians, gay men, and eventually queers were furious
about what was happening. But I began to see that that perspective was naturalizing anger. I
needed to think more about the sources of anger, what prompted it, how did it come to be a
given, something axiomatic, within lesbian and gay communities and even more so within ACT
UP. That required me to defamiliarize the movement's and my own common sense, to take a
step back. That's what turning something you participated in into your object of research allows
you to do, you get to take some distance from it, and it becomes curious to you. Or at least,
that's one way to approach it, as something to be curious about, to ask questions about: "Why
were we so angry about a virus? About a medical issue?" I needed to historicize lesbians' and
gay men's anger, to recognize that that feeling state came into being in a particular moment, it
hadn't been there at the start of the epidemic but rather came into being under specific
circumstances and took particular form and shape, and eventually spread widely throughout
lesbian and gay communities, and became the common sense of ACT UP. To understand those
processes and shifts over time required investigation and analysis; anger within lesbian and gay
communities and within ACT UP was neither natural nor inevitable, so I needed to treat its
existence and prominence as questions rather than as givens.

Regarding the question about labeling affects, and coming to understand the affects that
were in play after taking ACT UP as my object - is something lost, thereby? Is it possible to
truly capture the extra-linguistic nature of affect in academic writing? These are great questions.
We might say that a lot gets lost whenever we try to capture an historical event or moment in
writing. You're pointing to certain things, you're emphasizing <;ertain things, you're ignoring
other aspects, so it's an editing process, or better, an interpretive process. In illuminating
something, something else gets obscured. And someone might say, "what about this aspect that
you barely mention?" Suddenly a world opens, and you see things slightly differently; you
might then need to revise your previous interpretation. What historical and social science
writing ends up doing is giving us a particular take on something. It brings something perhaps
inchoate and barely perceptible- like affect- into language, and it provides an interpretation,
offering one way to understand something. The task in any kind of work like this is to try to
make your interpretation compelling and persuasive to people, to substantiate your own
interpretation in some way. But it will necessarily be a partial account with its specific analysis,
of course.

I think your question is also getting at something else, which is about how to convey
affect, specifically, in academic work. To get at affect requires sensing, tuning in to, attuning to
the transitions in bodily capacity and to the potentialities thereby generated, so one question is
about that sort of attunement as a method, and a second question is the one you raise: can that
be conveyed in academic work? I think it depends. I don't know that the standard ways of
writing in the social sciences are great for conveying affect - and I come out of the social
sciences, right? I have to say, the social sciences are not oriented towards great writing; in the
humanities and in the arts, there is more freedom to try to be more performative or
experimental in your writing, and that might allow for richer conveyances of affect.

Gould: Yeah, there's a need to experiment with different ways of trying to convey affect. In
Moving Politics, I begin with a "scene" and a long quote from David Wojnarowicz, who .died .of
AIDS-related complications; he was an artist, a lot of his work came out of the AIDS ep1dem1c,
and he was an AIDS activist. I felt like there was something about the way he put words
together that had a speed, an intensity, a motion to it, and it seemed to convey some of the
affects circulating in queer worlds, and within ACT UP, in that moment. Even if I'm ~ot able to
write like that myself, I wanted to signal the ways in which a written work denves from
affective states and can generate affective states as well.

I think it'd be great, it would be liberating in many ways. And I really like a good
argument, but that can be done in a way that is more creative. Experimenting more to try to
enliven our writing more would be great. Would something be lost thereby, by bringing more
affect into our work? I don't think so. Or I'm not too worried about that. So long as we
recognize that academic work isn' t the only site for interpretations of the past and interventions
in the present.

Rory Baron (RB): I talk about this with a lot of my friends who are creative writing majors, and
I'm not- I'm a thoroughly social science person- we talk a lot about the difficulties of trying to
harness that affective writing within English or Creative Writing rather than a more
argument-style type of writing. The structure's already there for you within a thesis-style
writing, but within creative writing, you have to come up with that structure on your own.

BF: Yeah, writing is so colonized by Western rationality. Alright, question three: In
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your usage of the emotional habitus, you describe it as a set of emotional labels, or an emotional
pedagogy for group members to use, as well as a force which operates beneath conscious
awareness. Can you talk more about how the emotional habitus provides labeling and
pedagogy, but on an unconscious level?

Gould: With the term emotional habitus (drawing from Bourdieu), I am pointing toward a social
grouping's collective and only partly conscious emotional dispositions, that is, members'
embodied, axiomatic inclinations toward certain feelings and ways of emoting. It operates at a
nonconscious level by and large. I prefer nonconscious to unconscious because the word
unconscious, as used in psychoanalytic theory, requires repression, whereas nonconscious
denotes anything outside of conscious awareness. Now, of course, processes like disavowal or
denial which push painful or traumatizing perceptions out of conscious awareness oftentimes
are in play, but not always, and not only. That's why I prefer the word nonconscious.

An emotional habitus is not consciously taken on and consciously used, but rather is
something that works through us. By which I mean, it is produced and reproduced through a
social group's emotional practices, and as a member of that social group engaging in and subject
to such practices, it gets into you, suffuses you, becomes your "nature." What we experience
and understand as our own nature, our human nature, is about this habitus shaping us, and
disposing us towards particular actions. A habitus, as in a kind of disposition, an orientation, a
kind of common sense, an axiomatic way of perceiving and being and acting, that's all
happening largely outside of our conscious awareness. You're not thinking, oh, in order to be
legible as an X, I need to walk in this way, and hold my body in this way, or talk in this way. It
doesn't happen like that. It's more that we imbibe ways to be a proper X in a given field,
through all of the ways that we look around ourselves and learn - that's what I mean by
pedagogy; I'll return to that.

In terms of an emotional habitus for, as you said, group members to use, that sounds
slightly purposive, and voluntarist, and strategic. To be sure, that certainly happens. An
example I discuss in Moving Politics is from very early on in ACT UP when AIDS activists
wondered, "How do we turn grief into anger? How do we turn people's rage into action?" That
was a form of strategic thinking around emotions. Activists do indeed sometimes try to
cultivate in themselves and others what they think are the proper feelings for their activist
goals. And that purposive "emotion work" helps to create the group's emotional habitus. But in
using the term habitus, I'm trying to emphasize the more bodily and less-than-fully conscious
dimensions of its forcefulness.

Here's how I see an emotional habitus working. Operating beneath or to the side of
conscious awareness, and instantiated through practices like enactments or intimations of
feelings, and through statements about what is (non)normative regarding feelings and their
expression, an emotional habitus provides members of a social grouping with an emotional
disposition, with a sense of what to feel, with ways of figuring out, understanding, and naming
what they are feeling, and with ways of then expressing those feelings . It is an emotional
pedagogy in the sense that it offers a sort of template for what and how to feel under particular
circumstances. It guides people's feeling and emoting by conferring on some feelings and
modes of expression an axiomatic, natural quality and making other feeling states unintelligible
within its terms and thus in a sense unfeelable and inexpressible.

Arlie Hochschild's important notion of "feelings rules" speaks to these social and
cultural dimensions of feeling and emoting. What I like about the habitus concept is that it
allows us to see how such feeling rules or norms operate beneath conscious awareness. Indeed,
an emotional habitus has force precisely because its bodily and axiomatic qualities obscure the
social, conventional nature of feelings and generate the sense that what you are feeling is
natural and individual, entirely your own. The habitus concept also allows us to grasp the
bodily, nonconscious, affective processes through which we all are conscripted, unwittingly but
willingly, into the social.

the consciousness

Gould: I do think it's possible to make what is nonconscious more conscious. I think that's a
really good question. Psychoanalysis is a theory and method that uses talk therapy to make
conscious what is unconscious; it is about trying to become more aware. Affect theorists such as
Massumi talk about attending to the newness of every situation, being sensitive to its openness
in the sense of remembering that nothing is predetermined and sensing that things could go in a
number of different directions even if there may be a tendency for the present to unfold like the
past. So, that sort of sensing and tuning in to the unactualized potentials of any situation, tuning
in to and amplifying alternative responses, alternative capacities that have been potentiated by
the unfolding of an event but that aren't yet being tapped into, that is a way to try to make more
conscious what is happening at a nonconscious level.

Something I've noticed in some contemporary activist contexts, some groups have
what's called a - what is it? It's like a "feeling monitor," but there's a name for it and I can't
remember what it is. Oh, it's a "vibe watcher," and sometimes that person will interrupt the
whole meeting and say something like, "There's a lot of tension in the room right now." That
may sound kind of new age-y, but really they're simply tuning in to the dynamics in the room,
sensing that things are going awry or that the meeting has hit an impasse, they're feeling into
the affects circulating in the space and interrupting a particular unfolding by drawing attention
to what may be barely conscious but in the room even so, and exerting force. The way I
understand it, the vibe watcher is paying attention to, trying to tune in to, the affects in the
room, thereby opening up the possibility that the group might navigate internal dynamics and
difficulties differently. That's an example of trying to tune in to the complex feeling states
circulating in a scene of some sort, and trying to make them more conscious. And it's not that
we can then navigate everything perfectly, but rather than allow them to take over and drive,
it's about trying to develop more of a relation to the affective dimensions of activist scenes and
use that greater awareness to hit pause: "Oh, something's happening here. Let's see if we can
actually try to talk about it, think about it, and maybe approach things differently."

Gould: Yeah, so the habitus concept as Bourdieu developed it ended up sounding very
structural, almost deterministic, and very much about social reproduction. I don't really read
him that way. I read him as thinking in terms of tendencies, probabilities, likelihoods, and I see
him as recognizing that there's a shaping rather than determining quality to a habitus. So it's
flexible in that sense. And I see it as flexible because a habitus gets reproduced- if differentlythrough practices, human practices, human doings, through sociality, through the events of
affecting and being affected by. All of those practices can cause a habitus to shift over time. In a
way, Moving Politics is an ethnography of a shifting emotional habitus. It tries to account for an
initial emotional habitus that shaped lesbians' and gay men's political horizons in very specific
ways, their senses of political possibilities early in the AIDS epidemic, and then explores how
that emotional habitus was transform~d in a manner that opened up different, more militant
political horizons in lesbian and gay communities across the United States. I was interested in
how that newer emotional habitus emerged and then was reproduced over time- how it took
form, how it crystallized and solidified, and then why and how it too eventually was
transformed, a transformation that contributed to the shrinking of ACT UP and the decline of
many chapters nationwide. My point is that it's important to think about a habitus processually
and historically. An emotional habitus comes into being under particular historical
circumstances, or more precisely, through human practices that are shaped by and unfolding
within particular circumstances, and as it solidifies and congeals and later may be transformed,
all of that happens under very specific historical conditions. And, as I said earlier, I think all of
those practices occur largely non-consciously. Which is not to s~y that there aren't conscious,
purposive, strategic attempts by activists to alter an emotional habitus. But you can't simply say,
"Okay, everyone! Be angry!" and then everyone suddenly is angry. It doesn't work that way.
The task as a scholar is to track, through painstaking empirical research, the discursive, bodily,
gestural, emotive practices that bring an emotional habitus into being, that stabilize and
reproduce it over time, and that sometimes transform it as well. The political dimension of this
scholarly pursuit is that it's helpful for us as activists to think about those practices and about
the ways that a resulting emotional habitus shapes political collectivities, their political
horizons, and their political doings.

RB: You discuss the role that affect has in political and activist movements at several points in
your book, especially in your observations about ACT UP's utilization of negative affects. In
contemporary movements such as Black Lives Matter, there's also this use of affect both positive
and negative, and we can see this in other movements like Water is Life, in the Standing Rock
movement, and MeToo- being probably one of the most recent of these - and the very titles of
these movements are based on affective responses to the hegemony. And you know, Black Lives
Matter uses both positive and negative affects in phrases like, "Stop killing us!" "I can't
breathe!" so in that sense it's similar to what ACT UP does. But in the case of BLM, the title itself
refers to a positive affect. Do you feel that positive affects can survive generationally as a
strategy the way the negative affects in social movements have?

Gould: I'rr: not sure I'm fully grasping your question, but what you're saying about positive
and ,negahve affect a~d social movements makes me want to say that movements, even if
they re ~ot a~are _of 1t, .engage in affective politics in the sense that they often attune to the
a~ects Clrculatmg m a pven co~text and, often not consciously, engage in practices that try to
bnng out some. of the potenhal of the moment. Consider, for example, the Black Power
m~vement and _
1ts s~~~ol of the raised fist . That symbol consorts with positive affects like
pnde, black pnde: JOmmg t~~t feeling t~ power and political militancy; the Black Power
m?:ement tapped mto that m1htant potential. That raised fist is a symbol, tethered to pride and
m1htancy, that h.as endured, and it has migrated: to women's and gay liberation movements, for
example. Sometimes mov~ments try to reckon with the hard, negative affects- the bad feelings
that_ people can have - trymg to transform those into either more positive feelings or activating
feelmgs or whatev_er. C~ns1der t~e women's movement; consciousness-raising groups in some
ways wer: reck?nmg w1th t~e depression that some women were feeling given life in a male
supremae1st s_oClety. De~'ressw~ can be a .very individualizing feeling where the person feeling
depr:ssed n:1ght say, T~ere ,~ somethmg wrong with me." Consciousness-raising groups
pro~1ded a d~~erent narra_hve: No, ~h:re's nothing wrong with you, and you're not depressed,
you_ re angry. That _consClou_sness-rmsmg work was emotion work. It transformed people from
f~elm~ depressed mto fe~hng angry, allowing women to collectivize, and the women's
hberatlon movement was m some ways born within and out of that process of emotional

So, movements engage in emotion work; not necessarily consciously and strategically
and purposefully, but sometimes they do, in order to produce the "right" kinds of feeling states
to activate people. In my experience, the left sometimes prohibits certain feeling states. I write
about despair at the end of Moving Politics, how there wasn't much space for it in the
movement. And that's true in many left contexts. You're supposed to feel hopeful, and you're
supposed to feel angry about all of the social injustice - this is kind of the pedagogy or
emotional habitus of the left, you know- feel angry, and enraged by what's going on, and feel
hopeful that through our collective action, we can and will change the world. And if you feel
despair, well, there's not a lot of space for that. But come on, it's a really important negative
affect. And there's a lot to feel despair about. So, in that chapter in Moving Politics about despair,
I was trying to think about what it would have been like if, rather than disallowing despair, the
movement had carved out some space for us to experience that despair collectively. Because the
imperative was to be angry, and to continue to be hopeful that we would save our friends' and
comrades' lives, and our communities. So, when people began to feel despair -this was before
the invention of protease inhibitors, so people were feeling despair about the never-ending
deaths, and about our inability to actually do what we said we were going to do which was save
people's lives and bring social change - there was no collective space created for that bad
feeling. So what ended up happening is people who started to feel despair would just kind of
slink away from the movement, especially as the refrain in the movement increasingly became,
"Where's your anger? Where's your anger?" And at a certain point, some people just felt
despair.

Many bad feelings are political. Disappointment is a deeply political feeling, and if the
left was able to reckon with it, and politicize it, and collectivize it, we might be able to address
that feeling and thereby mobilize people. I don't want to sound so instrumentalizing, as if we
even could instrumentalize people's feelings for the purposes of social change, but my point is
that those feelings are out there, and if we ignore them, if we don't create a space for them, or if
we simply hector people into not feeling them, telling them, "No, don't feel despair, you've got
to feel angry," then we're not really dealing with reality. And there's a lot of political potential in
those bad feelings.

RB: Yeah, so I'm thinking about how despair is highly discouraged, and you're only supposed
to feel anger and hopefulness- that kind of ties into purity politics, and it drives a lot of people
away. I think we live in a very apathetic time right now, and I think that these kinds of trends
have kind of contributed to that. Do you think there's any way to utilize affect as a way to kind
of collectivize, as you say, and kind of transform these apathies into despair, or as a collective
kind of emotion that moves us forward into political action?

Gould: So apathy implies not caring about what's going on, and I would rather understand
what gets called apathy through what people's behavior actually is, which is political
withdrawal; in multiple ways, people have withdrawn from political life. To call it apathy
presumes to know that people are withdrawing because they don't care very much about
what's going on, but we actually don't know whether people care or not. My hunch is that
people actually do care deeply about what's going on around them, and so the question is, why
. . . . . then have they withdrawn? Why do people withdraw from the political? And I think that's
really complex. Sometimes it has to do with the ineloquence o~ the political, by which I mean
the way in which the political doesn't speak to them, doesn't address them, doesn't
acknowledge people's needs, and desires, and aspirations, and pain, and difficulties. To the
contrary, elected leaders, politicians, say things like, "the recession is over," and "the economy's
booming." So then, if you're not booming, it must be your fault. What I'm saying is that the
political repeatedly fails to address people where people are at in terms of their needs and
wants, and so on. So then, I wouldn't call it apathy; what we see around us is political
withdrawal, and that raises all kinds of questions as to why. I think that what we were talking
about earlier- about tuning in to feelings- can help us, because if people feel disappointed by
the political, if they feel dismissed by the political, if they feel unaddressed by the political,
those are feeling states that if we tune in and attend to them, we can say to ourselves, well what
kind of a political context do we need to build that actually listens to what many people are
feeling, and that cares about people's disappointments, and despairs, and furies, and so on?
Turning towards affect is in some ways just attuning to what's already there, which is that
people are affected by whatever is going on around them, and if we're going to try to
collectivize, we need to be really attuned to what people are affected by, and what that then
makes them do or not do. And the idea of potentiality, the notion that things could go in this
direction, or this direction, or this direction, and that the direction things will go is not
predetermined, that is suggestive of the need to really try to tune in to the affects that are
circulating, because in that attunement we might gain a more adequate grasp of what's going
on, and that might allow us to push some of that potentiality in a good direction, in a direction
that would, for example, bring about greater social change in the form of, say, greater freedom
and a more just and equal distribution of resources.

Gould: Yeah! And of course all movements -whether from the right, or the left, or the middleare trying to build some sort of a collectivity, and they're trying to intervene in some kind of
way, and all of them are trafficking in affect. And of course the state works to produce all kinds
of affective states like fear and anxiety that help to control populations. They may not be doing
that purposively, or they may be doing that purposively, that's a question to be investigated, but
my point is that we can't think politics without thinking affect, whether the politics is
happening on the left, or the right, or the middle, or from the state, or from the people, from
diFferent groupings of the people. Affect sa turates the political.

RB: Yeah, I agree. So related to the last question, the neoliberal hegemony has caught on, in a
sense, and I don't know if "appropriated affect" is a good term-
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RB: -yeah, as a method of manipulation in order to sell the hegemony. Seemingly "activist"
organizations and movements such as "It Gets Better" is a good example of this, because they're
kind of pushing a more capitalist, normative framework. Do you think that affect can be used to
combat affect- and we've kind of touched upon this already- does it open up political horizons
that were previously cut off? Do you think leftist activism can ever successfully use affect as a
way to move on the offense rather than perpetually being on the defense?

Gould: Yeah, I think so. What your question gets at is the way the state uses affect to control
populations, to maintain the status quo, to continue the project of profit-making and staying in
power. And movements are constantly lassoing affec t, consciousl y or not, to oppose things, or to
pursue their own agenda. I don't know that it's affect alone that would allow the left to go on
the offensive rather than be always on the defensive. That requires organizing, building
movements. There are already many movements, so it's about figuring out how to amplify
those, how to have cross-fertilization among them, and affect obviously is in the mix there.
Figuring out how to amplify solidarities, how to create the conditions for people to touch across
difference and feel okay about that, and to desire that, how to create the conditions in which
people feel they can survive in their daily lives while being activists as well. All of those are
things that we need to figure out. Once again, I' ll just say that affect is in the mix there . You
can't think about these kinds of questions of organization and of solidarity and
movement-building without thinking about affect and emotion.

RB: A question regarding your most recent book project- the "Not-Yet" of politics- how do we
decide what's possible? What do you envision as the next step for leftist activism?

Gould: I'm not sure about the second part of your question, about what I envision as the next
step; my talk this afternoon is in some ways about not knowing what is to be done, and about
inhabiting that unknowingness in a manner that allows us to act even so. But regarding the
question of how do we decide what's possible. The word "decide" makes it seem like there are
several options and we decide which one, or that we can simply sit down and consciously
decide what's possible. And of course activists do sit around and ask, "Okay, what can we
achieve here? What do we want to try to do?" But senses of possibility and impossibility, I
think, are deeply political, as your question suggests, and movements need to be concerned
about where senses of possibility, and perhaps more importantly, senses of impossibility, come
from. We can't say in an abstract sense, or in a transhistorical sense, where a sense of possibility
comes from or how we decide what's possible or not. But again, from a political perspective, it's
important to be thinking about that question: where do senses of possibility come from? How do
they emerge and take hold, and then sometimes change over time? Sometimes it's an external
event that challenges our sense of possibility. Maybe you see what happened in Cairo, people
occupying a public square and collectivizing themselves and challenging state authority and in
fact bringing down a 30-year dictatorship, and you say, "We could try to do that too." You see
what happened in West Virginia with teachers going on strike and winning, and you're in
Oklahoma, and you say, "Maybe we could go on strike too." And so in thinking about this
question of senses of possibility, we should note that we give one another senses of possibility.
We also oftentimes destroy one another's senses of possibility by saying, "That's not realistic,
that's not going to happen, that won't work." It's useful to attune to those tonalities, to those
forms of knowingness, it gives us a sense of how we participate in creating particular senses of
possibility and impossibility. Attuning to that is really important, I think. Which is all to say, I
like the sentiment of your question a lot! And I think it's important to have an orientation
towards creating senses of possibility. But of course, if we think about that question of what's
possible only in terms of what's achievable, that can truncate our political horizons. We need to
think about the seemingly impossible if we want to bring it into being. If we only allow
ourselves to think about the achievable, we never think beyond what is; what is tells us what's
achievable, and it thereby limits what's achievable, so we have to think beyond that, otherwise
we can get stuck. In any event, this question of senses of possibility and impossibility is a very
important question.

Gould: Yeah, I mean, as I said, I don't have a blueprint [laughter]. But yes, I think we need to
attune to despair and other bad feelings, and not deny them by demanding we all be hopeful
and angry, you know, "Don't mourn, organize," as they used to say, or "Turn your grief into
anger," or "Turn your despair into rage," or whatever. You can't command feelings into being.
To harness our despair would require acknowledging it and trying to see its political sources,
and then trying to lasso it, I suppose. During the Bush years - the Bush II years - and the
beginnings of the (second) Iraq war, there was a group that formed that I was a part of called
Feel Tank Chicago; it's a feel tank as opposed to a think tank, a group of artists, activists, and
academics who are interested in the role that feelings play in public life. We held international
parades of the politically depressed as a way to try to politicize our bad feelings, our political
depression and despair. Politicize, collectivize, and put it out there into the world. There was so
much response. We made t-shirts that said, "Depressed?" on the front, and "It might be
political," on the back, and people either were confused or their faces just beamed with
recognition. The shirt spoke to them, it's like we were saying, "We feel you." People's reaction
of almost relief at being seen and felt really impressed upon me how important it is to politicize
and collectivize these bad feeling states, because they're out there, and they often do have
political sources, but they can be quite individualizing and defeating, leading people to
withdraw from political engagement.
·

Gould: Yeah, it is. Well, regarding despair, you're right, it is widespread, and I think it's often
individualized, and people just kind of throw up their hands. It's in activist scenes where, rather
than throwing up our hands about how awful everything is, we typically try to figure out what
to do. So, how appropriate in activist scenes to try to figure out what to do with that widespread
despair! We do indeed need to tune in to the affective states that are widely circulating, and
consider their sources, contours, and how they affect the composing, and decomposing, of
collectivities. So, yes, despair does play a role outside of activist circles, and in some ways, that's
precisely the audience for activist circles.
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Ferrington, Hechler, and Parsons

Jan~ell Parso~s (JP): ~he ~irst question we wanted to ask you, because we know you'll be
~alkmg_a~out_1mme~wt10~ m your talk tomorrow, is how are you thinking about this notion of
ur~medwtlon m re~atlonsh1p to affect? Or, maybe put another way, how did thinking about affect
brmg you to wantmg to theorize a notion of immediation?

Brian Massumi (Massumi): The two concerns came at the same time. My original interest in
affect didn't separate affect out. It was enfolded with a number of issues, forming a kind of
complex. That is why I was surprised when the term "affect theory" started being used and I
found myself categorized as an affect theorist. It made no sense to me to approach it in
separation, since it is a dimension of every event. What I was after, more than a theory of affect,
was a philosophy of the event. In Parables for the Virtual, I approached the event through the
question of movement, understood not as a simple displacement in space but as qualitative
transformation. Affect was a way of getting at the qualitative registering, in the event, of change
taking place. Affect comes flush with the event, in the immediacy of its occurring. But the
registering wouldn't be of a transformation if there were not, wrapped in the affect, a sense of
the state just left, as well as a sense of the shift in potential left for subsequent events to come. So
immediacy couldn't be reduced to the present, figured in the traditional way as a width-less
point of the present. It is, as William James said, a "saddle." It shades off in both directions into
abstract, or non-present, dimensions of experience: the immediate past that is already no longer,
and the future of potential that is not yet. I tried to address that inclusion of the abstract in the
concreteness of experience through the concept of the virtual, highlighting the paradoxical
question of how it is that the virtual - that which is real but abstract- might be actually felt.
That question has stayed with me throughout my work, and became especially central in
Semblance and Event, where I start turning to the concept of immediation in earnest. The
question of immediation is: are there practices for making the potential dimension of affect
more felt? This would amount to an intensification of experience, highlighting its changefulness.
It requires practices of the event which take potential as their object. Which means, practices
which take relation as their object, because potential, as the power to affect, is by definition
relational. Changefulness, potential, relation: the question of immediation is immediately
political.

This is the terrain that the research-creation lab I have worked with since 2004 has
explored. The SenseLab started from the question of what makes an event, and moved explicitly
toward the question of immediation, which became the concern of a years-long collective
project, some of the results of which will be presented soon in two collective volumes of the
SenseLab's Immediations book series at Open Humanities Press. My thinking about immediation
has been entirely bound up with the collective practice of the Sense Lab.

JP: So, I think since you're talking about the SenseLab here, that maybe leads to the next
question. We've been reading your The Power at the End of the Economy, but all of your wo~k
seems to challenge the Cartesian rational / affective binaries we are so used to. You return agam
and again to a need to rethink "the very concept of the rational in its relation to affect" (2).
Could you talk for a minute about why we continue to cling to that division and what it might
take for us to begin to move past it? To understand the rational and the affective as intertwined?
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Massumi: The trick is to overcome the Cartesian dichotomy without throwing out the ability to
make distinctions. Affirming one side of the dichotomy over the other just reproduces it, except
with half of it under erasure. That makes it difficult, if not impossible, to give an account of the
aspects of reality the suppressed term was trying to make thinkable. The tendency is then for
the pendulum to swing back, to recover what can no longer be accounted for. The result is a
sterile oscillation. The question is never "either-or." It is always a question of co-occurrence. In
what distribution? With what concurrences or inferences? How does the one implicate the
other? Can one become the other? If one can become the other, can they be construed as degrees
on the same continuum? What kind of events contain both in germ, and how and why do they
diverge from that embryonic coming-together? The capacity to diverge requires that we
maintain distinctions, even that troubling Cartesian distinction between the mental and the
physical. However, the co-occurrence, co-implication, and reciprocal becoming requires that we
refrain from rigidifying the distinction into a dichotomy, or only operate with that distinction.
What is needed is what I call a logic of differential mutual inclusion: a kind of monism of the
multiple that studies how distinctions, any number of distinctions, and a proliferating count of
them, come differently together. Philosophy is the art of making and multiplying distinctions.
FLOOR
Nothing is thrown out, not even the bugbear of the rational.

What rational thought does when it strives to separate itself from affect is to judge as if it
could stand aside from events and from that neutral vantage. point assess the best course of
action based on the most complete understanding of order and causality it can arrive at. This
conveniently brackets its constitutive co-implication with affect. As Hume argued, reason can
rationalize many things, but its own exercise is not one of them: it can give no ultimate reason
........~--.~-"'
why reason is better. That is why its use is so often the object of passionate exhortation. It has to 1
~.........-t
overpower the passions - in effect, make itself prime among them. Reason, then, is a passion.
The preachy, overbearing affective tone of contemporary champions of rationality, such as
Richard Dawkins, says as much. But it is not only its birth that is affectively inflected, but also ~~: 1~~M
its end. Hume also pointed out that reason has nothing in its own operation that can tell it when
to stop. It has a stopping problem, not unlike the halting problem in computer programming. NT PORCH (6' WID
There might always be a key consideration or bit of information that was missed but could well
prove crucial. Reason is, in fact, the functional equivalent of doubt. Its ruminations, endless by RST FLOOR
right, can only be cut off by taking an affectively propelled leap into action at what is felt to be
the propitious moment. This is an act of intuition. Affect is belief in the world- a noncognitve, - - - - embodied belief in the world's potential, directly felt, and no sooner felt than acted-upon.
Without the corrective of doubt, affectively propelled action will often go awry. But without
belief in the world, action is impossible. We are always plunging headlong into events, affect as
the leading edge.
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In The Power at the End of Economy I develop a number of vocabularies to talk about the
differential mutual inclusion of rationality and affect in the event, specifically as it relates to
economic thinking. The key is to understand that thought is not all on the side of reason,
making affect simply irrational or unthinking. I build on Peirce's concepts of perceptual
judgment and abduction, which are modes of hypothetical thought that come flush with the
event, enveloped in affect. Affect has what Whitehead would call a "mental pole" to its
operation. By this he means the capacity to "prehend" novelty, or inHume's terms, to exceed the
given. This is what affect, as the feeling of capacitation and potential, contributes. Affect is not
the opposite of thought. It is the movement of thought. It is the force of thought, embodied. It
comes before conscious rumination, alimenting it with the direct perceptual judgments that hit
like fate in the incipience of every event, but already with a felt sense of potential alternatives.
In this aspect, it carries a force of what I call in The Power at the End of the Economy, borrowing
from the linguist Oswald Ducrot, presupposition. Enveloped in the affect of every dawning
event is a presuppositional field, proposing action. This is a lived thinking of importance, of
situational constraint and enablement. But affect's force of thought also comes at the end,
pressing beyond the given into the future, in the form of abductive leaps into a hypothetical
course of action whose importance has yet to play out. In this aspect, it constitutes an enactive
speculation. Affect, throughout, is what I call a "thinking-feeling." It is in no way the opposite or
the absence of thought. It is in fact rationality that is a limited expression of the power of
thought, of which affect is the impetus and leading edge. Affect and rationality are differentially
mutually included on the continuum of thought- which is coextensive with the continuum of
feeling. It is often where conscious rumination is silenced that thought is most effective. Many
performers, in art and sport, speak of the need to silence the "ir:mer monologue" and refrain
from "overthinking," to make their thinking coincide with their movements, rather than direct
them.

In what I just said, the added distinctions of thought and feeling were added to situate
the way in which rationality and affect come together, in their difference. These added
distinctions are not there to eliminate or subsume the distinction between rationality and affect,
but to carry their difference.

JP: So kind of continuing along in this vein of these binaries and breaking them down and
thinking about them in relationship to each other, how do you think about affect in relationship
to language? So for example, if we want to recenter the event, rather than bodies and subjects as
I think you said to start, in our scholarship, how do we capture those affective intensities of the
event via language? Can they be captured linguistically? Should we be capturing them
linguistically?

Massumi: That's a really central question . I don't think affect can be captured by language. I
don't think it can be captured by anything without a remainder. There's always something that
escapes because affect has to do with potential and potential can't all actualize at one time. That
is the meaning of my widely misunderstood term, "the autonomy of affect." Affect is not
autonomous from thought, or from language, in the sense of being separated from them or in
opposition to them. The point of the concept is that whatever the formation you are talking
about, affect will pre-infuse it with importance at the incipient levet and carry over a surplus of
potential at the end of the exercise of whatever mode of activity the formation's operations are
dedicated to. This surplus-over, remaindered at each pulse of process, for more to come, is the
autonomy of affect.

Specifically in relation to language, this means that there is an unabsorbed remainder of
meaning left over after the statement is said and done. This is meaning that has yet to come to
determinate expression, so it is, strictly speaking nonsense. But is not nonsense simply as the
opposite of sense. It is nonsense as a surplus of sense, brewing with meanings to come. It is
what Guattari, following Hjelmslev, sometimes calls "purport"- pure matter of meaning, as yet
syntactically and semantically unformed, but already pragmatically preaccelerated. The purport
narrows down toward determinate expression as the event of expression begins to take force. It
forms, for the coming expression, a presuppositional field of the kind I was just talking about.

Another word for that field is a "proposition." A proposition, according to Whitehead,
cannot be reduced to its linguistic content. To do so, he says, is the fundamental error of logic. A
proposition is a pattern of contrasts delineating alternative courses of the universe, embedded
in a certain juncture of history. He puts it in those terms to prevent us from saying "alternative
choices." For, he says, "the proposition awaits its subject." The subject of the statement is
emergent from the playing out of the expression. It is emergent and occurrent. This asignifying,
asubjective dimension of this primary phase of an event where the matter of meaning begins to
narrow down toward a determinate issue is not in language. It is in the world, immanent to the
act of language. It is what comes to expression through language. "Prelinguistic" would be a bad
terminological choice for this . It is more "prolinguistic": toward language, in an anticipatory
dimension that is immanent to its exercise, but cannot be reduced to its structure and
signification. In What Animals Teach Us About Politics, I argue that animal play sets in place the
conditions for language at this level, even where language as such is absent. "lnfralinguistic" is
in fact a better word than "prolinguistic" for that dimension. And that dimension is affect. Affect
cannot be divorced from language, even where language is absent. It is infralinguistic. Its
relation to language has the paradoxical status I talk about in relation to the capitalist field in
The Principle of Unrest and 99 Th eses for the Revaluation of Value of the "immanent outside": of it,
but in it. It makes no more sense to say that an act of expression is outside language as it does to
say that we can stand outside capitalism. There is no outside of either, in the spatialized sense of
an external realm over against an interior realm. This in no way means that everything is "in"
(capitalism, language). It's a question of modes and degrees of inclusion, anticipatorily and in
fulfilment. In other words, as is always the case with affect, it is a question of potential and its
playing out.

How can language capture modes of affective intensity? The more it tries to capture
them, the more they slip away, following the prerogatives of the autonomy of affect.
Significations and propositions in the conventional logical sense try to capture affective
intensity, and fail. It is always already elsewhere before the last "i" is dotted. What language can
do is carry affective intensities. Language can make its movement coincide with the force of
thought moving through affect. It can create openings for the autonomy of affect to lead it,
rather than trying to subsume affect under its own structure and enclose it in its semantic
content. It can follow affective movements as tensors of meaning in their dynamic making. The
structure of language, and its formal propositions, are then catalysts for the self-expression of
affect, rather than its overlord. The affective force of language moves across words, carried in
their rhythm. When you feel that the meaning is as much in the gaps between the words as in
the words themselves, and that it continues virtually after the words have ended, in the
linguistic equivalent of one those optical illusions when you turn your eye from an image and
you see virtual movement spin off from it, then you are feeling the affective force of language.
We tend to call expressions that make that force felt "poetic," regardless of their genre. That's just
the word we reach for when language is outdoing itself affectively. A good philosophical text is
"poetic" in this way, however far it is from poetry as such. It carries a conceptually complex
movement of thought that wants nothing more than to keep generating more concepts, beyond
where the author stopped. A text carrying affective intensity is a generative text. From the
autonomy of affect it inherits the surplus-value of always having more to say than it knew how
to say- forcing a continuation in the same vein of thought.

Jacob Ferrington (JF): Thinking about a field of potentiality as kind of collapsing into a decision,

and the lived experience of somebody making a decision ~ nd sort of rationalizing or
cognitively / linguistically accounting for their decisions, how does that play into this discussion
of this mutually constitutive affect and cognition that it seems like you're getting to?

Massumi: Subjects don't make decisions- events make decisions. What we call the subject is an
outcome of decision. We retrospectively own decisions. Whitehead says that decision should be
taken in its etymological sense of "to cut." Decision is in the world, it's in the way the world's
activity parses itself. It's in the way in which self-affirming modes of activity - tendencies, in a
word- interfere and resonate with others toward a complex playing out that ends in a crossing
from one threshold of consistency and co-composition to another. Decision is the cut, the cusp,
of an emergent composition of forces. Whitehead also says that it is the exception, not the rule,
when this happens at the conscious level of cogitation and reflection. Consciousness, he says, is
the "acme of experience," underwritten by nonconscious levels of experience shrouded in the
incipiency of thought and action. Consciousness follows the playing-out of those levels as they
peak into an emergent composition of forces- taking "follow" both in the sense of coming after
and in the sense of being in the wake of. The nonconscious level is replete with activity, of the
propositional or presuppositional kind I was talking about before. It's the realm of what I call
"bare activity" (an as yet asignifying, nonsubject-bound incipient working-out).

One of the things that happens at that level is "priming": the modulation of action by
nonconsciously registered cues falling in the gaps of consciousness, which, again quoting
Whitehead, is not continuous, but rather continuously "flickers." The importance of priming is
that it forbids any notion of "raw experience." Words can prime nonconsciously. In other words,
"higher functions," the results of learned behavior of great complexity, fold back into bare
activity through priming. I spend a great deal of time in The Power at the End of the Economy and
Ontopower developing the concept of priming and talking about the implications of it. In
Parables I approached it under the rubric of the "feedback of higher forms." The point is that the
so-called "lower" levels of forming experience are no less complex - in fact, they are in many
respects more complex - than the "higher," conscious levels. And that although experience at
that level is not accessible to sovereign, conscious decision, it is open to modulation, and there
are techniques for that modulation. This suggests alternative modes of affect-based politics. The
status of rationality must be resituated in this context. Rationality is one modulatory technique
feeding back into bare activity among others. It is by no means the only one or, in our period,
the most effective.

JF: That might be a good space for us to move into a question about the sense of, say, a voter
who sees herself as an autonomous subject and when it comes to walking into the voting booth
and casting a vote, how do you conceive of what we'll call the event-space of voting? So what
drives a consumer to act the way a consumer acts but also a voter? The ideas we were thinking
of in this situation were priming and jamming specifically and how that relational field brings
about these seemingly autonomous subjects who go in and change. And also in the back of my
head I'm thinking of this group of quote-unquote Obama voters who became Trump voters what is happening there in that emergent shift?

Massumi: Voting is a way of individualizing co-activity. It's an activity that individuals do
together - completely separately. It's a mechanism for decollectivizing activity. This makes it a
power mechanism, in and of itself, and not only through its outcomes. Voting is a mass staging
of individuals as - as if they were - separate autonomous willing subjects. It produces an
effective feeling of this "as if. " It destroys an y sense of the collective as transindividual - or
infraindividual (which can also be called the "dividual").

Voting primes individuals into a sense of separation, in seclusion from every other
individual, literally curtained off from any collective dynamic. Here, the collective figures as the
simple opposite of decision-making individual segregation. It fosters the feeling that the
collective is just some kind of magma of undifferentiated - or more like it in these days of
migrant panic, an uncontrollably hyperdifferentiated - humanity threatening to swamp the self
and disable decision. This primes for a tendentially aggressive, even paranoid, stance toward
the collective. The last thing it does is carve out a space of reflection and considered decision.
Instead, it catapults the individual all the more powerfully into affective mechanisms, but in an
apparent vacuum of sociality and relationality. In that vacuum, decision is no longer a matter of
passing a threshold to an emergent co-composition. It is formatted as a zero-sum game, 0 or 1,
yes or no, thumbs up or down. This makes decision an exercise in mutual exclusion, rather than
differential mutual inclusion.

The vote in representative democracy, particularly in the age of social media, has become
an accelerator of relationally unhinged affect, so much so that calls for a return to rationality
ring ridiculously hollow. It's to the point that basing a decision on the reasonableness of an
argument strikes voters as counterintuitive. Evidence-based thinking, or what the Bush
administration criticized as "reality-based" thinking, can't compete. It is often said we are in a
post-fact world. I think that where we are in is the realm of the affective fact.

A matter-of-fact in process-oriented philosophy is the finality of an emergence that plays
out the consequences of a thinking-feeling pulse of bare activity, peaking in the crossing of a
threshold that makes an irreversible difference. That crossing of the threshold, because it is
irreversible, because it has added something to the world that can't be undone, has import that
makes relating to it imperative, and that imperative is directly felt. The next pulse of process
cannot not take into account toward its own peaking. The thing is that the affective aspect can
come without the crossing of the threshold actually taking place. A threat, for example,
produces the fear and the felt imperative to flee or fight, even in the absence of an actual danger.
This is "unhinged" in the sense that threats can conjure themselves with abandon, independent
of the actual conditions for their fulfilment, taking effect purely affectively. This is what I call an
affective fact. An affective fact is the felt imperative of an event that did not take place, except
through the feeling of the potential that it might. It is a fact because once the potential has been
felt, its consequences actually expressed, for example in fear, it can't be unfelt. It's irreversible.
The fear has transpired, and can recur. It remains looming. A threshold has been crossed, but
without ever leaving the realm of potential. The event is purely affectively felt, in the
conditional: in the might-be, or could-have-been, or would-have-been. In an increasingly
chaotic, far-from-equilibrium world, individuals are buffeted, through the media and the social
media in particular, by the constant barrage of threats. The world has morphed into what
security analysts call the "threat environment." We are barraged by affective facts, roiling
together, increasingly autonomous in their triggering. The isolated voter in the booth is
hard-pressed to counter this with evidence-based reasoning.

However, in the end it's really not so much a question of fact versus affect,
evidence-based rationality versus affect. In a sense, all matters-of-fact are affective facts, if we
think of the genesis of every event in thinking-feeling, and the autonomy of affect running
through events. It is more a question of postures toward potential, toward uncertainty and the
unknown, corresponding to different valences, different modalities of affective fact: atomizing
or relational; zero-sum or shaded and graded; trans/infra individual or "as if" merely
individual; mutually inclusive or mutually exclusive; differential or hegemonic; positively
bracing or paranoia-inducing; composing a world or exuding a threat environment; equal to the
complexity of the event, or violently reductive of it in exasperated reaction to its element of
uncontrollability. These are ways of rehearsing the Spinozist distinction, taken up by Nietzsche,
between active and reactive forces. And it is as a function of this distinction that democracy
needs to be reinvented, beyond representative democracy, in new forms of direct democracy.

I'm not at all saying that evidence-based reason and rationality have no role. In this age
of complexity and environmental emergency, to argue that rational assessment and
instrumental reason have no role would be self-defeating. It is just to say that there no sense in
returning to the fiction of their sovereign power of decision. That is just as self-defeating. The
role of rationality has always been as course-corrector for affective movements- as a feedback
of higher forms that acts as a prime to modulate the playing out of affective processes. The
answer is not to oppose reason and affect, but to return reason to its affective ground, and to do
so strategically, in ways that prime for differential mutual inclusion and peaks of decision that
actively affirm life in all its complexity. Rationality has to learn to be a catalyst, instead of a
sovereign. This is a necessity of survival as we hurtle into the growing effects of climate change.
The neoliberal and liberal democratic priming for the "as if' of individual decision, supposedly
governed by rational deliberation, and supposedly leveraging self-interest for the general good,
has had a central role in leading us to this impasse, which is an inevitable outcome of the
capitalist drive for more, for quantitative increase at all costs - with which liberal democracy
has always been in symbiosis, to the point that under neoliberalism the nation-state has become
little more than a territorial operator-console for the capitalist process. More of the same will
only yield just that - more of the same. And in this context, more of the same is global
catastrophe.

JF: This leads me to something we've been discussing in the course, intersectionality and
assemblage theory and trying to understand how that might work especially in relation to
identity politics which I think reigns a little bit on the left, and I'm wondering if you can talk a
little bit about how that might inform this discussion.

Massumi: Affect theory - or as I prefer to name my own orientation, process thinking - is in
many ways incompatible with identity politics. But to situate any critique of identity politics, it
is crucial to start from the incontrovertible reality that the first, and still dominant, identity
politics is the European identity politics of whiteness. Identity as we understand it today is an
outcome of the dual genesis by which a purportedly sovereign subject mirroring at a smaller
scale the sovereign nation-state to which it belongs by right arose out of the crucible of
colonialism and the slave trade, issuing at the same time, as on parallel tracks, into the brutal
rise of modern capitalism and the Enlightenment ideal of progress. The identity politics of
oppressed and marginalized minority groups is in reaction to this ur-identity politics, in an
attempt to turn its own model against it in order to oblige the dominant white society to live up
to its rhetoric of progress and inclusion. The strength of this approach is that takes a known,
historically validated form - that of identity - and uses it to confound the dominant usage,
which has historically been for purposes of exclusion. The problem is that exclusion is written
into the form of identity itself. Identity organizes itself around the self/other,
in-group I out-group opposition. This is not incidental to it; it is of its essence. As a result,
exclusion effects are impossible to expunge. They are just shifted down the road. You can see
this when any identity-based contestation achieves a certain success, carving out a space of
inclusion and recognition for itself. The identity schizzes. The success of second-wave feminism,
for example, was experienced as an exclusion by lesbians and women of color. The success of
the homosexual rights movement was in tension with the trans community, which had to rise
up for its own account.

The fact is that people do not live in their identity, they live their differencing. I say
differencing because it continues. Every recognition of an identity leaves out a fraction that must
then affirm itself and fight for its own recognition, leading to a proliferation of subdivisions and
an expanding abbreviation list, now far exceeding the original "LBG" (I'm old enough to
remember a time before there was even a "T"). I commented on this cascading of difference
away from the form and content of what at the time I was calling the Man-Standard of
whiteness almost thirty years ago in User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia. That tendency
has only accelerated since. This is as it should be: differencing is fractal. It does not stop at a
convenient boundary line, however finely cut. Its movement exceeds every category, so the only
way to keep up with it and approximate its scope is to keep madly multiplying the categories.
But at a certain point, another logic has to set in. An individual life is not a particular case of a
general identity category, however finely defined. An individual life is a singularity, and
singularities come not in categories but in populations, irreducibly dynamic and with fuzzy
boundaries. An individual is a fuzzy subset of a population. Individuals do not identify so
much as they schizz- invent a sui generis variation on the population to which they dynamically
and complexly belong. Society is dividual. Every population is internally diverse, and the same
is true of every individual within each population. There is always something in an individual
that does not fit its assigned category, and that even in utter isolation stands for what Deleuze
and Guattari call a "people to come": an emergent mode of life.

Intersectionality is helpful to start getting at this complexity, realizing that identity lines
cross, and everyone occupies a certain locus on the intersectional grid. But this doesn't go far
enough, because it is still speaking in terms of identity, general category, and particular case. It
compounds particularity, rather than fractalizing or dividualizing it, to grasp what Erin
Manning calls the "diversity in diversity": the differing of difference. There's a lot of thinking in
queer and decolonial thought and in the black radical tradition that go in this direction.
Particularly inspiring to me have been Edouard Glissant's concept of "relation identity" and
Moten and Harney's concept of the "undercommons," both of which propose a black sociality
that opposes the dominant identity politics of whiteness without appealing to the traditional
identity form. Although I have deep reservations about identity politics, and many aspects of its
culture on the left, I see the need for it in the macro political domain, as a matter of self-defense
and survival, and bristle at many criticisms of it, most especially from the right. It's a bit of a red
herring to point the finger at the identity politics of the left. It is simply succumbing to media
stereotypes. There is so much more to the social movements that is too complex to be
meme-worthy, and so barely registers in the media. It's also a diversion from the point I started
with: that the first and by far the most virulent and destructive identity politics is white identity
politics.

Alina Hechler (AH): And I guess kind of to close up on that, or end on maybe a more positive
or futuristic note, in The Principle of Unrest you have said that considering the limits of political
reason, and these affective facts that are kind of immune to a consistent rational argument, how
can we move forward? In The Principle of Unrest you have suggested a politics of care. So in a
sense, by pure rationality or pure argument we're not going to be able to turn the tide
ultimately, so how could we practice a politics of care or promote that?

Massumi: It's something we need to invent collectively. It's not easy. The first thing is to really
let it sink in that a politics of care is not about a personal attribute. It's not about having a
subjective feeling of care for someone else. That is more a politics of empathy. It doesn't work,
because it is based on the face-to-face . It begins by subjectivizing the relation, upstream of any
encounter. It puts the other across from the self on the outside, but then, as by a sleight of hand,
includes the outside in a structure of mirroring. The mirroring is supposed to be of a
commonality, of a common humanity reflected in the faces opposite each other. But this is very
often more of an imposition than an invitation, because it neglects to ask the question,
"commonality according to whom?" It is in fact an essential gesture of whiteness: assuming
we're all the same deep down, "we're all human," so can't we all just get along? To which the
answer is another question: "on whose terms?" Expressions of empathy risk doing the exact
opposite of what they're meant to do because they neutralize the political, by making the
political personal.

A politics of care in the way I mean it has to be a quality of the event, not of a subject. It's
a question of how the conditions for events are put into place. It assumes fractalization, not
facialization. It assumes that the social field is made up of differentials, not boundary lines,
however crossed. It assumes incommensurability: that if you scratch the surface of the mirror,
you see that we are all differencing, each in our own dividual/transindividual manner,
schizzing the populations to which we would belong into renewed being, always in becoming.
Commonality is a veneer of whiteness. There is no commonality across the board. But that
doesn't mean we can't live together. There is a word for a dynamic cohabitation of individuals
and populations in correlated becoming, always already gone· differing: ecology. A politics of
care is not about political psychology, it is a political ecology. Neither does it concern itself with
ideology. It concerns itself with emergent comings-together: events of differential
coming-together from which no common denominator is drawn, but which precipitate a further
difference. It requires techniques of the event, which is what we have been working at the
SenseLab for many years. These are techniques of relation, and of collective attunement to the
mix of tendencies afoot, the potentials they carry, and how they can be primed. This can be
theorized in terms of a revised notion of sympathy, in contradistinction to empathy, and that is a
big part of the project in What Animals Teach us About Politics and The Power at the End of the
Economy.

AH: I had a question that I'm personally really interested in- we as fledgling academics, the

academy is increasingly under siege, at least from a budgetary standpoint and everything, you
know, and there seems to be a stratification that we become more and more isolated, and I have
a sense that your work with the SenseLab might speak a little bit to this. What is our role in that,
in creating that conditioning relational events as academics?

Massumi: At the SenseLab, we're looking at creating an alter-university space, parasitical to the
university. We mean that also in the sense of constituting a "para-site," a site that occupies a
stratum adjacent to the university, operating by a different logic, not necessarily against it
frontally, but rather maintaining what Erin Manning, who founded the SenseLab, calls an
"approximation of proximity," so that we can avail ourselves of what the university has
positively to offer without being beholden to it. Alter-"university" is a misnomer. It won't give
credit or degrees, and it won't have a traditional course structure with the usual student-teacher
hierarchy. It will be self-organizing, like the SenseLab, and oriented toward emergent results
embodying collective expressions. We're calling it the 3 Ecologies Institute. Experimentation in
new forms of value and collective alter-economies is a key aspect, in response to the student
debt crisis. 3E will be organized along the lines of a gift economy. A basic principle is never to
charge for anything, as has been the practice all along at SenseLab. Hence the urgency of
alter-economic thinking. Personally, we're feeling cornered by the university, as it conforms
more and more to the dictates of the neoliberal value system and management model. I have
already left the university, through the privileged door of early retirement, and Erin is just
holding on. The 3 Ecologies does not feel optional to us. It's a matter of survival. It's imperative
that we find ways of creating sustaining milieus for thinking and acting together, imbued by a
politics of care. They must be open to segments of the population for whom higher education is
traditionally inaccessible, including those who are neurodiverse. This requires sustained
attention to techniques of relation. The idea is to create a pre-figurative milieu- one of many, for
there are projects of this nature popping up everywhere - enacting emergent modes of relation
and new forms of knowledge production. There is no time to go more into detail here. Readers
can refer to the SenseLab Web site (senselab.ca) for more details and links.

"Every Sentiment Has a History":
Affect and the Archive
An Interview with Ann Stoler

Ann Stoler is Willy Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Anthropology and Historical
Studies at The New School for Social Research. She is the director of the Institute for Critical
Social Inquiry. She has worked extensively on the politics of knowledge, colonial governance,
racial epistemologies, the sexual politics of empire, and ethnography of the archives. Her books
include Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of
Things (1995), Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (2002,
2010), and Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (2009).

© 2019 The Author(s). This is an open access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https:/ I creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ 4.0/),
which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
that the original author(s) and the publication source are credited.

Stoler: I'm not sure it is terribly interesting: My sister, nine years older than I, was a Sanskritist
with a passion for literature, poetry, and languages. She started teaching in "Oriental Studies"
at Barnard the same year I began as a sophomore undergraduate. She was my measure of all
things that mattered, my idol. Being an intellectual and getting my doctorate was my way (I
thought) of escaping my fate in a category I despised: the smart but not brilliant, ordinary and
ornery Jewish girl from a public school on the north shore of Long Island.

However much I wanted to be like her, that was not in the cards. The fact that we came ~
of age in such radically different moments made all the difference. My generation was shaped
by the Vietnam War, by how much we detested it, our kudos came from how well we knew
Marx, to the number of times we were jailed. It meant that politics and intellectual work seemed
organically to belong together and meshed . [ hdd thought to do an thropo logy (or something
like it) in Vietnam. It was far from possible but I did have an opportunity to go for the summer
to Indonesia in 1972, at the height of its plunge into the Green Revolution only seven years after
the massacre of alleged communist sympathizers across the archipelago. World Bank was eager
to make Indonesia "safe for democracy" and promised to reach "the poorest of the poor." As a
feisty marxist feminist in the making, I thought to do a summer project about landless women
in Java. I put off graduate school and didn't come back to New York and start at Columbia for a
year and a half.

.. .. ~

~

For my dissertation research I had some under-formulated notion that I wanted to be in
a place where the world capitalist system was playing out its contemporary course. I went to
North Sumatra, to the heart of multinational agribusiness in Indonesia, what was once known
as "The dollar land of Deli" -the plantation belt. Tobacco, rubber, and an expanding palm oil
industry were represented by Goodyear, Uniroyal, Palmolive and in the late 19th century by
some of the biggest traders on tobacco futures, cutting across the axis between Europe stock
exchanges and North Sumatra's agroindustry. A politics of knowledge and a grossly skewed
distribution of power were stamped into people's bodies, the architecture, the land. I suppose
one could argue that some course of work was set then: an effort to understand the mechanisms
of unequal distributions of privilege, resources, wealth.

~
~

~~
~

~~

~

I'm sure that being drawn to an attentiveness about entitlement and privilege was
something with which I grew up. The north shore of Long Island in the 1960s was a place that
took pride in its privilege and ascendance to the upper middle class. It was a well-heeled
enclave made up of those who made sure those who came to mow their lawns and iron their
clothes, and watch their children did so from a measured distance, lived most of the week in
isolation near the kitchen quarters of a house, or took buses back to Queens at the end of the
day. I remember how ashamed I was, how awkward I found it, how "easy" and common it was.

Stoler: I'm not sure I've ever gotten very far from the quotidian weight of distinctions, of
differences carved in the uniforms for maids, or in the creased folds of a taffeta dress. The
metrics of distinction and the crafting of race were all there in what we were taught to find
tasteful or distasteful. These were the implicit lessons of the everyday.

Stoler: Categories of people and things, race was inscribed in that everyday- in who was not in
our schools, where my father worked but did not play, where winter vacations took us, in places
my family would not go. I'm ever more convinced that race was a subtext in my growing upthose who would be excluded and those places my parents feared I might be excluded from.

Stoler: I'm drawn to working in and on situations that feel unyielding, with ready answers
eluding your grasp. I think that's what attracted me to working so long on the ambiguities and
polyvalence of race and to thinking with Foucault. We all like to quote his thought that his work
was an effort "to think otherwise," to "penser autrement." I wanted to figure out another way to
get there.

EC: That's actually one of our other questions . We were talking the other day about how there
seemed to be a shift in your work, where you had been very interested in implementing
Foucault and using his ideas in new ways, and then you suddenly switch to emotions and
affect. So, maybe this ties back into this recursivity, but we were just curious more about the
development of your theoretical lens?

Stoler: I don't see anything very sudden about it- understanding how power works has long
pulled me in different directions- from Marx to Foucault to Marguerite Duras and back again
through Raymond Williams' "structures of feeling" and again to Foucault. I've been writing
about Foucault's treatment of affect and thinking about why sentiment remains so often the
object of his work but not a dispositif in itself. In one of my favorite of Foucault's essays on
genealogy it made the forceful claim that "every sentiment has a history" but never pursued that
insight as one of his projects. I've long had the sense of a prior recognition in reading Foucault,
something I know is shared by many others.

Stoler: He does something that's so enabling and that you know is right, but you didn't really
quite know how to say it, nor could you have the kind of confidence to do so. I started teaching
1
.
Foucault's Genealogy essay 20 years ago to help me think about how to treat the stories and
histories that whites in the colonies told themselves about how they felt in the colonies, and
how they should feel toward others and by what measure they ascribed sensibilities to the
colonized - all of this so much a part of the imaginary real. My work has pushed between
inscription, prescription, and ascription, how race is inscribed in the colonial archives, how ways
of being are prescribed for Europeans and how they in turn ascribed features to others, those
populations who they so often saw as a potential threat.

"Every Sentiment Has a History"

JS: You have a really good quotation from Duress that I'll read to you, if I can. "Colonial archives

can impede the task: They have a way of drawing our attention to their own scripted temporal
and spatial designations of what is colonial and what is no longer making it difficult to stretch
beyond their guarded frames." So can you talk a bit more about how you've personally
navigated the tendency of archives to tell a story already in the way that they're built?

Stoler: Archival labor is about confronting order as mess and what at first appears as arbitrary
designations as the logic of an order. There are all kinds of ways in which the archive writes
against itself as it's creating a kind of uniformity that can't be held. Along the Archival Grain was
an effort to untangle obfuscations but also to stay with the tangled arts of governance, scripted
through security regimes and segregated schools and in so many other ways. I think of what
I'm after as writing history in a "minor key"- a history not of the crescendo of major chords but
with lower case tonalities.

Stoler: I read in the early hours at sunrise when I feel there is some sharpness to my attention,
rarely late at night. I've been reading Kant's "Critique of Judgment" to think about taste and
distaste with respect to race. Of course that's not what Kant was doing but I'm trying to
understand how these concepts of taste and distaste (gout et degout) have been pulled apart.
But to answer your original question: what's next to my bed right now - yes, Kant, and
Foucault's first lectures from 1970 at the College de France on La volonte du savoir ( I love
reading in French) ... and some students papers I should have commented on a while ago!

Stoler: Well I could do a plug but you know we have so many applications I don't need to ... still
I'd love to talk about this exciting venture that emerged from a fantasy of my own. In our
academic lives, as graduate students, assistant professors and more senior ones, there are
always so many more thinkers to read and that we feel we need to read, more than we have
time for or feel we can grasp on our own: it might be Levinas or Lacan, Hegel or Marx, Freud,
Arendt, or Foucault ... And each time you hear or see the name you think, "I've got to sit down
and read this," feeling you should have already. So my thought was this: would it not be an
amazing opportunity, after the semester of teaching is over, to sit with a small group of others
for an intensive week and read and think with one of those thinkers- and do it with a "master"
of sorts who has written on and thought with a Foucault or Marx for most of their careers?

A trustee from the New School shared my enthusiasm for the venture and provided the
funds to start five years ago and we are going stronger than ever. Applicants hail from 40 to 50
different countries and the fellows we choose are a mix of advanced graduate students and full
professor all there simply to learn, and learn more about what they have sought to know. It's an
exhilarating and exhausting week each year and one in which fellows are always asking if they
can come back again.
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Shannon Sullivan (Sullivan): I didn't intend to work on affect and emotion. When I taught a
course last fall [2017] on philosophies of emotion and affect, I realized that I do work in that
area and I hadn't really conceptualized my work that way before. But when I go back to your
question properly and think about it, it was connected to being interested in embodiment,
which is important to thinking about race in particular. And so, as I was writing the Good White
People book, I was thinking about white guilt and white shame and how central those emotions
are to a lot of discussions about how white people should respond to white privilege. Thinking
about guilt and shame then led me to look at different affects and to focus on love, which is the
most controversial part of the book.

But the other answer is really three answers. One of them, I realize, is that it's Nietzsche
who had a huge influence on me from early on, even before I started working in anything
directly in feminist or critical philosophy of race. Nietzsche was an affect theorist before affect
theory became popular, particularly in his criticism of guilt and resentment. And then, second,
my most recent monograph on The Physiology of Sexist and Racist Oppression is, in many ways,
about affect. I didn't design it that way initially, but it pushes further to think about being
embodied in the context of racism and sexism. I really wanted to consider embodiment not
merely phenomenologically or metaphorically, but to think about physiology: stress hormones
and epigenetics and heart functions and the like. I wanted to do that in a way that understands
affect and emotion in very bodily terms, and so, thirdly, William James's work has become really
important to me. Recall the James-Lange theory of emotion, in which emotion is defined as
bodily movements and changes. That's the sta~ting point of that book: to think about
physiological unconscious habits and the ways that they are structuring and being structured by
experiences with racism and sexism. So, I increasingly find affect to be an important part of my
work, but getting to that point happened by accident.

RC: I come from China, so race is really a new topic to me. This semester I'm taking a class on
race and class. The books we're mainly reading focus on structural forces like police state
violence and housing policy, but your work is actually focused on the body rather than
structural forces.

Sullivan: Yes. For better or worse, my work tends to focus a lot on that. I won't say on
individual experiences necessarily, but on the person and personal experiences. Those are
intimately connected with structural and institutional forms of racism or sexism. The personal
and the structural are two pieces of a very complex puzzle and they feed into each other. And so
my work leans toward looking at ontological issues, in the sense of how we as selves get
constituted. That shouldn't be done in a silo or an isolated way from thinking about the world
that we're part of and its institutions. But while they can seem to have a life of their own,
institutions often are affectively invested in by individual people and this happens sometimes in
a very unconscious and bodily way.

We're not really going to fully understand structural and institutional forms of racism
and sexism if we don't look at the invested self - affective and otherwise, not just financially
invested, but affectively invested - this sense of the self that is invested in the structures and
institutions of racism and sexism in ways that we don't consciously want to endorse or avow,
but that might be there nevertheless.

Sullivan: As you know, the concept of habit is really important to me as a way of thinking about
patterned predispositions, ways, and styles of engaging the world. I think a lot of this does not
happen through conscious deliberate instruction or education. But there are unconscious habits,
unconscious ways of doing things as a kind of mechanism. This leads to my interest in
childhood as a site, or a location, for the development of unconscious habits. Philosophers don't
talk about children much at all. But how do habits that form us as adults get formed in very
early ways? Here's where some version of Freud is very important: we need to pay attention to
childhood. We get formed as the selves that we are in so many powerful ways as children,
which we developmentally cannot consciously be aware of or shape or control as conscious
agents.

Branfield, Chang, and Saperstein

Sullivan: It is a deliberate choice for different reasons. Part of it comes from finding a home in
feminist and pragmatist philosophy and the way in which they both insist that philosophy is
useful. Philosophy is like a toolkit for doing things with one's life. It's connected to real
experience or real situations or practices. I'm not at all opposed to abstraction, but abstraction
has got to tie back and be in some kind of interactive relationship with real experiences. That
leads me to want to talk about actual experiences when I'm writing. I also find philosophy very
therapeutic . It's very much about trying to work out crap in my own life. Hopefully what I'm
writing about is not just about me, of course. It's also about broad features situated in human
existence. As I'm reading and thinking, I'm sometimes either not finding answers to what I
want or not agreeing with what I'm finding, so I'm trying to work it out for myself. How do I
live this life as a white woman, as a parent? And can philosophy be a useful tool to help me do
that?

I find often it can be, which is why personal examples are in my work. Also, and
especially as I began writing more and more about whiteness and race, I felt that it was very
important to take the risks that I was implicitly asking white readers to take. I've got to have
skin in the game. I've got to be just as much at risk in terms of feeling uncomfortable or feeling
exposed, so I've got to be willing to put myself out there and do that too. And if I can't do that,
then it doesn't feel very honest as an author.

Some of this approach also comes from teaching. When I teach about gender and race,
for example, it's never about scolding the students. I don't want students to think, "And now
we're being schooled in how we're supposed to think about X, Y, and Z." For this reason, I try to
have the classroom environment be one in which they see that I'm just as much flailing around
with this material and just as much at risk existentially as they are. And so sometimes I will
direct it back to me: "Here's an example in my life where this happened ... " and then that helps
everyone relax a little bit.

RC: Yes. I really like your approach that you use personal experience as a method. I really liked
that. The next question I would ask is: there's one thing I have difficulty understanding in your
book. It's about your mentioning that race is ontological. Can you elaborate more on this

Sullivan: When I use the word ontology, I mean it in an historical, situated, embedded way.
There can be ways of using that word that may sound like one is trying to point to something
universal and essential for all of being, and I'm not doing that. I'm trying in some basic ways to
talk about how we as selves get formed and that is always going to be ongoing- never a static
process or a static thing. It's always dynamic, always changing. At the same time, if that
formation is happening through habits, they provide a durability to the self that can be difficult
to change, which the concept of habit helps explain. Habits also are one way in which the self
can be somewhat plastic, somewhat capable of change. So, habit has become an interesting
mechanism for thinking about both the durability and the plasticity of who we are. Another
word I would use is "transactional": a co-constitutive formation between the self and its various
environments, if we take "environment" in a very capacious sense - not just physical
environments, but also social and affective environments. I really love the work of Sarah Ahmed
and Teresa Brennan that talks about the circulation of affects. I think of circulation as a kind of
transaction in which you've got selves and worlds and affects circulating to form the self in a
way that is invested and affectively leads to wanting the world to be certain ways.

RC: I also feel like if race is ontological, actually, we can apply this ontological view to gender
and class and thus I feel like there's actually a possibility for solidarities between different social
groups. Intersectional solidarity.

Sullivan: I think ontology is always intersectional, so "intersectional ontology" might be the
best term? At the same time, however, for certain temporary purposes we may need to consider
some pieces separately. It's so complicated how we get constituted as selves. It's probably
impossible to take it all in, to occupy a God's eye point of view that could see it all at once.
There can be reasons to pick out some pieces at times, to focus on them more than others. But
that's a functional claim, not a claim that we're constituted in isolated, siloed ways. I think
especially in the United States, it's almost impossible to pull race and class apart, for example.
This might be true in other countries and situations as well, but in the United States race is
classed and class is raced and that's not to collapse them.

I want to resist the notion that there is a neutral core to the self and that things like
gender and race are epiphenomenal. And to resist the related claims that if you're doing "real"
philosophy, you're examining the core of human existence, and that race and gender aren't
important or they are secondary. I think that's changed a lot, but around 25 years ago when I
was going through grad school, and even as a young assistant professor, that was definitely a
fight that had to be waged. If you were talking about gender or race, it was supposedly a fad. I
think a lot of that has changed now, but there are still pockets in philosophy where one has to
argue for something like a weaving model rather than a core model. The self is a fabric that's
woven together out of different strands, and some of them are more prominent strands and
some are minor. It's admittedly not an even playing field where every strand constitutes you in
the same way, but there's no core that's neutral or separate from the strands that make you up.
It's a very different model of the self than a core-periphery model.

RC: But, if we consider embodiment - or bodies actually - as compared to the constructing of

emotions, the body is actually something less constructible, or something real. So it feels like if
we don't have a neutral core, actually, we have this body... ?

Sullivan: That's a great question, although I want to push to say even our literal bodies get
constituted in these transactional ways. The Physiology book takes up that claim in a very
detailed way. That's not to say that we can't find some generalities about human embodiment,
such as we all have to eat or we'll die. But the minute you take that beyond some sort of simple
platitude and start talking about it in some very concrete ways- about the food that constitutes
us- then the core model is inadequate. For example, I have a chapter in the Physiology book on
the gut as a site of resistance to taking in the world in certain ways (and I'm greatly influenced
here by the work of Elizabeth Wilson) . There's a huge connection between what I call gut habits
and gut character. In that chapter, I examine, for example, how there is a significant connection
between women's guts and incidents of sexual assault and sexual trauma that are gendered. It
doesn't mean sexual assault happens only to women or to feminized people, but this doesn't
change the fact that gendered patterns exist regarding sexual assault. And this is where
philosophy needs to catch up with a lot of material in the health sciences, because this has been
known in the health sciences for the last 10 or 15 years. As for the gut - I'm literally talking
about intestines and stomachs- it's the largest section of our body that's exposed to the outside
world, more than the skin, and doctors will talk about the outside world coming into and
passing out of your body via your gut. This is the site of exposure and a kind of dynamic
interaction with the world in terms of what you're taking in and what you are- what's forming
you, and then what you're giving back to the world. I want to talk about bodies as sites of
habits, as physiological habits that are dynamically constituted in ways that are durable and
plastic. We can find a transactional relationship developing physiological habits that are shaped
by a world that's full of racist and sexist oppression, which helps form biologically unconscious
habits. This is a kind of affective shaping in response to the world on the level of our
physiological embodiment. Here again is where William James becomes important for tightly
connecting movements and changes in the physiological body and with the effects of sexism,
racism, and other forms of trauma.

Sullivan: I don't know that all of this quickly or easily translates over to talking to a broader
public, although I do think it can in part. The Physiology book weaves in very concrete case
studies, and it opens with a concrete example of a physiological affective sense of pain or
struggle, and unpacks it in ways that get to more theoretical points. On this question, I have to r-1....,......,.
admit that one of the things I'm proudest of is that Good White People was named Ms. Magazine
Best Feminist Read for 2014 and a CHOICE academic outstanding title for the same year. That
meant I was able to talk to both scholarly audiences and public audiences. A broader audience
could pick up the book and feel like they got something important out of it. That is somewhat
ironic because getting that book published was one of the hardest things I've ever done in my
entire life. I don't mean writing the book - I was writing it, rewriting it, and revising it for
several years - but the process of dealing with the pushback I got on the manuscript. I thought,
"This book will never ever be published, it will never see the light of day," because I got such
strong pushback.

JS: Do you find that that happens often in your work? Because I know when we were
discussing your article on white priority, there was a lot of discussion about whether it's good to
talk about white priority when talking to a non-academic audience . But is it useful academically
to separate out these terms? We had a lot of conversations regarding how we speak to a public
audience and how we speak in academia . And should there be different conversations
happening?

Sullivan: I think the answer has to be "yes." There have to be places where you can move fast,
when using technical terms don 't feel like jargon, because people know what you 're talking
about and you can move quickly and you can do more things that way. But I think it's also
really important that there be spaces where one is intentionally trying to reach a broader
audience. And there are a lot of times where those hopefully overlap. Context really matters,
and paying attention to one's audience really matters, whether you're teaching or writing. It's
wonderful when sometimes you can speak to multiple audiences at once, but I wouldn't want to
insist upon that. There may be times when that doesn't work and you may need different tools
in your toolkit and different ways of going at things.

But if I go back to white priority, the worry I have is whether we really need another
term. We've got white privilege. We've got white supremacy. We've got white fragility. And now
we've got white priority, and this can sound like a mere proliferation of terms. The answer may
be that an additional term doesn't turn out to be very helpful. One has to be experimental and
see what works. However, I think harm is done if the term white privilege gets overused in
ways that don't pay attention to the differences in how privilege cashes out in different people's
lives. That's not to let white people off the hook. But I think the pushback that we're increasingly
seeing regarding white privilege needs to be taken seriously in a critical way. Otherwise the
concept of white privilege might seem to be about an elite set of white people beating down
other white people with a stick, shaming and ridiculing them. We still need the concept of white
privilege, but we've got to nuance the way we're thinking about whiteness.

Gut Feelings

SB: Can you talk more about the resistance you get to your work particularly with Good White

People? You mentioned there was a lot of pushback. It was difficult to get published. What sort
of pushback did you get? And why do you think Good White People received more of that than
your other work?

Sullivan: When that book was going through the review process, it received very strong
reviews: really positive and really negative, not much in between. The negative reviews
effectively said, "Who cares what white people feel? Don't they need to go change the world?" I
had to fight an uphill battle to establish that talking about emotions and affect had any kind of
political relevance. Thankfully, I don't feel like I have to fight that fight anymore- that if I want
to talk about affect or emotion, it could be connected to work in political philosophy. Then, once
I got past that hurdle and when I criticized white guilt and shame, I received strong responses
that were concerned that this was a kind of white supremacy in disguise. Or, even if that wasn't
my intention, that I was really naive and didn't understand that my arguments were supporting
or espousing white supremacy. To go then from criticizing guilt and shame to talking about a
form of white self-love as an alternative to white shame, well, that confirmed all the worst fears
of some of my critics.

For example, someone told me when I was at SPEP [the Society for Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy] presenting some earlier work that fed into the book that there was a
person in the audience who leaned over and said, "Next thing you know, she's gonna put on a
white hood," referring to the Ku Klux Klan. This happened as I was reading the paper. I will
admit that the book takes a lot of risks in saying that the comfortable divides we have between
the white supremacists, that is, the bad white people over here, and the good ones over there
who are anti-racist- that there are not really such sharp lines and that we cannot be confident
where those lines are. For that reason, we need a lot of rethinking of strategies and tactics. But
once you blur that line, it presents a difficult epistemological issue. How do you know for sure
that you're not furthering a white supremacist agenda? And the answer is we cannot. The
attempt to know that with certainty and to be really sure you're not doing that- I worry that
often becomes an agenda of protecting yourself as a good white person rather than actually
figuring out how we might rethink the problem of racial injustice and make some headway on
it. It's pretty clear we haven't made much headway. That was true when the book was written
and it is still true now. If you start blurring the line between the good and the bad, it's
epistemologically and morally risky- even though I very explicitly argue in the book that this is
not an argument saying to give up on the good white people, "Go be a bad white person
because there's no difference." Nonetheless, some of the responses I received took the position
that once you blur that line, you're just like the white supremacists, and not only that, you also
open the way for all the white supremacists to stand as legitimate. That was one concern, and it
equated to the claim, "Well, maybe because you didn't care about that line, you really weren't a
good one after all." Your so-called true colors are showing. So, finishing that book was a very
emotionally, affectively, and existentially difficult process.

~~~~

JS: We're talking about how you 're getting a lot of pushback on ideas concerning affect in the

early 2010s. You might not be able to answer this, but what do you think has changed either
academically or socially and politically that has allowed for that shift towards accepting ideas of
affect, or being turned towards it?

Sullivan: I'm not sure. I have a couple of guesses. There has been work going on in affect
studies and affect theory in fields outside of philosophy for a long time. So, some of it feels like
philosophy is late to catch up . We're still trying to figure out that we have bodies half the time,
for example. And there are other things such as when Martha Nussbaum published her book
Political Emotions: Why Love Is Important for Justice. Not that Nussbaum is hostile to feminism,
but she's not a feminist philosopher, she's a political philosopher who works in ancient
philosophy. When you get folks outside of the "fringe" group of feminist and critical race
philosophers who are publishing major works with major presses that deal with emotion or
affect, now suddenly it's okay in philosophy.

RC: I have a question that goes back to the feedback you received about Good White People.
When we discussed the book in our class, we also had separate opinions, like, "If we want to
make political change we should make people cry, we should make people feel ashamed,"
which is just like the approach you are criticizing in your book. Another approach is that, "If
you want other people to hear your pain, you should first hear their pain." So it's like trying to
see even racist white people as emotional beings, to see them a.s persons with affects. So I feel
like your book is trying to say, "OK, we have enough of the first approach. Now we should do
something about the second approach."

Sullivan: I do think that something like guilt and shame can be the result of being a white
person and confronting that wall of ignorance. There are so many ways in the United States that
people don't learn about this stuff and their families don't talk about it. I think back to
childhood again: there are very few practices or habits in white, "normal," good white families,
where the pattern tends to be: if you talk about race, you talk about people of color. To talk
about whiteness and how it functions is very uncomfortable for most white people because it's
not something they are used to doing. And if you do talk about whiteness, that tends to mark
you as being one of the bad white people. So the safe thing to do is not talking about it at all. I'm
not saying white people will never feel guilty qr ashamed when they learn about wrongdoings,
both personally and in their families, and I also think of the long histories of white supremacy
and white privilege in different countries. But cultivating white guilt and shame as the marker
of how you've become enlightened to the fact that white privilege exists- I'm concerned that
doesn't have much to do with actually trying to fight racism but instead with protecting your
moral reputation.

Sullivan: I think one of the biggest dangers is that the pushback against Trump will be merely a
push to return to where the nation was before he was elected. I'm worried about the pushback
of good white people who want to ensure that we get white privilege in the form of "good"
rather than "bad" whiteness back in place. I recognize that Trump's election had a lot to do with
Obama, that is, with the fact that there was a black man in the White House. But my worry is
that anti-Trump energy is trying to go back to where w e were before, when we "knew" who the
bad white people were and they were kept in their place, so to speak- that's very problematic. I
don't know if there's another backlash coming. I think it's too early to tell. But the fact that there
is resistance to Trump does not necessarily mean that it's going to tackle some of these other
problems. It's not just that the choices are stale, "Accept a Trump-era or try to return to a
pre-Trump-era." They also are harmful. There have got to be some different ways to live as a
white person. There have got to be some different options both personally and politically. How
we create those different ways of living is going to be hard, and it's going to be risky. But if the
pushback against Trump is merely returning to the colorblind days of a supposedly post-racial
Obama era, we're in trouble.

Sullivan: The question that I want to get away from is: "Is race real?" That and similar
questions have dominated critical philosophy of race for a long time. I know that's not true in
other fields where critical race theory is done. In philosophy, however, we've exhausted that
question. I also think we need to confront the vicious feedback that public philosophers
sometimes receive. I'm thinking of George Yancy, an African American philosopher who ran a
series in "The Stone" in the New York Times on race, and in December of 2016 he published an
editorial the New York Times called "Dear White America." He also has a book coming out in
April of 2018 called Backlash: What Happens When We Talk Honestly about Race. The massive
amount of vile and threatening things that were sent to him in the wake of "Dear White
America" is mind-blowing, and as a result Yancy had to have police presence with him when he
was on campus for a while. Is this what critical philosophers writing about race have in store for
them? Yancy has received support from academics, and the American Philosophical Association
recently published a statement in support of him and other public philosophers. But the episode
has a chilling effect. Yancy isn't going to back down, he's going to keep doing the work he does.
But when you see what got thrown at him ...

I've heard a lot of people, including graduate students, pull back and say, "Why be a
public philosopher?" or, "If you 're going to be a public philosopher, why talk about race, why
go there, why risk yourself and your family?" It would be really easy to go back to abstractly
analyzing whether race is real or not. Or for young scholars to decide, "You know, I don't need
to write my dissertation on that topic, I don't need to have my first publications in that area. I've
got to get a job, I've got to get tenure, I don't need that controversy, and so I'll just step back"? It
reminds me a little bit of a book by John McCumber called Time in the Ditch, which examines the
McCarthy era after World War II, what happened in the academic world, and particularly how
that shaped what happened in philosophy. He also discusses the type of philosophy that was
institutionalized in academic departments, and the kind of philosophy that got shut down. I
didn't know this before reading McCumber's book, but philosophers were the main academics
fired or otherwise harassed in the McCarthy era; philosophy was the primary discipline that
was targeted. And so, there was a huge pullback away from doing anything connected to
social-political issues. McCarthyism was very effective in shaping the discipline. And now my
worry is: what kind of chilling effect are attacks on public philosophers going to have on the
discipline, and not just philosophers but other scholars talking about difficult social political
questions? It might seem easy to brush it off and call the 1950s "that strange McCarthy era," but
similar things could happen again.

